We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability a la Hart and Kurz (1983) into the classical Shapley lambda-transfer value. Precisely, our analysis proceeds by first dening a new solution concept, the lambda-transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.
Coalition formation in games without side payments
CENTRONE, Francesca;
2008-01-01
Abstract
We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability a la Hart and Kurz (1983) into the classical Shapley lambda-transfer value. Precisely, our analysis proceeds by first dening a new solution concept, the lambda-transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.File in questo prodotto:
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