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
Aristotelica

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IGNACIO DE RIBERA-MARTIN

NEW LIGHT ON THE NOTION OF *ENTELECHEIA*:
TWO WAYS OF HAVING SOUL IN
THE *GENERATION OF ANIMALS*

Abstract

The philosophical relevance of Aristotle's distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*, which is unique to the *Generation of Animals*, has not been properly appreciated. In this paper, I show how this distinction is important in two ways. First, only the mode of having soul in *dunamis* is adequate to articulate the peculiar way in which embryos have the soul-principle. Second, this distinction also casts light on Aristotle's coinage of the word *entelecheia*: since there is more than one way of having a principle, it is fitting to coin a word to capture the complete mode of having a principle.

Keywords

Aristotle, *Dunamis*, *Entelecheia*,
Energeia, Soul, Embryo, Generation

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Introduction

Aristotle uses the notions of potentiality or capacity (δύναμις), as well as those of fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) and activity (ἐνέργεια),¹ to articulate various modes of being and to contrast them with one another.² For example, he says that the soul is an *entelecheia* of the first kind,³ that motion is an incomplete *energeia*,⁴ and that bronze – rather than earth – is already a statue in *dunamis*.⁵ By means of these notions, Aristotle can describe a wide range of modes of being in the natural world, which include not only subjects (e.g., a statue, an animal, a seed), but also their activities (e.g., generation, sensation) and their principles (e.g., soul, powers).

The literature on Aristotle's account of modes of being has focused on key passages from *De an.* II 1 and II 5, *Phys.* III 1-2, *Nic. Eth.* X 4, and *Metaph.* IX.⁶ However, in these discussions no attention has been paid to the distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia* in Aristotle's *Generation of Animals* (*GA*), a distinction that is unique to this treatise.⁷ While this distinction has not gone unnoticed by commentators interested in Aristotle's biology,⁸ its relevance for the particular mode of

¹ Since I will be using these terms frequently, from now on I will simply transliterate them, leaving them unitalicized.

² Commentators refer to these modes of being with others phrases, such as levels of potentiality and of fulfillment (Johansen 2012a, p. 21); levels of realization (Kosman 2013, p. 57); and ways of being (Beere 2009, p. 171).

³ *De an.* II 1.412b4-6.

⁴ *Phys.* III 2.201b31-32.

⁵ *Metaph.* IX 7.1049a17-18.

⁶ For example, see Chung-Hwan (1958) pp. 12-7; Blair (1967) pp. 101-17; Kosman (1969) pp. 40-62; Mamo (1970) pp. 24-33; Couloubaritsis (1985) pp. 129-55; Menn (2002) pp. 28-90; Burnyeat (2008) pp. 219-92; Beere (2009); Johansen (2012b) pp. 209-20; and Kosman (2013).

⁷ Although on a few occasions Aristotle uses the phrase having in *dunamis* elsewhere (e.g. *De an.* II 1.412a27-28 and *Metaph.* VII 9.1034a33-b1), it is only in the *GA* that he mentions its counterpart having in *energeia* and draws an articulated distinction between these two modes of being.

⁸ See, for example: Morsink (1982) pp. 114-9; Carraro (2017) pp. 274-304 and 288-94; Connell (2016) pp. 146-7; and Lefebvre (2020) pp. 101-23.

being of the soul principle of a developing⁹ animal embryo (from now on, I will refer to it simply as embryo) has not been recognized.¹⁰

In this paper, I will show how we need the *GA* distinction to describe the mode of being of the soul of an embryo. Embryos have soul, but not in the same way in which a fully generated animal has soul. The more familiar distinctions between having and exercising (in *De anima*) and between being in *dunamis* and being in *energeia* (in the *Metaphysics*) cannot be used to articulate adequately this peculiar mode of being of the soul of an embryo. We need the *GA* distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia* to answer the question: does the embryo have soul?

Further, I will show how this distinction may also elucidate Aristotle's coinage of the word *entelecheia*. Why not simply use the familiar existing word ἔξις (the noun from the Greek verb ἔχειν, which means to have), instead of coining such a complicated new word as *entelecheia*, to refer to the principle of a living substance? Since the mode of having the principle in the embryo and in the fully generated animal is different – the former having the principle in *dunamis* while the latter in a complete way (ἐντελής) – it appears fitting to refer to the latter mode of having as *entelecheia*, and not simply as ἔξις. I will propose that *entelecheia* corresponds to the mode of having soul in *energeia* in a generated animal, in contrast to the incomplete mode of having soul (in *dunamis*) that we find in an embryo.

The paper is divided into four sections. First, I will present the *GA* distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia* (Section 1). Then, in the next two sections, I will compare the *GA* distinction with the *De anima* distinction between having and exercising (Section 2) and with the *Metaphysics*' distinction between being in *dunamis* and being in *energeia* (Section 3) respectively. This comparison will help relate the *GA* distinction to these two more familiar distinctions and to show its uniqueness. Finally, I will explain how the distinction from the *GA* may shed light on Aristotle's coinage of the term *entelecheia*.

⁹ That is, *while* the embryo is actually developing towards completion. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same goes for seed of plants that are already developing.

¹⁰ This distinction is also relevant for understanding Aristotle's Homonymy Principle. See De Ribera-Martin (2019b).

1. *Having in dunamis and Having in energeia in Aristotle's GA*

Aristotle is concerned with seeds in different treatises of his corpus.¹¹ It is only in the *GA*, however, that he directly addresses the question of whether a seed has the internal formal principle, that is, the soul. In *GA* II 1, he says:

It is evident both that the seed [σπέρμα] has soul and that it is in *dunamis* [καὶ ἔχει καὶ ἔστι δυνάμει]. And something can be closer or further away from itself in *dunamis* [ἐγγυτέρω δὲ καὶ πορρωτέρω αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι δυνάμει], just as the sleeping geometer is farther away from the waking geometer, and as the latter, in turn, is farther away from the one who is theorizing. Thus, no part of the seed is the cause of the generation, but rather that which has moved first from without. For nothing generates [γεννᾷ] itself by itself. But when it has been generated, it already grows itself by itself [ὅταν δὲ γένηται αὖξει ἤδη αὐτὸ ἑαυτό]. (*GA* II 1.735a8-14)¹²

In this passage, Aristotle uses the adverbial phrase being in *dunamis* (cf. ἔστι δυνάμει and εἶναι δυνάμει).¹³ This phrase is based on the verb to be. However, he also uses another, different adverbial phrase, which is instead based on the verb to have. He says that the seed has soul in *dunamis* (ἔχει ... δυνάμει).¹⁴

Aristotle explains that at some point the seed is ready to grow by itself, while before it is not. As we know from the context of *GA* II 1 and elsewhere, by growing itself by itself (αὖξει ... αὐτὸ ἑαυτό) Aristotle does not mean the accidental change of growth in size, but the coming to be of the organs that were not present before.¹⁵ There is still a good deal of generation ahead until the seed becomes a complete animal. This path discloses successive modes of being, closer or farther away from the fully generated animal.¹⁶

¹¹ Cf., for example, *Phys.* I 7.190b3-5; *De an.* II 1.412b26-27; and *Metaph.* IX 7.1049a1-18.

¹² All English translations from Aristotle are my own.

¹³ Aristotle uses this phrase in *Metaph.* IX 7.1049a14-16, as we will see later on.

¹⁴ Just a few lines above, he uses a similar phrase, saying that the progenitor has the form in *energeia* (ἐχούσης τὸ εἶδος ἐνεργείᾳ). Cf. *GA* II 1.735a4.

¹⁵ For the distinction between growth in size and generative growth, see De Ribera-Martin (2019c). While it falls outside the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to study how this notion of growing itself by itself in the *GA* can be related to Aristotle's discussion of the difference between moving by itself and moving itself in *Phys.* VIII 4. For this purpose, see Graham (1999) pp. 74-9.

¹⁶ As Aristotle explains, a living substance gradually advances towards its own fulfillment (τέλος) through different modes of being that succeed one another. Cf., for example,

It can be objected that, based on this passage alone, it is not certain that Aristotle is using the phrase having soul in *dunamis*. This observation is fair. I have purposely tried to convey this ambiguity in the translation: “that the seed has soul and that [it] is in *dunamis* (καὶ ἔχει καὶ ἔστι δυνάμει).” The subject of ‘being in *dunamis*’, namely ‘it’, is only implicit, and it can be interpreted as referring either to the seed or to the soul. If the former is the case, then we do not have here the phrase having soul in *dunamis*. Furthermore, given Aristotle’s use of the word seed (σπέρμα) to refer both to seeds at rest and to embryos, we may wonder in which of these two senses he is using the word in this passage.¹⁷

In sum, this passage from *GA* II 1 seems to be using the phrase having soul in *dunamis*, but it still leaves us with some open questions:¹⁸ whether the subject of the phrase is the seed at rest or the embryo; whether Aristotle has in mind only the nutritive soul or also the other kinds of soul; and whether Aristotle is, in fact, using the phrase having soul in *dunamis*. Let us turn to another passage from the *GA* to address these questions.

In *GA* II 3, Aristotle takes up again the question of whether seeds (σπέρματα) and embryos (κυήματα)¹⁹ have soul. In this context, he says:

It is evident that we must say that the seeds and the embryos [τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰ κυήματα] that are not yet separated have nutritive soul in *dunamis*, but not in *energeia* [τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ... ὅτι δυνάμει μὲν ἔχοντα θετέον, ἐνεργείᾳ δ’ οὐκ ἔχοντα] until (as those embryos that are separated) they draw the food and do the work of such a soul. First, it seems that such things live the life of a plant. Next, it is evident that the same must be said regarding the sensitive soul and the rational soul, for [the seeds and the embryos] must necessarily

Metaph. IX 8.1050a4-16; *GA* II 1.733a11-12; and *GA* II 4.740a3. This end is prior in substance, while last in genesis. Cf. *Phys.* VIII 8.261a13-20 and *GA* II 6.742a16-22. Yet not every last stage (τὸ ἔσχατον) is a fulfillment (τέλος), as for example death (cf. *Phys.* II 2.194a30-33).

¹⁷ Aristotle uses the word seed (σπέρμα) to refer not only to the seeds of plants and to the progenitors’ separate contributions to generation, i.e., the gametes, but also to the substance that results from the interaction of the two gametes, i.e., the κυήμα or embryo. See De Ribera-Martin (2019a).

¹⁸ For other important questions, which are not relevant to our purposes, see De Ribera-Martin (2019c) pp. 230-1.

¹⁹ For the range and complexity of the word *kuêma* in Aristotle’s *Generation of Animals*, see De Ribera-Martin (2019a).

have all [kinds of soul] in *dunamis* before having them in *energeia* [πάσας γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον δυνάμει πρότερον ἔχειν ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ]. (*GA* II 3.736b8-15)

Concerning the soul [ψυχῆς], therefore, it has been explained how the embryos and the seminal fluid have it [πῶς ἔχει τὰ κυήματα καὶ ἡ γονή], and how they do not have it: for they have it in *dunamis*, but they do not have it in *energeia* [δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐκ ἔχει]. (*GA* II 3.737a16-18)

In these two passages, Aristotle is using without any ambiguity the adverbial phrases having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*. Furthermore, as we see in the first passage, this distinction concerns the different powers of the soul (not just the nutritive, but the sensitive power as well). And it is also clear from the phrase ‘seeds and embryos’ that he is thinking of the embryo when he says that it has soul in *dunamis*, for the embryo (κυῆμα) is the first mixture of the male and female contributions, and it already has the two principles of generation.²⁰ The embryo already has the active generative principle from the male, which enables it to generate and grow by its own internal principle into a complete animal.

As Preus explains when commenting on this passage, to say that something has soul in *dunamis* is not simply a tricky way of saying that it does not have it.²¹ While both the seed at rest (before the two gametes unite) and the embryo are in *dunamis* with respect to the generated animal, there is a radical ontological difference between the two. The former is not yet an animal in *dunamis*, while the latter is already an animal in a real way, albeit in *dunamis*. This is so because the former lacks a sensitive soul, while the latter has one.²²

In another passage from *GA* II 5, Aristotle uses a similar adverbial phrase: “soul being present in *dunamis*”. He explains that the female cannot generate by herself because menses lack the active principle from the male. In this context, Aristotle says that “it is impossible that face or hand or flesh

²⁰ See, for example, *GA* I 18.724b12-22; I 20.728b32-34; and II 3.737a29-33.

²¹ Cf. Preus (1975) p. 79.

²² Preus also invites us to compare this passage with Aristotle’s definition of the soul in *De an.* II 1, where Aristotle uses the same phrase applied to life: the soul is the first *entelecheia* of a body having life potentially (δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος). In the same way in which we do not say that there is no life in the body because it has life in *dunamis*, Preus argues, we should not say that there is no soul in the fetus because it has the soul in *dunamis* (Preus 1975, pp. 79-80).

exist (or any other part) when the sensitive soul is not internally present either in *energeia* or in *dunamis* [μὴ ἐνοῦσης αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει], and either in some qualified way or simply.” (*GA* II 5.741a10-12). Once again, Aristotle implies that there is more than one way of having soul.

