We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures; (b) the process of coalition formation is treated as endogenous. To this end we introduce the definition of stable coalition structure value allocation and provide, under standard hypotheses, a preliminary existence result for the three - player case in an exchange economy.

Value Allocations in economies with coalition structure

CENTRONE, Francesca;
2008-01-01

Abstract

We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures; (b) the process of coalition formation is treated as endogenous. To this end we introduce the definition of stable coalition structure value allocation and provide, under standard hypotheses, a preliminary existence result for the three - player case in an exchange economy.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11579/27403
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