Philosophical Methods Explored: Thought Experiments, Paradoxes, and Hypothetical Scenarios

This dissertation contributes to metaphilosophy by examining two central tools in philosophical methodology: thought experiments and paradoxes. Both have shaped philosophical inquiry from antiquity to contemporary analytic philosophy, prompting foundational questions about their nature, function, and epistemic value. Despite their widespread use, the definitions and roles of thought experiments and paradoxes remain contested, with unresolved theoretical challenges. The first section of the dissertation addresses these definitional and classificatory issues. It critiques the standard view of paradoxes, proposing a socially grounded redefinition, and challenges the rigid distinction between paradoxes and thought experiments by highlighting their structural and functional overlap. The second section explores the role of hypothetical scenarios in both tools. It argues for the epistemic and dialectical importance of scenarios in paradoxes and examines how deviant interpretations of thought experiments can be mitigated through a combination of semantic, pragmatic, and psychological strategies. The dissertation adopts a paper-based structure, with each chapter offering a self-contained investigation that collectively advances two central ideas: first, that thought experiments and paradoxes are indispensable to philosophical practice; second, that their similarities—often overlooked—warrant a unified metaphilosophical analysis. By reframing existing debates and offering novel conceptual tools, this work aims to clarify and deepen our understanding of these influential instruments of philosophical thought.