By means of the distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*, Aristotle can offer an account of generation that avoids the two extremes of preformationism (all parts are already present from the outset; they merely grow) and of supervenience of form (the form is not present from the outset, but only supervenes at the end, when the change is completed). According to Aristotle, from the beginning, the embryo already has the principle, namely, the soul, but not yet the necessary organic parts of the body, which must be generated;²³ by the end of the generation, the animal can exercise all the proper functions because the relevant material parts have been completed.²⁴

Thus, Aristotle’s account in the *GA*, following the paradoxical nature of generation, discloses a tension between having soul and being able to exercise its powers. As we will see in Section 2, this tension is not apparent in the *De anima* II 1 and II 5, where to have (ἔχειν) appears sufficient to be able to exercise (ἐνεργεῖν): the knower who has knowledge is able to put it to work whenever he wants. By contrast, this tension does appear in *Metaphysics* IX 7. As we will see in Section 3, the seed that *is* already an animal in *dunamis* – but not yet an animal in *energeia* – is the seed that already *has* the principle of generation (i.e., the soul), namely, the embryo (κυῆμα).²⁵ Both the embryo and the fully generated animal *have* soul, but only the latter can exercise all the activities proper to the animal. Thus, according to this passage of the *Metaphysics*, it is not the case that having soul is sufficient to have the *dunamis*

²³ The lack of the proper organs affects the mode of being of the soul, but not its presence. The phrase ‘having soul (but) in *dunamis*’ allows us to say that the embryo has soul (the soul is present) and, *at the same time*, that the soul cannot fully perform its activity.

²⁴ It would be worth studying the relation between incomplete having and impeded having. I wonder if we could regard the incompleteness of the developing seed as a sort of impediment to its own soul, and generation as a sort of removal of that impediment. De Haas explores Neoplatonic readings of Aristotle’s account of learning as a sort of removal of impediments, thus bringing Aristotle’s account closer to Plato’s account of recollection. See De Haas (2000).

²⁵ See De Ribera-Martin (2019a) pp. 119-21.

to exercise all the functions. Beere has pointed out the paradoxical nature of this mode of being in *dunamis*. He says [my italics]:

The problem is that the human being in capacity, as here described, appears to have no place in an Aristotelian ontology, for it would have to fulfill incompatible conditions. On the one hand, the human being in capacity has to have the principle in virtue of which it becomes a human being. This principle is the human form. ... On the other hand, the human being in capacity is not a human being in *energeia*, but merely in capacity. Thus it would seem that *Aristotle here allows that there is something that has the form of human being, and is a material composite of that form and some correlative matter, and yet is only in capacity, not in energeia, a human being.*²⁶

Beere sketches some suggestions as to how this ontological problem may be addressed from the point of view ofhylomorphism,²⁷ but he does not refer to the *GA* distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia* to articulate the two different ways in which the embryo and the fully generated animal have the internal principle of soul. Preus raises a similar question when commenting on *GA* II 3:

Two interrelated problems arise from this interpretation: (i) Can it be ever proper, within or without Aristotle's system, to say that something has a power which it cannot exercise *now*? (ii) Is it not self-contradictory to say that something has a soul (defined as first *entelecheia*) but does not have it in *energeia*?²⁸

Preus briefly addresses these two questions, suggesting that powers may be present and still in need of other preconditions before they can be actualized.

²⁶ Beere (2008) pp. 254-5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 255-8. The first solution he considers is to allow that in certain cases something may have the form of the human being but not the matter of the human being, as occurs, for example, at the early stages of the fetus. The second solution, compatible with the first, is to distinguish various kinds of composition: complete (when something is no longer simply in *dunamis*) and incomplete (when something is still in *dunamis*). Interestingly, as Beere explains, both proposed solutions deny the principle that according to Aristotle having the form of *X* is sufficient to be an *X* in *energeia* (*ibid.*, p. 256). Besides, the first solution, by allowing for the human form to be present without its correlative matter being present, denies another principle that interpreters often attribute to Aristotle, namely, that the form can only be present in the right sort of matter (*ibid.*). Denying this principle does not mean that just any matter will do, as Beere himself explains. But it would allow the human form to be present, for example, in blood, and not just in flesh and bones.

²⁸ Preus (1975) p. 80.

He also says, that “the supposed contradiction between the presence of an *entelecheia* and the absence of an *energeia* may be resolved by the specification of the precise *entelecheia* and *energeia* involved in the discussion.”²⁹ I think this is fine point, which may be presented in an even sharper way by replacing *entelecheia* with having (ἔχειν): *the supposed contradiction may be resolved by specifying the relevant way of having that is at stake*. In other words, the (apparently) single mode of having soul in *De anima* is now divided into two modes of having soul. And depending on the mode of being in which the soul is had, the substance has or lacks the *dunamis* to exercise the relevant activities.

Recent studies have explained which functions can, and cannot, be performed by the embryo in this mode of having soul in *dunamis* at this juncture of the embryological development.³⁰ My purpose in this section has rather been to show how the distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*, unique to the *GA*, *must* be used to articulate the different ways in which the embryo and the complete animal have the internal principle: both have soul, but the embryo has soul only in *dunamis*.

In the following two sections, I will compare Aristotle’s *GA* distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*, on the one hand, with the more familiar distinction between having and exercising in *De anima*, and with the *Metaphysics*’ distinction between being in *dunamis* and being in *energeia*, on the other. These two comparisons will serve to relate the *GA* to better-known Aristotelian distinctions, and, at the same time, to show how the *GA* distinction is necessary and unique to this treatise.

2. *Having and Exercising in De anima II 1 and II 5*

In *De an.* II 1, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of *entelecheia*: the first, analogous to sleep, is described as having knowledge without currently exercising it (ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν); the second, analogous to being awake, corresponds to exercising that knowledge.³¹ The soul, Aristotle says, is an *entelecheia* of

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ See, in particular, Carraro (2017) pp. 288-94; and Connell (2016) pp. 146-7.

³¹ Cf. *De an.* II 1.412a9-11.22-26.

the first kind, while the body that is capable of living is the one that has a soul. In contrast, the seed and the fruit are such a body only in *dunamis*.³² It is important to note that the seed that Aristotle is considering here is *not* the embryo, but rather the seed prior to fertilization, before the generation has started.³³

In *De an.* II 5, on the other hand, Aristotle explains that we call not only someone currently engaged in the activity of knowing a knower (ἐπιστήμων, 417a23), but also someone not using his knowledge; and even someone who does not yet know, provided that person is able to acquire knowledge at some point. The knower who already has the knowledge and is exercising it is the primary instance of what it is to be a knower (ἐντελεχεία ὧν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος): that person is a knower according to the mode of *energeia* (κατ' ἐνέργειαν).³⁴ The other two are knowers according to the mode of *dunamis* (κατὰ δύναμιν), but they differ from one another: one is capable of knowing because that person can be taught, the other because that person already has the knowledge and thus is able to exercise it whenever he wants.³⁵ Aristotle does not have a specific name for each kind of *dunamis*, but he illustrates this distinction by contrasting the mode of being of a boy and that of an adult as regards the exercise of warfare.³⁶

The second mode of *dunamis* and the mode of *energeia* of *De an.* II 5 correspond to Aristotle's distinction between the first kind of *entelecheia* and the other kind of *entelecheia* in *De an.* II 1 respectively. A threefold

³² Cf. *De an.* II 1.412b25-413a2.

³³ Polansky (2007) pp. 166-7. See also Johansen (2012a) p. 32.

³⁴ Cf. *De an.* II 5.417a30 and b19.

³⁵ Cf. *De an.* II 5.417a21-b19.

³⁶ Cf. *De an.* II 5.417b29-418a3. Both the boy and the general are in *dunamis* with respect to the actual exercise of warfare, but in different ways. See Polansky (2007) pp. 244-5. In commenting on *De an.* II 5 (cf. 15.305.34-36), Philoponus refers to the two modes of *dunamis*, respectively, as according to suitability (κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα) and as according to habit (κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν). Cf. Philoponus (2005) p. 114. Philoponus also refers to the two modes of potentiality as first potentiality and second potentiality (διττὸν τὸ δυνάμει, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον). None of the four phrases used by Philoponus to describe the two modes of being in *dunamis* appears in Aristotle's text, but they are helpful and present in the Greek Aristotelian tradition. In the Latin tradition, we find the corresponding distinction between *dispositio* and *habitus*.

scheme emerges from relating these distinctions to one another.³⁷ Aristotle is describing the different modes of being by using primarily three words and their cognates: capacity or ability (δύναμις, δυνατός, δύνασθαι, κατὰ δύναμιν), having (ἔχειν, ἐντελέχεια, ἐντελεχεία ὦν), and exercising (ἐνεργεῖν, ἐνέργεια, κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἐνεργεία γίνονται). Here is an outline of the threefold scheme that emerges:

(1) Knower according to <i>dunamis</i>	- Does not have knowledge - Is <i>able to acquire</i> it by learning
(2) Knower according to <i>dunamis</i> Analogous to being-asleep	- <i>Has</i> knowledge - Is <i>able to exercise</i> that knowledge whenever he wants - Is not currently exercising that knowledge
(3) Knower according to <i>energeia</i> Analogous to being-awake	- Has knowledge - Is able to exercise that knowledge whenever he wants - Is currently <i>exercising</i> that knowledge

Mode (1) corresponds to the progenitors' gametes prior to their union: these seeds are not yet an animal, but only potentially an animal; they do not have the internal active principle of an animal.³⁸ Mode (2) corresponds to the animal that has been fully generated, an animal that has a soul and therefore the *dunamis* to exercise the vital functions of an animal.

But what about an embryo, which is *in the process of generation*? On the one hand, the embryo is essentially different from (1) the gametes, because the embryo already has soul and is no longer at rest, but actively developing by its own internal principle. On the other hand, there is also some difference between the embryo and (2) the fully generated animal, because the former is not yet able to exercise activities proper to the species. Now, the way Aristotle contrasts Modes (1) and (2) in *De an.* II 1 and II 5, presents

³⁷ As Burnyeat explains, *De an.* II 5's threefold distinction (two kinds of *dunamis*, and *energeia*) can be related to Aristotle's distinction between first and second *entelecheia* in *De an.* II 1, although in *De an.* II 5 Aristotle does not explicitly call *entelecheia* the second mode of *dunamis*, and he is extending the model of knowledge to the first mode of *dunamis*. Burnyeat calls the articulation of these distinctions the triple scheme (Burnyeat 2002, pp. 50-1). Menn refers to this scheme as the standard picture (Menn 1994, pp. 88-9).

³⁸ Being potentially an animal must be carefully distinguished from being an animal in *dunamis*. For example, the gametes are not an animal (either in *dunamis* or in *energeia*), but something (not a animal) that is potentially an animal. By contrast, the embryo is already an animal, albeit in *dunamis*.

having soul as sufficient for having the *dunamis* to exercise the proper living functions. This is not, however, the case with the embryo, which *already* has soul but does *not yet* have the *dunamis* to exercise all its proper activities. The embryo corresponds neither to Mode (1) nor to Mode (2), but rather seems to belong somewhere in-between these modes.³⁹

In *De an.* II 5, Aristotle does consider a mode of being between (1) and (2), namely, the transition from the former mode to the latter, as a foil to the mode of being of the activity of sensation. The former transition is exemplified by the acquisition of knowledge and by the acquisition of sensitive soul by the seed under the agency of the male progenitor.⁴⁰ Despite the complexities of this passage,⁴¹ Aristotle's main point is clear: the activity of sensation is neither a replacement nor a development, but a sort of special alteration (*ἀλλοιωσις τις*) different from both.⁴²

³⁹ This asymmetry may also be appreciated when we compare Aristotle's three knowers in *De an.* II 5 with the three knowers in *GA* II 1.735a8-14, the passage quoted earlier where Aristotle explains that something may be closer or farther way in *dunamis*. In *GA* II 1, *all three* knowers have knowledge (the one who has knowledge and is asleep; the one who has knowledge and is awake *but* is not currently exercising that knowledge; and the knower who has knowledge, is awake, *and* is currently using it). By contrast, in *DA* II 5, only the last two knowers have knowledge (the one who has knowledge and is asleep, and the one who has knowledge and is awake exercising it); the first knower has the ability to acquire the knowledge, but does not yet have the relevant knowledge. Further, in *GA* II 1, there is a knower who is awake but not exercising the knowledge, while in *De an.* II 5 the knower who is awake is also exercising the knowledge. This asymmetry suggests that there are *two* ways of having the knowledge, and not just one, in a knower who is not yet putting the knowledge to work.

⁴⁰ The sensitive power of soul is what defines an animal. See, for example, *GA* II 3.736a30-31.

⁴¹ For the complexities of this difficult chapter, see Burnyeat (2002). See also Bowin (2012) pp. 262-82. For the debates regarding how to interpret sensation as a special kind of alteration, see Caston (2005).

⁴² Cf. *De an.* II 5.417b18-19. On the one hand, sensation differs from ordinary alteration, in which one quality is replaced by its contrary, so that the former quality is lost rather than preserved; in this case, the alteration moves towards the contrary disposition (cf. *De an.* II 5.417b2-3.15). On the other hand, the activity of sensation also differs from another special kind of alteration, such as occurs in learning and the generation of the sensitive power, in which nothing is lost, but rather there is a preservation and development into itself and into its *entelecheia*; in this second case, the change is a development into a habit to which something was naturally disposed (cf. *De an.* II 5.417b3-7.16). Accordingly, three different kinds of alteration need to be distinguished, as Burnyeat explains. He refers to them, respectively, as ordinary alteration (replacement), unordinary alteration (development), and extraordinary alteration (exercise). Cf. Burnyeat (2002) p. 65.

