In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster's procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure
FRAGNELLI, Vito
2012-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster's procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.File in questo prodotto:
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