We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. We also formulate a notion of incentive compatibility suitable for coalitional models and study it in relation to equilibria.
Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
Francesca Centrone;
2019-01-01
Abstract
We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. We also formulate a notion of incentive compatibility suitable for coalitional models and study it in relation to equilibria.File in questo prodotto:
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