For our purposes, the transition that is relevant is that between Mode (1) and Mode (2), which corresponds to the acquisition of the power of sensation by the seed. We are looking for a notion to articulate the mode of being of the embryo, a notion which seems to lie between these two modes of being. Aristotle explains [I add the numbers, which correspond to the modes]:

Thus, the first two knowers, who are knowers according to *dunamis*, come to be knowers in *energeia*, (1) one through the alteration that learning is ... (2) the other in another way: from (2) having the knowledge of arithmetic or grammar, but not exercising it, to (3) exercising it [ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ, εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν] ... And the first change [πρώτη μεταβολή] of the sense comes to be by the agency of the progenitor [ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννώντος], while once it has been generated, (2) it has already the power to sense [ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη] in the same way as knowledge is had. And (3) the actual exercise of sensation is said in the same way as theorizing. (*De an.* II 5.417a30-b19)

The generation of the sensitive power by the male progenitor, which Aristotle calls the first change (πρώτη μεταβολή),⁴³ lies between Mode (1) to Mode (2). This change, however, is an *activity* (generation) rather than the *subject*⁴⁴ of the activity (the embryo) or its active *principle* (the soul). Furthermore, in

⁴³ There are two ways to interpret πρώτη μεταβολή in this passage: as contrasted to the exercise of sensation or as contrasted to a second and third subsequent changes within the generation and prior to its completion (cf. *GA* II 1.733b13-16 and III 9.758a32-b16.21-27). It is thus not clear whether when Aristotle says “once it has been generated (ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ)” he refers to the birth of the animal (as most translators and commentators interpret) or to some earlier stage in the process of the generation, after conception but prior to birth, as Johansen explains. I think that Johansen is right when he says that the existence of *two* stages (conception and the development from conception to birth) in the acquisition of a capacity is suggested by Aristotle’s language at 417b16-18 (cf. Johansen 2012a, p. 140). In fact, Aristotle is using the verb γεννάω (to generate, in the transitive sense). For the purpose of this paper we need not settle this matter.

⁴⁴ It is important to distinguish these two aspects of change, as Anagnostopoulos does. See Anagnostopoulos (2017) pp. 170-209. He argues that changes and other activities can be distinguished by two different criteria, which he calls the telic structure criterion (based on the structure of the activities themselves), found in *Metaph.* X 6 and *Eth. Nic.* X 4, on the one hand, and the subject criterion (based on the kind of thing the activity is an activity of – namely, its subject), on the other. According to the former, changes are exclusive of their ends, and thus incomplete activities, while, according to the latter, changes are the activities of incomplete subjects. Anagnostopoulos argues that the subject criterion is more fundamental than the telic criterion (*ibid.*, pp. 171-2).

as already completed, rather than as ongoing. He says that *once* the animal has been fully generated, that is, at Mode (2), then the animal already has the *dunamis* of sensation.⁴⁵ Aristotle says nothing about whether *during* the process of generation the embryo has or does not have such *dunamis*.

Let us take stock. In *De an.* II 1 and II 5, Aristotle draws some distinctions that are helpful to articulate the mode of being of the termini of the generation of the embryo, namely, (1) the gametes and (2) the fully generated animal, as well as the powers of these termini: the former lacks, while the latter has, the relevant principle. None of the distinctions from *De anima*, however, correspond to the mode of being of the embryo as the *subject* of generation; nor can these distinctions articulate the difference between the mode of being of the internal *principle* (i.e., the soul) in the embryo and the mode of being of the soul in the fully generated animal.

This is not a mistake on Aristotle's part though, because in *De anima* he is not interested in the mode of being of the subject of generation nor in the mode of being of its principle *while* the generation is ongoing.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the triple scheme that emerges from *De anima* proves helpful to framing the mode of being of the embryo: the embryo lies between Mode (1) and Mode (2), the termini of the generation; and the embryo is the subject of the transition from the former mode to the latter.

In the following section I will turn to *Metaphysics* IX 7, where Aristotle applies the distinction between being in *dunamis* and being in *energeia* to natural substances *in the process of becoming*. We will see how the notion of being an animal in *dunamis* adequately captures the mode of being of the embryo as the *subject* of generation. At the same time, we will see that such a mode of being cannot be used to articulate the mode of being of the *principle* (soul) of the embryo.

⁴⁵ Aristotle's approach to generation as completed can be appreciated in the use of the verbal aspect: he says that once it has been generated (ἔτ' ἔστι γεννηθῆναι – aorist aspect) the animal already has (ἔχει ἤδη) the power of sensation.

⁴⁶ While it is taking place (present aspect).

3. *Being an Animal in dunamis and
Being an Animal in energeia in Metaphysics IX 7*

Dunamis and *energeia* are one of the four senses of being that Aristotle distinguishes in *Metaph.* V 7 and VI 2. In Book IX of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explains these notions in more detail. He wants to reach a common account of *energeia*, including not only change, but substance as well, and to show that *energeia* has priority over *dunamis*. For our purposes, the relevant passage is found in *Metaph.* IX 7, where Aristotle addresses the question of when something is already in *dunamis*. Not just anything, nor at any time, Aristotle argues, is a particular being in *dunamis*. For example, earth is not yet a statue in *dunamis*, because it must first be changed into bronze, which is then already a statue in *dunamis*. In turn, bronze comes to be a statue in *energeia* by the efficient causality of the sculptor.

Aristotle asks when something can be said to be already in *dunamis*, and he presupposes a process of generation, as Beere and Johansen note.⁴⁷ Aristotle is after a universal criterion to find out when, in this process of becoming, something can first be said to be in *dunamis*. It turns out, however, that we need two separate criteria: one for things whose principle is internal (i.e., natural and living beings), for example, a human being or an animal, and another for things whose principle is external, such as a house or any other artifact. Aristotle says:

We must distinguish when each is in *dunamis* [πότε δυνάμει ἔστιν] and when it is not, for it is not in *dunamis* just at any time. For example, is earth a man in *dunamis*? Or not yet, but rather when it has already become seed? Or not even then perhaps? ... Similarly, with the house in *dunamis*: if nothing in it, or in the matter, impedes the coming to be of a house, and if there is no need to add or to take away or to change [μεταβαλεῖν], then that is a house in *dunamis* – the same occurs in all cases in which the principle of generation [ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως] is external –. And in those cases where the principle is in that which has it [τῷ ἔχοντι], when it will come to be by itself if nothing external impedes it. To illustrate: the seed is not yet [οὐπω] a human being in *dunamis*, for it must fall in another and change [μεταβάλλειν]; but when it is already [ἤδη] such by its own principle, then it is a human being in *dunamis*. The former lacks the other principle [ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται], as the earth is not yet a statue in *dunamis*. (*Metaph.* IX 7.1048b37-1049a18)

⁴⁷ Cf. Beere (2009) p. 235, and Johansen (2012a) p. 28.

In the case of things whose principle of generation is external, the criterion for when something can be said to be in *dunamis*, simply put, is that no further change is necessary for it to be ready to become such a thing by the agency of its external principle. Accordingly, bricks are already a house in *dunamis*, while earth is not yet a house in *dunamis*, because earth must first be changed into bricks. Once changed into bricks, these are ready to become a house by the agency of the housebuilder. For living beings, the criterion is different, because the principle of generation (ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως) is internal.⁴⁸ In this case, the criterion for being in *dunamis* is to have the internal principle of generation. This principle is acquired by a change (μεταβαλεῖν) effected by the male progenitor.⁴⁹ The first knower in *De an.* II 5 fails to meet this criterion.⁵⁰

In all cases, something comes to be already in *dunamis* through a change. The difference is that the result of that change is, for non-living beings, a passive disposition to be acted upon by an external cause, while in the case of living beings, the result of that change is the acquisition of the internal active principle of generation. As Aristotle explains, once the seed has the principle of generation, it comes to be by its own principle.⁵¹ Only then, and not before (οὐπω), we can say that the seed is already (ἤδη) a particular living being in *dunamis*.

At this point we must recall the distinction between the seed at rest (the gametes), which lacks (δεῖται) the principle of generation, and the embryo, which already has (ἔχειν) the principle of generation and is in the process of being generated. Aristotle's claim is that the former is not yet a human being in *dunamis*, while the latter already is such. The transition from the former

⁴⁸ Cf. *Phys.* II 1 and *Metaph.* IX 7.1049b8-10.

⁴⁹ Cf. *De an.* II 5.417b16-18 and *GA* II 5.741b5-7.

⁵⁰ I want to highlight that the first mode of being a knower in *De an.* II 5 does *not* have the internal principle, that is, such a knower is still lacking in the relevant knowledge. By contrast, the being in *dunamis* of *Metaph.* IX 7 already has the principle, albeit in an undeveloped way – that is why we cannot yet say that it is a knower in *energeia*. Thus, while both the first knower of *De an.* and the embryo in *Metaph.* IX 7 can be said to be in *dunamis* in a broad sense, the former does *not* qualify as being in a knower in *dunamis* according to the criterion of *Metaph.* IX 7.

⁵¹ Cf. *Metaph.* IX 7.1049a15-16 and *GA* II 1.735a13-14.20-21. See also Johansen (2012a) p. 28.

to the latter is a change (μεταβολή), through which, by the agency of the male progenitor, the principle of generation is acquired.

The change Aristotle is referring to in this passage, namely, the change whose completion marks the first stage at which something is already in *dunamis* in the case of living beings, is a part of what he calls the first change (πρώτη μεταβολή) in *De an.* II 5.⁵² The terminus ad quem of the change that Aristotle is referring to in *Metaph.* IX 7 is not birth, nor the completion of the generation. Rather, by the end of this first change, which marks when something can first be said to be in *dunamis*, *the generation is still ongoing*, but now under the agency of the embryo's own internal principle. The animal cannot yet exercise all its powers: it is still an animal in *dunamis* and not fully in *energeia*. Accordingly, in the process of the generation of an animal we must distinguish between (a) the passive acquisition of the principle of becoming by the external agency of the male progenitor, on the one hand, and (b) the active generation of the animal by its own internal principle, on the other. The completion of the former marks the beginning of the latter.⁵³ The subject of (a) is (1) the gametes, while the subject of (b) is the embryo, which is no longer merely potentially an animal, but rather already an animal in *dunamis*. The former does not yet have, while the latter already has, the principle of generation.

To distinguish modes of being in *Metaph.* IX 7, Aristotle favors the adverbial phrase with the verb to be (εἶναι), namely, being in *dunamis* and being in *energeia*, over the phrase based on the verb to have (ἔχειν), which is prominent in *De anima*. It is telling, however, that the criterion that Aristotle gives in *Metaph.* IX 7 for living beings ultimately reduces being in *dunamis* to having a principle: something *is* already a particular being in *dunamis* when it no longer lacks, but already *has*, the internal principle and is thus becoming on its own. This connection between being and having invites us to correlate the modes of being of *Metaph.* IX 7 to the modes of being of *De anima* in the following way. I will use the example of an animal:

⁵² Cf. *De an.* II 5.417b17.

⁵³ At some point, as Aristotle explains, the developing seed or embryo must manage itself by itself, as a child who has left his father's house (cf. *GA* II 4.740a5-7). For more on the progressive stages of embryological development in Aristotle see De Ribera-Martin (2019a) pp. 114-9.

1) Being potentially an animal (the gamete(s)) ↓ (a) change by the external progenitor	does not have the principle
(*) ⁵⁴ Being an animal in <i>dunamis</i> (embryo) ↓ (b) change by its own internal principle	has the principle (i.e., the soul) but <i>lacks</i> the <i>dunamis</i> to exercise
(2) A generated animal at rest Analogous to being-asleep	has the principle (i.e., the soul) and <i>has</i> the <i>dunamis</i> to exercise
(3) A generated animal at work Analogous to being-awake	has the principle (i.e., the soul) has the <i>dunamis</i> to exercise and is currently exercising

While among the various modes of being of *De anima* we do not find one that corresponds to the embryo, (*) the mode of being an animal in *dunamis*, as described by Aristotle in *Metaph.* IX 7, does correspond to the embryo as the subject of (b) generation. The embryo is an animal in *dunamis* because it already has the principle of generation and is becoming a fully generated animal by its own internal principle. Thus, the *Metaphysics* provides us with a notion (being in *dunamis*) that is suitable to articulate the mode of being of the embryo as subject.

Nevertheless, the notion of being an animal in *dunamis* from *Metaph.* IX 7 still raises important questions.⁵⁵ The most relevant for our purposes is the problem of how to articulate the different ways in which (*) the embryo and (2) the generated animal *have* soul. In fact, both are said to have the principle, but only the latter has the *dunamis* to exercise all the relevant powers. As I mentioned earlier, in *De anima*, to have (ἔχειν) a principle or power appears to be sufficient for having the *dunamis* to exercise (ἐνεργεῖν) that power: (2) the person who has knowledge of geometry can (3) exercise that knowledge whenever he wants. By contrast, (*) the embryo has soul but not

⁵⁴ I use the symbol ‘(*)’ to refer to the mode of being of the subject of generation while (b) the change by its own internal principle is taking place. As we will see, Mode of being (*) corresponds to Being X in *dunamis*.

