In this paper we focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, we extend the classical notion of criticality of players in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to the collusion with other players.
Orders of Criticality in Voting Games
FRAGNELLI, Vito;
2016-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, we extend the classical notion of criticality of players in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to the collusion with other players.File in questo prodotto:
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