⁵⁵ For example, when exactly does it happen, from the biological point of view, that the subject of generation is first an animal in *dunamis*? This is something that Aristotle never specifies in this chapter (cf. Beere 2009, p. 236). Further, when does the subject become an animal in *energeia*? Again, Aristotle does not specify this in this chapter either. Presumably, it will be already an animal in *energeia* once the generation is over, and, in a fuller sense, when the generated substance actually exercises the proper functions. These are complex matters, but we do not need to address them for the purposes of this paper.

yet the *dunamis* to exercise all its powers. Having the principle, therefore, is not sufficient in this case to have the relevant powers.

We have already discussed how this mode of being of the soul of the embryo is puzzling. *It is now apparent why Aristotle must draw a distinction between two modes of having soul* in the *GA*, namely, having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*, when directly facing the question: does the embryo have soul or not? We cannot simply say that the embryo has soul without qualification. It does have soul, but in a different way. Accordingly, we need to divide having soul into two different ways, namely, in *dunamis* and in *energeia*, which is precisely what we find in the *GA*. To say that the embryo has soul in *dunamis* is the correct way to articulate this paradoxical mode of being of the soul during the process of generation.

In the following and final section, I will turn to the other way of having soul, namely, having soul in *energeia*. I will show that this second member of the *GA* distinction is also relevant, because it may illuminate why Aristotle coined such a strange word as *entelecheia*.

4. *Entelecheia: Having Soul in energeia*

The word *entelecheia* is Aristotle's own coinage. It has been translated into English by different words: actuality,⁵⁶ fulfillment,⁵⁷ realization.⁵⁸ It is agreed that the word includes the roots of τέλος (perfection, completion) and of ἔχειν (to have), but its precise etymology remains obscure and has not yet been settled, despite much discussion.⁵⁹ In this section, I will show how the *GA* distinction can illuminate Aristotle's coinage of this word. I will do so

⁵⁶ Cf., for example, Aristotle (1999) pp. 166-7, 211; Menn (1994) pp. 100-1; Polansky (2007) pp. 149-50; and Shields (2016) pp. 12 n. 2, 22-3.

⁵⁷ Cf., for example, Beere (2009) p. 218.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Kosman (2013) pp. 46, 49.

⁵⁹ See Graham (1989) pp. 73-80. As Beere puts it, "It is agreed, I think, that *entelekheia* is fundamentally a teleological notion. Whatever its precise etymology – which is obscure – the term clearly suggests *the property or state of fulfillment and completion*." (Beere 2009, p. 218). Another complication to understanding the notion of *entelecheia* is the close connection that Aristotle draws between *entelecheia* and *energeia*, the latter's being key to Aristotle's account of being as activity in the *Metaphysics* (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 218-9). *Energeia* is also Aristotle's coinage, but its etymology is not disputed. Aristotle sometimes uses *entelecheia* and *energeia* as if they were interchangeable.

by comparing Aristotle's account of the mode of being of motion as an incomplete *energeia* (ἀτελής ἐνέργεια) in the *Physics* with the distinction in the *GA* between having in *dunamis* and having in *energeia*.

In *Phys.* III 1-2, Aristotle describes motion as the *entelecheia* of a *dunamis* as such.⁶⁰ He also uses the word *energeia* to describe motion, while qualifying that it is an *energeia* of a special sort: an incomplete one (ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι τις δοκεῖ, ἀτελής δέ).⁶¹ Two of the definitions of motion are relevant for our purposes. Aristotle says:

The *entelecheia* of that which is in *dunamis*, when, while being in *entelecheia*, it exercises [ὅταν ἐντελεχέια ὄν ἐνεργῇ], not as such [i.e., not as in *entelecheia*] but as movable, is motion. (*Phys.* III 1.201a27-29)

Motion seems to be some sort of *energeia*, but incomplete [ἀτελής]. The reason why it is incomplete is because that which is capable, to which the *energeia* belongs, is incomplete [ὅτι ἀτελές τὸ δυνατόν, οὐ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια]. And this is why it is difficult to grasp what it is, for it must be placed either under privation or *dunamis* or *energeia* simply; but none of these appears to be possible. It remains then the way we have said, namely, that it is a sort of *energeia*, an *energeia* such as we have described, difficult to conceive, but possible to exist. (*Phys.* III 2.201b31-202a3)

From the first passage, I will just note that it openly discloses the temporal aspect of motion, which remains opaque in *De anima*. In *De an.* II 5, Aristotle moves directly from (1) the seed that *lacks* the principle, to (2) the fully generated animal that already (and fully) has the principle (ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη – recall the aorist aspect)⁶² and is at rest. Aristotle, in *De an.* II 5, is thus considering the transition from (1) to (2) as a change that has been *completed*, not as an ongoing one. By contrast, in *Phys.* III 1, Aristotle is considering motion as an *ongoing* change, thus displaying its temporal character (ὅταν ... ἐνεργῇ – note the present aspect).

In the second passage, Aristotle acknowledges how difficult it is to grasp the nature of motion. Motion is neither simply *dunamis* nor simply *energeia*. Rather, he explains, motion is a sort of incomplete *energeia* (ἐνέργειά τις,

⁶⁰ Cf. *Phys.* III 1.201a10-11.27-29; b4-5; and III 2.202a7-8.

⁶¹ Cf. *Phys.* III 2.201b31-202a3 and *De an.* II 5.417a16-17.

⁶² Cf. *De an.* II 5.417b17-18.

ἀτελής μέντοι),⁶³ in contrast to those *energeiai* that are complete, as for example the activity of seeing.⁶⁴

The contrast between complete and incomplete *energeia* corresponds to what Anagnostopoulos calls the telic structure criterion.⁶⁵ As he explains, this is neither the only criterion to approach change, nor the most basic one. Rather, the most fundamental criterion to distinguish change from complete activities is what he calls the subject criterion, which the definition of change yields:⁶⁶ “Changes are incomplete because their subjects are incomplete beings.”⁶⁷ Despite how counterintuitive the idea of an incomplete *energeia* may sound, Aristotle clearly says that the *energeia* is incomplete “because (ὅτι) that which is capable, to which the *energeia* belongs, is incomplete (ἀτελής).” In other words, the *energeia* is incomplete *because* its subject is incomplete during the process of becoming.

Incomplete *energeia* concerns the mode of being of a change (e.g., generation), which is one kind of *activity*; it does not concern the mode of being of the *subject* of a change (e.g., the embryo), nor of its *principle* (e.g., the soul

⁶³ Cf. also *De an.* II 5.417a16-17.

⁶⁴ Aristotle’s distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις is well known in the literature. In *De an.* III 7.431a6-7, he refers to this distinction in terms of incomplete (ἀτελής) *energeia* vs. *energeia* simply (ἀπλῶς). The former *energeiai* are an end in themselves; there is no distinction between *F*-ing and *F*-ed. For example, seeing *is* having seen, and vice versa. By contrast, in the latter *energeiai* the end (*F*-ed) are different from the *energeia* (*F*-ing). For example, learning is an incomplete *energeia* different from having learned, which is the end. In the activity of motion there is something other than the activity itself, namely, its completion (τέλος). In this light, the qualification of the *energeia* as incomplete (ἀ-τελής) is most appropriate: motion is an *energeia* that has not yet reached its completion. Aristotle sometimes substitutes the word *energeia* with the word *praxis* (action), for instance, in *Eth. Nic.* I 1.1094a16-17 and in *Metaph.* IX 6.1048b18-35. For this last passage, which is controversial, see Burnyeat (2008).

⁶⁵ See n. 44 above.

⁶⁶ “Aristotle is in effect claiming that the ‘potential being’ that figures in the definition of change is ‘incomplete being.’ This incompleteness is a feature of the subject of change, not (as in the telic structure criterion) of the activity. ... It is *because* ... the subject of change, i.e., the ‘potential being’ of [*Phys.*] 3.1’s definition, is incomplete, that change itself is an incomplete ἐνέργεια rather than an ‘unqualified’ one.” (Anagnostopoulos 2017, p. 179).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 172. It is unclear how this principle may apply to other kinds of change, such as locomotion: in which sense is the subject incomplete while it is moving from one place to another? For the purposes of this paper, which is concerned with the case of generation, we need not address this problem. As Anagnostopoulos puts it, “at least for the case of change, the incompleteness of the subject appears to explain the incompleteness of the activity.” (*Ibid.*, p. 180).

of the embryo). The explanation of why the activity of change is incomplete, however, gives us a clue to understand why we may also speak of an incomplete (ἄτελής) way of having (ἔχειν) the principle: if change, considered as an *energeia*, is incomplete because its subject is still incomplete,⁶⁸ *we can also conceive of an incomplete way of having the principle for the same reason*, namely, because the subject of the principle is incomplete. In both cases, it is the paradoxical nature of change that is creating the tension of something's being in itself complete (i.e., the *energeia* as such and the soul as such) and, at the same time, incomplete in virtue of the incompleteness of its subject.

What is incomplete in the embryo, as I mentioned earlier, is the material side of the composite substance. The generation of a living substance goes hand in hand with the generation of the material organs that are necessary to have the *dunamis* to exercise the proper functions. Accordingly, generation has a principle (ἀρχή) and a completion (τέλος). Given the composition of living substances (i.e., matter and form) and the internal and primordial character of their form,⁶⁹ during the process of becoming the subject of generation of a living substance is not yet fully complete (it is rather ἄτελής) and, nevertheless, at the same time, it already has the principle. The coincidence of having the formal principle with being materially incomplete is precisely what characterizes the animal in *dunamis* (i.e., the embryo) of *Metaph.* IX 7: the embryo is already (*) an animal in *dunamis*, and *no longer* simply (1) potentially an animal, because it already has the principle and, therefore, the *dunamis* to actively become on its own. On the other hand, the embryo is *not yet* (2) an animal in *energeia*, because, due to its material incompleteness, it still lacks the *dunamis* to exercise all the functions.

Here is an interesting passage from the *GA* where Aristotle connects the incomplete mode of being of the subject with its incomplete material development:

Since it [the embryo] is already an animal in *dunamis*, but not complete [δυνάμει μὲν ἤδη ζῶον ἄτελές δέ], it must take the nourishment from elsewhere, so that it makes use of the womb that holds it – as a plant makes use of the earth – in order to take the nourishment

⁶⁸ See *De an.* III 7.431a6-7 for another example of how Aristotle draws a causal connection between an incomplete subject and the incompleteness of its activity.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Phys.* II 1.192b21-23.

until it is eventually completed [ἔως ἂν τελεωθῇ] so as to be already [ἤδη] an animal with the *dunamis* to move around. (*GA* II 4.740a24-27)

In this passage, Aristotle uses the adverbial phrase of *Metaph.* IX 7 (namely, being in *dunamis*) to describe the mode of being of the embryo during the process of becoming. He does not focus on the principle of generation, but rather on its subject. The embryo has the *dunamis* to actively become, because it already has the principle and goes on its own, even if it still needs the assistance of the mother to take nourishment. Thus, it is already (*) an animal in *dunamis*, and not simply (1) potentially an animal. However, since the developing seed is still incomplete and lacks the proper organs to move around, it is not yet (2) an animal in *energeia*, and, therefore, does not yet have the *dunamis* to exercise the locomotive function. This passage from the *GA* shows how being an animal in *dunamis* and the incomplete character of the subject of generation (i.e., the embryo) are causally connected: a *principle* is incomplete when its *subject* is incomplete.

Elsewhere, Aristotle refers to the incomplete *activity* as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, while referring to the complete activity as *energeia* simply (ἀπλῶς ἐνέργεια)⁷⁰ or as τελεία ἐνέργεια.⁷¹ Analogously, I think that the *GA* distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia* is precisely Aristotle's way of referring to the incomplete and complete ways of having the principle of soul respectively. This correlation sheds light on why Aristotle may have coined the word *entelecheia*: *since there are two ways of having the principle, and not just one, it is appropriate to have a specific word for the complete way of having the principle*. Aristotle coined the word *entelecheia*, corresponding to the phrase having soul in *energeia* in the *GA*, to refer to the complete mode of having the principle. This fits well with the two roots of the word, namely, ἔχειν (to have) and ἐντελής (complete).

The existence of two different ways of having the principle also explains why the word *entelecheia* is not redundant with the word ἔξις (habit, the substantivized form of the verb ἔχειν): as we speak of two kinds of *energeia* (complete and incomplete), so too we can speak of two kinds of habit: complete and incomplete ones. And just as the phrase τελεία ἐνέργεια is not redundant

⁷⁰ Cf. *De an.* III 7.431a7.

⁷¹ Cf. *Eth. Nic.* X 4.1174b16-17.

with *energeia* – the phrase signals that at some previous point the *energeia* was incomplete⁷² – so too the word *entelecheia* is not redundant with ἔξις: the word *entelecheia* signals that at some previous point the principle was had in an incomplete way.⁷³ Here is an outline of the comparison I am proposing between *energeia* and *entelecheia* from the point of view of completion:

	Incomplete Subject	Complete Subject
ἔργον, ἐνέργεια	ἐνέργεια ἀτελής	τελεία ἐνέργεια
ἔχειν, ἔξις	ἔχειν [X] δυνάμει	ἔχειν [X] ἐνεργείᾳ ἐντελέχεια

As the outline shows, *entelecheia* corresponds to the mode of being that Aristotle calls in the *GA* having in *energeia*. An interesting and somewhat speculative question, which I will only briefly allude to, is which word (and not just which phrase)⁷⁴ would then be the correlative to *entelecheia*. Aristotle did not coin any such word, but I think that he could have done so in at least two ways. The first one would be <ἀτελέχεια> (incomplete having). While this is not a word documented in Greek, it would be the natural counterpart of the word *entelecheia*, given that the contrary of the adjective ἐντελής (complete) is the adjective ἀτελής (incomplete), both of which are common adjectives in Greek and frequently used by Aristotle himself.

The second possible word correlative to *entelecheia* would be <ἐναρχήχεια>. Again, while this is not a word documented in Greek, it appears as another natural counterpart of the word *entelecheia* given the correlation between ἀρχή and τέλος. Having the ἀρχή and having the τέλος

⁷² To refer to something as complete only makes sense if there is a possible correlative incompleteness. And vice versa. We do not call something complete that has not been, or at least could have been or be, incomplete. For example, it only makes sense to call a tree or a table complete if the tree or the table have been found, or could be found, at some point in an incomplete state. On the other hand, incompleteness is not a mere privative term, but another positive way of being.

⁷³ Aristotle could have used the phrase τελεία ἔξις as a parallel to the phrase τελεία ἐνέργεια, to describe the complete way of having the principle; but he did not. Instead, he preferred to coin the word *entelecheia*.

⁷⁴ As a phrase, having in *dunamis* fits well as the counterpart of *entelecheia*.

(*entelecheia*) are correlative terms.⁷⁵ The τέλος is that which comes to be last in genesis,⁷⁶ while the ἀρχή is that which comes to be first. Thus, the completion of the genesis is rightly called *entelecheia*, and not simply ἔξις. By contrast, the beginning of the genesis is already a having (ἔχειν), but still incomplete (ἀ-τελής), and, accordingly, not yet an *entelecheia*. When the subject, say an embryo, has the ἀρχή, and not yet the τέλος, we say that it *has* soul in *dunamis* and that it *is* an animal in *dunamis*;⁷⁷ we do not say that it has the τέλος. On the other hand, the development from ἀρχή to τέλος is not the acquisition of a soul that before was not present:⁷⁸ having the ἀρχή is the initial mode of having the soul while the subject is not yet complete, but still in the process of becoming; while having the τέλος (*entelecheia*) is the final mode of having the soul.⁷⁹

Conclusion

Aristotle's distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*, unique to the *GA*, has not received the attention it merits in the scholarly literature. As I have shown in this paper, this distinction is relevant to Aristotle's account of modes of being in two important ways. First, it provides the correct notion to articulate the mode of being of the soul-principle

⁷⁵ In the same way in which predicating completion (τέλος) of something only makes sense if there is a corresponding state of incompleteness (ἀ-τελής), it only makes sense to say that a subject has a principle (ἀρχή) if the subject can have at some point a culmination or completion (τέλος).

⁷⁶ Cf. *GA* II 3.736b2-5.

⁷⁷ Recall how in *Metaph.* IX 7 being an animal in *dunamis* goes hand in hand with having the principle (ἀρχή).

⁷⁸ Recall how in *De anima* Aristotle only considers the mode of not having and the mode of having simply, without disclosing two ways of having the internal principle.

⁷⁹ Accordingly, and notwithstanding the real presence of soul in the embryo, it appears that we should probably *not* call the soul in that (incomplete) mode of being an *entelecheia*, but rather another kind of having. In other words, it does not appear to be the case that in all its modes of being the soul of a living being should be called *entelecheia*, but only when the generation is completed and the soul has the *dunamis* to exercise all its basic functions. This is not to deny, of course, that regardless of the mode of being in which the soul is actually present, it is present and active as the first act (first actuality) of the living substance. It is this soul, which the embryo has in *dunamis*, that actually leads the embryological development from the start as its intrinsic cause.

of an embryo – a notion which is not provided by Aristotle in his more well-known discussions of modes of being in *De anima* or the *Metaphysics*. In answering the question of whether the developing seed has soul, we can say neither that it does not have it (οὐκ ἔχειν) nor that it has it (ἔχειν) without qualification; we need to clarify that the developing seed has soul in an incomplete, undeveloped way. The notion of having soul in *dunamis* adequately articulates the paradoxical mode of being of the soul principle of an embryo in the process generation: due to the incompleteness of its subject, the embryo does not yet have the soul in a mode of being that would allow the exercise of all its powers (ἐνεργεῖν).

Second, the *GA* distinction also sheds light on Aristotle's coinage of the word *entelecheia* as the appropriate counterpart of the incomplete way in which embryos have soul. *Entelecheia* corresponds to what Aristotle calls having soul in *energeia* in the *GA*, the mode of having soul that is complete, fully developed. Aristotle describes the mode of having that is not complete by the phrase having soul in *dunamis*. Since there are two modes of having the principle, a complete and an incomplete one, the words ἔχειν and ἔξιν are ambiguous in a way in which Aristotle's new word *entelecheia* is not. So, it is fitting to have a particular technical term, i.e., *entelecheia*, for the complete mode of having the principle.

Considering these two points together, it is worth noting that at least some of Aristotle's technical and novel notions, which he uses in other fields, seem to have been forged in the context of his biological investigations. Aristotle's metaphysics and physics, in contrast to Plato, has sprung, so to speak, from his grappling with the phenomena of life, and not from mathematical inquiries.

The order of Aristotle's works remains controversial to this day. The differences I have pointed out in the use of the notion of ἐντελέχεια between the *Generation of Animals* and other treatises such as *De anima*, the *Physics*, and *Metaphysics* may be helpful in illuminating the order in which Aristotle wrote these treatises. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper, though it is a question worth pursuing.⁸⁰ The same goes for Aristotle's enigmatic claim in the *Generation of Animals* that intellect alone comes from

⁸⁰ I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.

without (τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν),⁸¹ which I have not discussed in this paper. In what sense can intellect *become* an ἐντελέχεια of the body if it comes from without? The same problem appears in *De anima*, albeit from a different perspective: in what sense *is* intellect the ἐντελέχεια of the body?⁸²

There are other interesting uses of the notions of *dunamis* and *energeia* in Aristotle's *Generation of Animals* that deserve a more detailed study.⁸³ In this paper I have focused on the distinction between having soul in *dunamis* and having soul in *energeia*, which shows that the *Generation of Animals* is a treatise that is relevant not only for those interested in Aristotle's biology, but also for those interested in his metaphysics.

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⁸¹ Cf. *GA* II 3.736b27-28 and Connell (2021).

⁸² An important source for studying this problem is found in a work by the Renaissance Aristotelian commentator Simone Porzio, *De Humana Mente Disputatio* V. See García Valverde (2012). I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer who suggested this work to me.

⁸³ I will just mention two. First, Aristotle only uses the term *entelecheia* twice in the *GA*; and in both cases he uses it as interchangeable with *energeia* (cf. *GA* II 1.734a30 and b35; II 6.743a23). Second, Aristotle also uses the adverbial phrase having in *dunamis* / *energeia* to refer to the *parts*, and not just to the principle. He says, for example, that the menses have all the parts in *dunamis* (πάντα τὰ μέρη ἔχει δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐθέν). See *GA* II 3.737a21-24 and also *GA* II 5.741b7-8.14-15, where Aristotle says that parts are present in the matter (i.e., the menses) in *dunamis* (Ἐνυπαρχόντων δ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ δυνάμει τῶν μερίων) and that parts come to be in *energeia* after having been present before in *dunamis* (γινόμενα ἐνεργείᾳ ἃ ὑπῆρχεν ὄντα δυνάμει πρότερον).

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LES MEILLEURES RAISONS SELON ARISTOTE POUR VIVRE EN DÉMOCRATIE

Abstract

In his *Politics*, Aristotle argues in favour of a moderate democratic regime, what he calls *politeia*, which starting from Book IV – but in accordance with the developments already seen in Book III, chap. 11 especially – represents the new *best regime* (ἀρίστη πολιτεία), a regime counting a large amount of middle class citizens all in turn taking parts in public affairs, a regime that is appropriate to the vast majority of peoples and cities and which, moreover, is more stable than all others, a constitution *of the future*, as he himself pronounces it. No other form of government in the treatise receives such a praise, no doubt a serious turn in political history, when we compare it to previous thinkers, especially to the way Plato viewed democracy. The paper therefore contrasts the widespread commonplace of an Aristotle politically acquiescent to the authoritarian orientation of the Macedonian monarchy or a follower of Plato, more or less, in his political preferences. Such a radical rethinking of the intellectual message of the *Politics* compels us to reflect further on the historical impact of the organization of the corpus on its reception: we cannot exclude the possibility that the relevance of Aristotle's arguments in favour of some sort of moderate democracy is obscured by their location in *Politics* books III-IV, making it seem as if their theory of 'the best politeia' was a transitional position meant to be superseded by the final books VII-VIII, whose position was already questioned in the nineteenth century but has been more accepted in recent times.

Keywords

Aristotle, Political Philosophy, Democracy, *Politeia*, Best Regime

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Dans un ouvrage publié récemment intitulé *Sagesse cumulative et idéal démocratique chez Aristote*,¹ j'ai proposé un éclairage à certains égards nouveau sur la pensée politique du Stagirite, une réflexion dont il faut rappeler qu'elle constitue encore aujourd'hui l'une des références majeures en philosophie politique. Deux remarques préliminaires tout d'abord, avant d'en venir à l'exposé synthétique du contenu de ce livre et à quelques énoncés sur le potentiel critique encore aujourd'hui, éminemment critique même, des réflexions politiques d'Aristote :

1. Il est bien entendu que ce dernier n'a pas écrit, comme s'il s'agissait d'une œuvre planifiée et finalisée, un traité de philosophie politique en tant que tel, à savoir celui dont nous disposons aujourd'hui, car le traité des *Politiques* que nous possédons est en réalité composé de huit Livres dont les péripéties d'assemblage nous sont inconnus et entre lesquels les liens réciproques sont bien loin d'être manifestes. L'on y retrouve en effet des coupures, des interruptions, des redites, etc., tant et si bien qu'on a pu parler à leur endroit d'un fatras en huit Livres.² La place notamment des Livres VII-VIII par rapport à l'ensemble demeure très incertaine et d'ailleurs débattue, et j'ai moi-même défendu après d'autres l'idée qu'ils représentaient des vues vraisemblablement anciennes, platoniciennes pour être clair, sur la cité. Personnellement, je pense qu'ils remontent à une période au minimum antérieure à la rédaction du Livre III. Après le Livre I (introductif), le Livre II (doxographique) et le Livre III (théorique, c'est-à-dire abordant sur le plan des principes généraux les notions de cité, de citoyenneté et les différentes formes de régimes possibles), se lit la trilogie des Livres IV-V-VI, des exposés dits « réalistes » qui, de l'avis quasi unanime des spécialistes, forment un tout relativement homogène. D'où la série : I ; II (VII-VIII, intercalation ou rédaction séparée?) ; III ; IV-V-VI. Mis dans cet ordre, les développements

¹ Narbonne (2020).

² A. Francotte, en effet, tient que l'écrit est « un fatras en huit livres », expliquant que « l'ouvrage consiste dans une enfilade de mémoires distincts », et qu'il n'y a rien d'étonnant par suite à ce que « la *Politique* soit marquée par des redites, des discordances et même par des contradictions », à quoi s'ajoutent « des lacunes, voire des coupures », d'où « des disparates assez nombreuses et le défaut de plusieurs développements annoncés » (cf. Bodéüs 2004, p. 1320).

du Livre III concernant la sagesse cumulative (chapitre 11 surtout mais pas seulement) trouvent un aboutissement relativement cohérent au Livre IV dans la défense de la *politie* (πολιτεία, mélange d'oligarchie et de démocratie avec prépondérance accordée à l'élément démocratique), à savoir la nouvelle *constitution excellente* (ἀρίστη πολιτεία) aux yeux d'Aristote, la *politie* remplaçant à ce titre la royauté ou l'aristocratie privilégiée auparavant par Platon et par bien d'autres.

2. Il est entendu par ailleurs que la disparité des points de vue entretenus par Aristote dans l'ensemble de ce traité mais aussi dans d'autres de ses écrits sur la valeur respective des différents régimes politiques, rend extrêmement difficile la reconnaissance chez lui d'une prédilection nette accordée à un régime particulier par opposition à d'autres. Une constitution, à ses yeux, est bonne dès lors qu'elle vise le bien de toute la cité dans son ensemble et qu'en même temps elle s'avère adaptée aux circonstances données de même qu'au type de peuple auquel elle s'adresse, ce qui évidemment rend possible plusieurs d'entre elles (royauté, aristocratie, *politie*). Néanmoins, « à défaut d'être un démocrate acharné ou toujours constant », comme nous l'avons fait remarquer,³ il est clair que le Stagirite développe avec force et conviction au Livre III une argumentation en faveur de la sagesse collective, à savoir l'idée d'une *sagesse cumulative* ou *sommative* (*Summierungstheorie*) qui accorde au peuple – ou du moins à certains types de peuples – la capacité collective, par le biais de la délibération, de juger avec pertinence et efficacité des affaires de la cité, cette capacité pouvant non seulement égaler mais même dépasser à l'occasion le savoir des experts, une thèse d'orientation clairement démocratique et qui se montre par ailleurs en phase avec les exposés subséquents du Livre IV concernant les atouts d'un gouvernement de la classe moyenne et les bienfaits d'une *démocratie modérée*, à savoir d'une *politie*. Cela étant dit, d'autres formes de gouvernement lui paraissent par moments encore et toujours légitimes (en vrai, il n'en exclut quasiment aucune), et il n'y a dès lors rien d'étonnant à ce que certains commentateurs, privilégiant plutôt d'autres passages du traité pris globalement (incluant bien sûr les Livres VII-VIII), aient pu être conduits à lui prêter d'autres inclinaisons que

³ Narbonne (2020) p. 5.

celle démocratique au sens large. Néanmoins, le parcours que j'ai décrit allant du sommet atteint en III 11 au nouveau sommet conquis en IV 11-13, paraît non seulement défendable ou argumentable en soi mais en vérité clairement supérieur à tout autre, car enfin, c'est bien ce gouvernement de la classe moyenne et lui seul, cette démocratie assortie d'éléments oligarchiques si l'on préfère, bref cette *politie* et nulle autre qui se voit consacrée et expressément dénommée « constitution excellente » (ἀρίστη πολιτεία), et cela, insiste Aristote, pour l'immense majorité des cités (1295b28; 35; 1296b2; 1297b33), celui-ci se référant alors à « une vie que la grande majorité des gens soient capables de mener en commun et à une constitution que la grande majorité des cités puissent adopter » (1295a29-31), une claire *révolution* par rapport au point de vue défendu par Platon, mais une révolution, comme on y a insisté, *mesurée, modérée*, bref *tranquille*.

À la suite d'un premier chapitre introductif attirant l'attention sur la spécificité de l'approche que nous avons choisie pour aborder la pensée politique d'Aristote, soit l'argument cumulatif de III 11.1281a40-1282b1, le second chapitre de notre ouvrage (« Le projet politique d'Aristote, ou comment s'arracher à l'orbite platonicienne ? ») aborde la question centrale de l'opposition du Stagirite aux analyses politiques de Platon dans la *République* et subsidiairement dans les *Lois*.

Dès les premières lignes de son essai, Aristote marque sa différence fondamentale avec le point de vue platonicien en posant que la communauté politique se distingue *spécifiquement* ou *par l'espèce* (εἶδει) des autres types de communautés (une cité n'est pas simplement une grosse famille), dans la mesure où la cité est par définition le lieu d'un partage égal du pouvoir, là où l'on est « à tour de rôle gouvernant et gouverné ». L'idée du « à tour de rôle » (κατὰ μέρος ou ἐν μέρει ou ἀνὰ μέρος, 22 occurrences de ces trois formules dans l'œuvre) constitue un véritable *leitmotiv* du traité aristotélicien, car c'est elle qui confirme l'échange des fonctions entre les citoyens et ainsi la participation de tous aux affaires de la cité. C'est ce qu'exige une cité formée de gens « libres et égaux (ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις) » (1261a32), et c'est en ce sens qu'Aristote peut parler de la permutation réciproque des fonctions comme d'une sorte de *devenir autre social* : « Alors, les uns gouvernent et

les autres sont gouvernés chacun à tour de rôle, comme *s'ils étaient devenus autres* » (1261b4-5). Bref, la diversification civique ou sociale dépend elle-même de la *différenciation dynamique des fonctions*, une différenciation qui n'a pas cours chez Platon, lequel plaide au contraire pour l'*exclusivité fonctionnelle* (en grec *οικειοπραγία*), un terme d'ailleurs forgé par lui), le « *à chacun sa tâche propre* » faisant en sorte que celui qui est appelé à commander commandera et sera seul à commander, même chose pour celui appelé à cultiver, à commercer ou à guerroyer.

Arrêtons-nous un instant sur ce concept de l'*οικειοπραγία* énoncé en *République*, IV 434c8. Le terme n'existait pas auparavant dans la langue grecque, comme on l'a dit. Forgé donc par Platon lui-même, il est au fondement de sa conception de la justice. Ce dernier signale en effet, après avoir décrit en quoi consistait l'injustice : « Le contraire de cette injustice-là serait donc la justice, qui consisterait pour chaque classe, celle des acquéreurs, celle des militaires auxiliaires et celle des gardiens, en sa tâche propre (*οικειοπραγία*), chacune de celles-ci effectuant dans la cité la tâche qui lui revient ; c'est cela qui rendrait la cité juste » (IV 434c, trad. Leroux modifiée).

C'est d'ailleurs sur cette base qu'Aristote incrimine la trop grande unité de la cité recherchée par Platon, une idée fondamentalement ruineuse dit-il, car l'unité ne représente pas le bien suprême mais s'avère destructrice de la cité, laquelle constitue naturellement une multiplicité (*πλῆθος*), à savoir un regroupement de gens différenciés. Aristote récuse donc le principe même de l'approche platonicienne : la thèse est indéfendable, « je veux parler, argue-t-il, du fait que ce qu'il y a de meilleur, c'est que la cité soit une, le plus possible : car c'est cette hypothèse que Socrate prend pour base » (1261a15-16). Or c'est de cette unicité excessive ou disons mal comprise que découle l'essentiel des propositions politiques platoniciennes : le communisme des femmes, des enfants et des biens; le pouvoir réservé à une élite seule habilitée à statuer sur les affaires de la cité; l'eugénisme revendiqué et le reste. Au final, raisonne Aristote, l'on aboutit de la sorte à *deux cités en une*, une cité formée de deux groupes hétéroclites et hostiles l'un par rapport à l'autre (cf. II 5.1264a24-25).

L'on aura compris ainsi l'importance stratégique de cette remise en cause des prémisses platoniciennes dont j'entreprends de tirer toutes les

conséquences au chapitre 3 de mon essai (« L'efficacité démocratique : intelligence collective et théorie cumulative »). En défendant le principe de l'alternance des charges, Aristote s'acheminait tout naturellement vers sa propre conception de la citoyenneté puisqu'au Livre III, il définit lui-même le citoyen de la manière suivante : « de celui qui a la possibilité de participer au pouvoir délibératif ou judiciaire, nous disons qu'il est de fait citoyen de cette cité, et nous appelons, en bref, cité l'ensemble des gens de cette sorte quand il est suffisant pour vivre en autarcie » (1275b19-21). En d'autres termes, la cité implique le regroupement de gens *de cette sorte*, à savoir de citoyens entre lesquels l'alternance des charges a effectivement cours, sans quoi la possibilité de la participation mentionnée, « au pouvoir délibératif ou judiciaire », ne serait aucunement satisfaite dans les faits. Or cette définition de la citoyenneté, universelle et qui convient donc en principe à toute cité, l'on comprend tout de suite qu'elle correspond au plus haut point à la cité démocratique, puisque c'est dans un régime de ce type que l'alternance est la plus largement pratiquée, comme le reconnaît Aristote lui-même : « C'est pourquoi le citoyen tel que nous l'avons défini existe surtout en démocratie; dans les autres régimes, il peut aussi se rencontrer, mais pas nécessairement » (1275b5-7). Aristote précise par ailleurs, le point est absolument crucial, qu'« être commandé et commander diffèrent *spécifiquement* » (ἐἶδει, I 13.1259b37), et l'on a vu que l'alternance des charges impliquait elle-même un devenir-autre : « Alors, les uns gouvernent et les autres sont gouvernés chacun à tour de rôle, comme *s'ils étaient devenus autres* » (II 3.1261b4-5).

Ces données s'avèrent déterminantes et ont orienté toute la suite de l'enquête menée. Car enfin, qu'est-ce que l'argument cumulatif de III 11, si ce n'est la défense d'une pratique effective du pouvoir partagé par les citoyens ? Or, n'est pas moins magistrat pour Aristote celui qui remplit le rôle de juge que celui qui est membre de l'Assemblée (1275a26), et ce sont mêmes, nous dit-il, les membres de l'Assemblée que l'on peut considérer comme les plus puissants des magistrats (1275a28-29). Si tel est le cas, n'est-il pas logique qu'Aristote fasse état des avantages épistémologiques et pratiques de l'exercice délibératif qui se trouve avoir cours dans de telles assemblées, là où justement les citoyens se révèlent pleinement citoyens, et n'est-il

pas logique et cohérent aussi qu'il se porte ensuite à la défense d'un régime constitutionnel qui laisse place à de tels éléments ?

Une analyse attentive des arguments de III 11, auxquels font d'ailleurs écho d'autres passages dans le traité, révèle que la délibération commune comporte de multiples atouts et que ses impacts sont divers puisqu'elle agit tout à la fois sur la vertu, l'intelligence pratique, les dispositions éthiques et l'intelligence : « étant plusieurs, chacun possède une part (μόριον) de vertu (ἀρετῆς) de même que d'intelligence pratique (φρονήσεως), et une fois rassemblés, de même que la masse devient un seul homme avec de multiples pieds, de multiples mains et plusieurs organes de sens, de même en est-il aussi pour les caractères éthiques (ἥθη) et l'intelligence (διάνοιαν) » (1281b4-7). Contre le savoir du spécialiste à proprement parler, Aristote fait valoir notamment l'apport possible de l'homme cultivé (le πεπαιδευμένος) ou encore le jugement de l'usager, et il remarque au surplus que les possessions de la masse dépassent même l'avoir des riches. Mis ensemble, du moins dans le cas de certains peuples, les citoyens « s'avèreront ou meilleurs juges ou pas plus mauvais » (1282a17), c'est-à-dire ou *égaux* ou *supérieurs* aux spécialistes, ce qui consacre une fois pour toutes la supériorité possible du procédé cumulatif.

Fort de ces arguments, Aristote aurait pu en conclure que c'est la multitude elle-même qui devrait décider absolument de tout et s'occuper elle-même de tout, mais demeurant prudent, telle n'est pas la conclusion qu'il tire, soulignant plutôt qu'elle doit veiller « aux élections des magistrats et aux redditions de comptes », c'est-à-dire recourir aux gens compétents, aux meilleurs, tout en les gardant sous contrôle. Les individus ordinaires ne doivent pas « gouverner individuellement » (1281b34), même s'il est indéniable qu'« une fois rassemblés (συνελθόντες), ils détiennent une perception (αἴσθησιν) suffisante des choses, et que mélangés avec les meilleurs, ils sont utiles aux cités » (1281b35-36). Or cette situation politique où la multitude participe aux affaires en conjonction avec une certaine élite qui y apporte son expertise, ce mélange de la masse indifférenciée avec les meilleurs, nous reconduisent tout naturellement aux développements des Livres IV à VI où les différents mélanges possibles de gouvernements se trouvent savamment examinés.

Le chapitre 4 de mon ouvrage (« La constitution excellente selon Aristote : la polittie ») se penche alors sur les différents types de mélanges décrits

par le Stagirite et fait voir le lien pour ainsi dire naturel existant entre les avancées du Livre III, chapitre 11 (on ne parlait cependant jamais alors de *politie* en tant que telle) et le nouveau régime idéal, idéal au sens pratique du terme, idéal en même temps que réalisable : la *politie*. J'ai fait observer qu'Aristote ici avance seulement pas à pas et semble à la recherche d'une solution qu'il ne détient pas encore, laquelle va d'ailleurs passer, en IV 3, par l'abandon ou disons la remise en cause de la topique classique des 6 régimes.

Un premier mode de dérivation se trouve alors rapporté par le Stagirite, celui entrevu par la majorité des gens selon lequel il n'existerait à la base que deux régimes principaux, deux régimes matriciels, la *démocratie* d'un côté et l'*oligarchie* de l'autre – comme il n'existerait finalement que deux vents fondamentaux, les boréens du nord et les notia du sud, dont tous les autres vents dériveraient, ou encore deux harmonies premières, la doriennne et la phrygienne, dont les autres dépendraient –, les autres régimes valant comme des sous-catégories des premiers, car l'aristocratie s'avère finalement une sorte d'oligarchie, et la *politie* de démocratie. « C'est surtout de cette manière, précise alors Aristote, que l'on a coutume de considérer les constitutions » (IV 3.1290a22-24), mais il ne nous apprend rien de plus sur ces « gens » qui ont ainsi coutume d'entretenir ce point de vue, que l'on peut néanmoins supposer être celui des Athéniens en général. À la même époque qu'Aristote, peut-être avant, peut-être après lui, Platon lui-même dans les *Lois* avait évoqué une telle dualité principielle des régimes.⁴

Quoi qu'il en soit, à la suite de plusieurs tentatives de reclassifications des constitutions au Livre IV, des chapitres 1 à 10, Aristote entreprend de montrer en IV 11 que c'est bien la *politie*, un régime qu'on traduit parfois par en parlant d'un *gouvernement constitutionnel*, qui forme désormais l'*aristè politeia*, à savoir la *constitution excellente*. Or ce dernier prend soin de noter que « la *politie*, pour parler schématiquement, est un mélange d'oligarchie et de démocratie. Mais on a l'habitude, signale-t-il, d'appeler *politie* les formes de mélanges qui penchent vers la démocratie, et plutôt aristocratiques, celles qui penchent vers l'oligarchie » (IV 11.1293b33-37), tant et si bien que l'on se retrouve avec la *politie* en présence d'une démocratie

⁴ Cf. *Lois*, III 693d-e.

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mâtinée d'éléments oligarchiques, une démocratie modérée correspondant d'ailleurs aux démocraties d'autrefois puisque, comme ce dernier le souligne, « ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui des politiques s'appelaient auparavant des démocraties » (IV 13.1297b24-25).

Comme nous l'évoquions précédemment, le début du chapitre 11 pose d'emblée la question de la constitution excellente :

Quelle est la constitution excellente et quelle est la vie excellente pour la grande majorité (*πλειστοις*) des cités et pour la grande majorité des hommes, en se référant pour juger ni à une vertu qui est au-dessus des individus ordinaires, ni à une éducation qui requiert une [certaine] nature et un cortège de ressources dues à la bonne fortune, ni à une constitution existant conformément à nos vœux (*κατ' εὐχὴν*), mais à une vie que la grande majorité (*πλειστοις*) des gens soient capables de mener en commun et à une constitution que la grande majorité (*πλειστοις*) des cités puissent adopter ? (1295a25-31).

Or c'est par un procédé bien typique, à savoir la saisie directe de ce qui constitue le milieu entre les extrêmes, qu'Aristote, au chapitre 11 du Livre IV, fait littéralement *naître sous nos yeux* la catégorie de la classe moyenne comme une quasi entité en soi, cette dernière ne se réduisant pas à un simple *amalgame d'autres éléments* mais formant un *entre-deux* doté de qualités pour ainsi dire propres. Évidemment, pour pouvoir parler d'un certain « milieu », il est nécessaire que les extrêmes existent, mais l'élément intermédiaire ainsi dégagé se voit non seulement rehaussé par rapport aux autres mais pratiquement autonomisé.

À partir de là, les arguments en faveur de la situation médiane de ces gens vont s'accumuler :

1. Les *mesoi* se montrent plus raisonnables, c'est-à-dire qu'il leur est plus facile *d'obéir à l'autorité de la raison* (*λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν*),⁵ par opposition à ceux qui excèdent par la richesse, la puissance, la bonne famille, la beauté, ou ceux qui à l'inverse excèdent par leur misère, leur faiblesse ou leur indignité. Donc les *mesoi* ne sont pas plus raisonnables ou vertueux *en soi*, mais c'est leur situation objective qui les rend dans les faits plus dociles, le phénomène étant objectif et pour ainsi dire *sociologique* (1295b5-11).

2. Les *mesoi* ni ne fuient le pouvoir ni ne le convoitent ou y aspirent spécialement, deux choses nuisibles aux cités. Pourquoi nuisibles ? Parce que dans la querelle sans fin – toujours menaçante pour la paix des institutions – visant à déterminer qui devrait gouverner, ces citoyens du centre sont facteurs de conciliation sociale (1295b12-13).

⁵ Un verbe rare (*πειθαρχεῖν*), 3 occurrences dans les *Politiques*, qui signifie obéir à qui commande, à ce qui détient l'autorité (lois, magistrats, gouvernement, etc.).

3. Contrairement aux *mesoi*, les citoyens situés aux extrêmes du spectre sont les uns capables de gouverner mais ni ne savent ni ne veulent être commandés, et pour les autres, c'est la situation inverse qui prévaut. Or la cité doit à la base être formée avant tout d'hommes libres (ἐλευθέρων)⁶ et donc capables des deux choses d'égale manière. « Il est de la sorte nécessaire, insiste Aristote, que soit *constituée au mieux* (ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι) la cité dont nous disons que les éléments forment, par nature, la composition d'une cité » (1295b27-28), ces éléments étant bien sûr les hommes libres et égaux capables de gouverner comme d'être gouvernés, une exigences plusieurs fois mentionnées dans les *Politiques* (1295b13-28).

4. Les *mesoi* s'avèrent par ailleurs les citoyens les plus en sûreté, puisqu'ils ne suscitent pas la convoitise des pauvres et ne convoitent pas eux-mêmes les avoirs des nantis comme le font les pauvres, si bien qu'ils passent leur vie sans danger. Et Aristote de citer dans ce contexte le poète Phocylide de Milet du VI^e siècle, proclamant : « plusieurs choses dans la moyenne sont excellentes, dans la cité je veux être au milieu » (1295b34).

Au terme de ces quatre premiers arguments, le Stagirite s'estime en mesure de formuler la conclusion qui suit : « il est par conséquent évident que *la communauté, celle politique, qui est la meilleure* (ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρίστη), est celle formée d'individus moyens, et qu'il est possible que de telles cités soient bien gouvernées en lesquelles la classe du milieu est nombreuse et au mieux plus forte que les deux autres classes, ou sinon que l'une des deux » (IV 11.1295b34-38).

Cette conclusion se trouvant définitivement établie, Aristote souligne ensuite que si les dirigeants de cités semblables possèdent eux-mêmes une fortune moyenne et tout juste suffisante, c'est en vérité un heureux hasard (εὐτυχία), comme si par le fait même ils se trouvaient en meilleure posture pour maintenir l'équilibre au sein de la cité. Car là où le déséquilibre des fortunes est important, le vaisseau de la cité, pourrait-on dire, tangue trop d'un côté ou de l'autre, vers une oligarchie ou une démocratie excessive, proches toutes deux de la tyrannie. De là, un nouvel argument en faveur du gouvernement moyen :

5. Or il est manifeste que *la [constitution] moyenne est la meilleure* (ἡ μέση βελτίστη), car seule elle est *non troublée par les factions* [ou *non sujette à sédition* (ἀστασίαστος)]; en effet, là où la classe moyenne est nombreuse, c'est là que les factions et les dissensions naissent le moins parmi les citoyens (1296a7-9).

⁶ Ce qui nous renvoie directement au modèle démocratique de constitution comme à celui-là seul (cf. *supra*, 1275b5-7) où l'individu peut être pleinement citoyen.

L'effet bénéfique de la classe moyenne se fait sentir aussi dans les grandes villes où cette classe s'avère importante en nombre, et elle joue également un rôle de stabilisateur au sein même des démocraties. Or le signe, la preuve par les faits (σημεῖον) de cela, à savoir que la situation moyenne contribue au succès, c'est que les meilleurs dirigeants eux-mêmes, souligne Aristote, appartaient en vérité à la classe moyenne, tels Solon,⁷ Lycurgue et Charondas.

Puis, Aristote en arrive à la déclaration finale du chapitre 13, laquelle clôt en même temps cette vaste investigation menée sur la constitution excellente inaugurée depuis le premier chapitre du Livre IV. Le Stagiritte y révèle à la fois ce qu'il a entrepris d'analyser dans les chapitres précédents et le résultat net auquel il estime lui-même être effectivement parvenu :

On a donc dit pour quelle cause les constitutions sont multiples, et pourquoi il en existe d'autres que celles dont on parle [habituellement] (car il n'y a pas qu'une seule démocratie, et de même pour les autres constitutions), et aussi quelles sont les différences entre elles et pour quelle raison cette [différenciation] advient et, outre cela, quelle est celle des constitutions qui est excellente, j'entends dans l'immense majorité des cas (τίς ἀρίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν), et, parmi les autres constitutions laquelle est adaptée à quels gens (διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τί παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἕτεραι δημοκρατία τε γὰρ οὐ μία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως), ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις τίς ἀρίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποία ποίοις ἀρμόττει τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴρηται.) (1297b28-34).

Dans de telles conditions, l'on ne s'étonnera pas d'apprendre que sur quelque 217 emplois du terme « démocratie » dans les *Politiques*, s'il y en a bien une quarantaine qui s'avère négatif, la majorité d'entre eux s'avère neutre (autour d'une centaine) et plusieurs assez nettement positifs (50 occurrences environ). Très souvent, en parlant de manière positive d'un régime populaire, on s'attendrait à ce que ce soit le terme *politie* qui apparaisse, mais c'est celui de *démocratie* que l'on découvre.

⁷ Sur Solon comme « l'homme du milieu », voir notamment l'exposé de Caire (2016) rappelant entre autres (p. 342) le célèbre fragment 5 West [= Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 12, 1 et Plut. *Sol.* 18.5] de Solon : « Au peuple j'ai donné autant de prérogatives qu'il suffit, sans diminuer ni augmenter sa dignité ; ceux qui avaient la puissance et en imposaient par leurs richesses, j'ai pris garde qu'ils n'aient pas une part indigne d'eux. *Je me suis tenu debout, protégeant les deux partis d'un fort bouclier ; à aucun des deux je n'ai permis de vaincre injustement* ».

Je voudrais maintenant attirer l'attention sur une singularité du Livre VI, concernant la définition ou disons la caractérisation de ce qui constitue en son fond une démocratie. En VI 2, on peut lire ce qui suit :

Le principe de base de la démocratie c'est la liberté (c'est, en effet, ce qu'on a coutume de dire, parce que c'est seulement dans une telle constitution que les citoyens ont la liberté en partage ; c'est à cela que tend, dit-on, toute démocratie). Et l'une des formes de la liberté c'est d'être tour à tour gouverné et gouvernant. En effet, le juste selon la conception démocratique, c'est l'égalité numérique et non selon le mérite [...] Un autre signe distinctif [de la démocratie] c'est le fait *de vivre comme on veut* (τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεται τις), car, disent-ils, tel est l'effet de la liberté, étant donné que la servitude est de ne pas vivre comme on veut. Voilà donc la seconde caractéristique de la démocratie. De là est venue la revendication de n'être, au mieux, gouverné par personne, ou sinon de l'être à tour de rôle. Et cela va dans le sens de la liberté fondée sur l'égalité (VI 2.1317a40b-17, trad. Pellegrin).

Il est vraiment frappant de voir que dans l'explicitation du second trait de la démocratie, à savoir le fait « de vivre comme on veut (τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεται τις) », l'interprétation qu'en propose Aristote colle de très près à la situation qui vaut pour le premier trait. « Vivre comme on veut » n'est pas interprété comme signifiant vivre simplement selon ses désirs, en faisant n'importe quoi ou en se livrant à tous les excès, mais dans le fait de ne pas vivre sous l'emprise d'un autre, c'est-à-dire comme un esclave, et même de ne pas être gouverné par personne d'autre. Mais puisqu'il n'est guère envisageable ou réaliste de n'être gouverné par absolument personne, on peut à défaut être tour à tour gouvernant et gouverné, voilà ce qui satisferait pratiquement le désir de vivre comme on veut. Bref les deux cas mentionnés par Aristote comme caractéristiques de la démocratie – la liberté d'un côté, vivre comme on veut de l'autre – trouvent leur expression ou leur satisfaction dans la participation aux affaires, rien ne les distingue plus en réalité l'un de l'autre. L'on peut penser qu'en traitant le sujet de la sorte, celui-ci coupait court aux critiques adressées par Platon au régime démocratique en *République* VIII 561c-562a, le fait qu'un tel régime encourage le relâchement et la poursuite des plaisirs personnels (liberté négative), mais nullement l'engagement (liberté positive).

Or le τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεται τις aristotélicien ne comporte plus rien de déréglé, il n'est plus caractérisé par ses excès mais par ses éventuels engagements. Cela signifie-t-il qu'Aristote ignore la liberté par excès ? Nullement, il sait

qu'elle peut exister mais surtout dans les démocraties extrêmes dont il parle au Livre V et que du reste il réproouve :

[...] dans les démocraties qui semblent les plus démocratiques c'est le contraire de ce qui est utile qui s'est établi, la cause de cela étant qu'on définit faussement ce qu'est la liberté. Car il y a deux choses par lesquelles la démocratie semble pouvoir être définies, le fait que la multitude soit maîtresse et la liberté; car le juste semble d'une part être ce qui est égal, et l'égal, à savoir cela qui paraît tel à la multitude, voilà ce qui est maître, et d'autre part, par le fait qu'est libre et égal celui qui peut faire ce qu'il veut : de sorte que dans de telles démocraties, chacun vit comme il veut et « en vertu de ce qu'il désire », comme le dit Euripide (fr. 883). Or cela est mauvais, *car il ne faut pas considérer comme une servitude le fait de vivre en vertu d'une constitution, mais comme un salut* (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οἶεσθαι δουλείαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίαν) (V 9.1310a26-38).

Quand Aristote remarque ici que « οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οἶεσθαι δουλείαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίαν », il annonce en vérité l'enseignement de VI 2 selon lequel participer aux affaires affranchit de l'état de sujétion et permet de « vivre comme on veut », mais comme on veut *entendu dans le bon sens*, un sens qui est d'ailleurs compatible avec la vie démocratique elle-même.

Dans mon livre, j'ai attiré enfin l'attention (chapitre 5 : « La place des Livres VII et VIII dans le traité des *Politiques* ») sur l'écart doctrinal subsistant entre les Livres VII-VIII et la conception du meilleur régime défendu en IV 11-13. Ce n'est pas seulement que le Livre VII commence par s'interroger sur la constitution excellente en ignorant superbement les développements qu'offre le bloc des Livres IV-VI sur le sujet (cf. p. 265), c'est aussi qu'il exclut de la participation à la vie politique la classe des artisans, des marchands et plus encore des paysans (cf. 1328b39-1329a2), à la base pourtant de la meilleure démocratie dans les Livres antérieurs, et de là, comme je l'ai suggéré, « la rupture qu'introduit le Livre VII par rapport aux Livres III à VI s'il vient après eux, ou l'écart qui le sépare de ceux-ci s'il les précède, cette dernière hypothèse s'avérant de fait la plus convaincante » (p. 256).

Quoi qu'il en soit de toutes ces difficultés, les percées réalisées par Aristote sur le plan de la réflexion politique se révèlent indubitablement majeures dans cet écrit, qu'il s'agisse de sa défense de l'approche cumulative en politique, laquelle redonne de la dignité à une large partie des citoyens, ou de sa promotion originale de la classe moyenne, deux éléments que l'on peut

qualifier de révolutionnaires et dont la postérité a tiré dans le passé, et tire encore aujourd'hui, un très large profit.

Athènes et nous

La liberté chérie par les Athéniens, c'est un peu le type de liberté que nous encensons nous-mêmes aujourd'hui. Sur ce point, très brièvement, je reprendrais volontiers la réflexion du grand spécialiste de la démocratie grecque qu'est Mogens Herman Hansen. À ceux qui déniaient l'existence d'une telle parenté entre les Grecs et nous, ce dernier posait simplement la question suivante: « Si les Athéniens n'avaient aucune notion de la liberté individuelle, comment se fait-il qu'elle apparaisse comme un idéal dans les sources qui vantent la démocratie ? [...] Si les Athéniens n'avaient aucune idée de la liberté individuelle, c'est pour moi un mystère, note-t-il, de constater qu'ils sont capables de la décrire dans des mots et des phrases qui sont si proches de ceux utilisés par les champions modernes de la liberté [...] ».⁸ On peut comparer à ces remarques les propos jadis d'un Benjamin Constant qui, dans un essai resté justement célèbre, remarquait lui aussi : « De tous les États anciens, Athènes est celui qui a le plus ressemblé aux modernes. Athènes [...] était de toutes les républiques grecques la plus commerçante, aussi accordait-elle à ses citoyens infiniment plus de liberté individuelle que Rome et que Sparte [...]; le commerce avait fait disparaître des Athéniens plusieurs des différences qui distinguent les peuples anciens des peuples modernes ». Et Constant d'ajouter : « on sera frappé de leur amour excessif pour l'indépendance individuelle ».⁹ Vivre en démocratie, cela signifie fondamentalement vivre de manière libre et pouvoir s'exprimer à égalité avec d'autres en toute franchise, d'où l'existence d'une sorte de triade socio-politique : la triade démocratie-liberté-égalité (de parole), à savoir, en grec, la triade δημοκρατία-ἐλευθερία-ισότης (ισηγορία). Les éléments de cette triade sont mentionnés par plusieurs auteurs antiques, que ce soit simplement pour exposer les contours de la démocratie en exercice, se porter à sa défendre ou au contraire la critiquer.

⁸ Hansen (2010) pp. 338-9 (ma traduction).

⁹ Constant (1997) pp. 595, 600 et 601 pour les trois passages cités.

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Or, les deux dimensions de la liberté restent importantes, la vie privée d'un côté, la vie publique de l'autre, comme y insistait Constant lui-même :

Le danger de la liberté antique était qu'attentifs uniquement à s'assurer le partage du pouvoir social, les hommes ne fissent trop bon marché des droits et des jouissances individuelles. Le danger de la vie moderne, c'est qu'absorbé dans la jouissance de notre indépendance privée, et dans la poursuite de nos intérêts particuliers, nous de renoncions trop facilement à notre droit de partage dans le pouvoir politique.

Si donc on doit éviter les excès de l'un ou de l'autre, on doit aussi préserver la coprésence des deux éléments et s'accommoder d'une dose d'individualisme à laquelle il serait difficile et d'ailleurs nullement profitable de renoncer. La comparaison des deux formes de démocratie peut nous conforter dans cette expérience riche et complexe que constitue la vie démocratique.

Le message final d'Aristote est que la démocratie, quand elle s'exerce dans un cadre légal approprié et accorde une place à certains critères d'excellence, s'avère un bon régime, sans doute même le meilleur, le plus stable en tout cas du fait de l'assentiment obtenu d'un grand nombre de personnes (classe moyenne), le plus d'aujourd'hui, insiste-t-il, où l'on trouve beaucoup de gens bien formés et aptes à participer aux affaires publiques. Au fond, c'était déjà pour lui le régime de l'avenir, ce en quoi l'avenir lui-même lui a donné raison.

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MONICA UGAGLIA

ARISTOTLE ON UNIFORM CIRCULAR MOTION

Abstract

Uniform circular motion has an important role in Aristotle's physical world. In this paper a correspondence is built up between: the unique state of being of necessary beings, which are $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ (eternally), outside time; the periodic sequence of identical states of uniform circular motion of the heavens, which are $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ (over and over again) moving in circle; the sequences of different states of change of sublunar bodies, which are $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ (always) changing, in time.

Keywords

Aristotle, Circular Motion,
Potential Infinite, Iteration, Time

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Introduction

In the list of the infinite processes allowed by Aristotle in his cosmos – time, number, the division (and a specific increase) of continuous magnitudes, the generation and corruption of human beings, and the circular motion of the heavens – the circular motion of the heavens occupies a particularly significant place, for reasons which are both physical and metaphysical.

In fact, the state of $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ (over and over again) be moving in circle of the heavens can be read as a sort of mean proportional between the state of pure being of necessary beings, which $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ (eternally) are, outside time, and the state of perpetual motion of sublunar beings, which $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ (always) are changing, in time. In this paper I will show how this can be done, by analyzing the iterative structure of the process of being in circular motion.

An important role in my analysis will be played by the adverb $\alpha\epsilon\iota$, which in its iterative meaning ‘over and over again’ can be used – and, in fact, is used in Greek mathematics – in order to transform a single action into an infinite process. The idea is to build up a correspondence between the unique state of being of necessary beings and one of the infinite identical states of being-in-circular-motion of the heavens. Analogously, a correspondence will be built up between the continuous sequence of identical states of being-in-circular-motion of the heavens and the contiguous sequence of different states of change of sublunar bodies.

In Section 1, the ultimate iterative structure of circular motion is investigated with particular emphasis on its properties of uniformity (the speed is constant), continuity (no interruptions are allowed) and infiniteness (there is no beginning nor end). Read as a purely iterative process, the uniform circular motion of the heavens is then contrasted, on the one hand (Section 2), with the state of being of necessary things, and, on the other hand (Section 3), with the process of change in the sublunar world.

1. *Infiniteness and Periodicity*

Aristotle's notion of infiniteness is constrained by the indispensable requirement of compatibility with the finiteness of his cosmos, that is, a sphere of actually finite radius, containing an actually finite multitude of objects. This excludes any form of infinite in actuality and limits the range of acceptable instances of potential infinite. Denying the actuality of the infinite simply means that the infinite cannot exist either as an object¹ – the infinite *per se* – or as the attribute of an object – an infinite collection of things, a straight line of infinite length and so on.² Instead, allowing its potentiality means that, under certain conditions, it can exist as the attribute of a process. In modern terms, it is the attribute of an iterative process.³ In Aristotle's own terms:

D: the infinite is in virtue of [**D1**] another and another thing being taken, over and over again ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$); and [**D2**] what is taken is finite, over and over again ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$); but [**D3**] it is a different thing, over and over again ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$). (*Ph.* III 6.206a27-29)⁴

As this definition shows, the existence of the infinite is linked to three requirements. The first, **D1**, is that there are no obstructions to the repetition of a given action, in such a way that it can turn into an unending series of identical steps: for each thing one takes (*first step*), there is another thing to take beyond that (*second step*), and another to take beyond that (*third step*) again, and so on, over and over again ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$, *next steps*).⁵ The second requirement, **D2**, is that the thing taken must be limited, at any step, in such a way that no actual infinities are involved in the process. The third requirement, **D3**, is that the process must be a genuine progression, which always goes on without starting from scratch.

In fact, **D3** is not a mandatory condition for the existence of the infinite. Instead, it distinguishes between processes that are infinite in a proper

¹ *Ph.* III 4.203a4-16; 5.204a8-34.

² *Ph.* III 4.203a16-b2; 5.204b4-206a7.

³ Aristotle's iterative notion of infinity is discussed in Ugaglia (2009) and (2018).

⁴ ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔστιν τὸ ἀπειρον, τῷ ἑὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ λαμβανόμενον μὲν ἑὶ εἶναι πεπερασμένον, ἀλλ' ἑὶ γε ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον (*Ph.* III 6.206a27-29).

⁵ On the meaning of $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$ in Greek mathematics, see Mugler (1958-1959), pp. 43-4 and Federspiel (2004).

sense⁶ and processes that are infinite solely because they are periodic – in this case, after a certain number of steps, one comes back to something already taken, and the process is repeated identically, over and over again.

The division of the continuum is the paradigmatic example of the first type of process, which is genuinely infinite: take a segment AB, and divide it at C₁ (*first step*), then take the resulting segment C₁B and divide it at C₂ (*second step*), then take the resulting segment C₂B and divide it at C₃ (*third step*), and so on, over and over again (*ἀεὶ, next steps*):⁷



Figure 1

Due to Aristotle's definition of the continuum as having no inner limits, the division can go on over and over again (**D1** is satisfied). Due to the finiteness of the starting segment, the segments produced at any step of the division are also finite (**D2** is satisfied). Due to the division itself, the segment produced at any step is different from the ones produced at the previous steps (**D3** is satisfied).

⁶ Aristotle's examples are number, time, the generation of men, but also increasing, or shortening, a given magnitude.

⁷ The paradigmatic examples of iterative procedures are those employed in mathematics, and I mean particularly the procedure of reciprocal subtraction, employed in Euclid's *Elements* VII 1-2; X 2-3, and the method of exhaustion, employed in Euclid's *Elements* XII 2, 5, 10, 11, 12; VIII 9; IX 34 and in Archimedes's *Quadratura Parabolae* Prop. 20 and its corollary, and Prop. 24. The pivotal idea is to constrain an *a priori* infinite sequence of steps in a finite procedure of demonstration. As is well known, Greek mathematics is written in natural language; notwithstanding, it is possible to isolate the presence of words, or strings of words, which are intentionally employed in a technical sense, to enunciate a formal scheme, or algorithm. In the case of iterative demonstrations, the algorithmic scheme is particularly evident: after a detailed description (*first step*) of a precise operation, a first repetition of the operation (*second step*) is briefly set forth, and the subsequent identical steps of the process are only alluded to by means of a conventional phrase. The situation can vary in detail, but the way of denoting iteration is fixed: the adverbial *ἀεὶ* followed by a verbal form denoting the action of doing or of producing something (*καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ ποιοῦντες, καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ ποιῶμεν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γινέσθω, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐξῆς ἐνὶ πλείους... next steps*). The important point is that the grammatical structure is the same in Aristotle and in Greek mathematics. On the relevance of the algorithmic feature of the method of exhaustion, see Vitrac (2001) p. 249.

Uniform circular motion is the paradigmatic example of the second type of process, which is infinite and periodic: chose a point on the circle, call it a beginning (A_1), and go from this beginning A_1 to an end B_1 (*first step*), then call this end B_1 a beginning A_2 and go from this new beginning A_2 to a new end B_2 (*second step*), then call this new end B_2 a beginning A_3 and go from this new beginning A_3 to a new end B_3 (*third step*), and so on, over and over again ($\alpha\epsilon\iota$, *next steps*):




Figure 2

Due to the fact that a circle is a closed line which has no endpoints (limits), motion can go on over and over again (**D1** is satisfied). Due to the finiteness of the circle, the portions traveled at any step are also finite (**D2** is satisfied). Due to the fact that a circle is a closed line, after a given number of steps one comes to a portion of the circle already traveled (**D3** is not satisfied).

Although Aristotle has no hesitation in listing circular motion among the manifestations of the infinite allowed in his cosmos, he also stresses that it is not infinite in a proper sense. As I will show in the next sections, it is something more perfect than that.

2. *Circular Motion vs Rectilinear Motion*

A crucial point to clarify, concerning Aristotle's treatment of circular motion, is the difference between a generic, constrained motion *on* a circle (κύκλον φέρεσθαι) and motion *in* circle (κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι), that we could more properly call natural circular motion and is the theme of this paper.⁸ Of course, some of the features of natural circular motion are due exclusively to the geometrical structure of the circle, so that they are common to every motion on a circle, whether natural or not. Other features, however, depend on the specific bodies which naturally move circularly, and this would be of a certain importance in the following. Indeed, everything can be constrained to move *on* a circle, but only celestial eternal beings naturally move *in* circle, just as everything can be constrained to move down *on* a straight line, but only the heavy elements naturally move *in* this way.⁹

In particular, natural circular motion is uniform (that is, the speed is constant),¹⁰ continuous and infinite. I will clarify the meaning of these features by contrasting circular natural motion with a more familiar – from an Aristotelian perspective – natural change, which is continuous but finite and non-uniform.

2.1 *Uniformity and Circularity*

A natural change in Aristotle's sublunar world is a teleological process, resulting from the interaction between a mobile object and its proper mover. At the beginning (A) the mobile object only potentially possesses the form that its mover actually possesses, while at the end (B) the mobile object, which is now moved, also actually possesses that form.¹¹ For this reason, the final point B is not just the end of the change, it is its aim. But for Aristotle,

⁸ οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι καὶ κύκλον (for to travel in circle is not the same as to move on a circle: *Ph.* VIII 8.262a15-16).

⁹ Of course, due to an external intervention, a stone can move up, or sideways, or no matter where, and can do it with a variable speed, depending on the intensity of the intervention. Indeed, no connection exists in this case between the (form of the) mover and the end of the motion.

¹⁰ More properly, the angular rate of rotation is constant, and so is the speed of a point on the circumference, but not its velocity, a vector which changes its direction during the motion.

¹¹ See, e.g., *Ph.* III 2.202 a7-12.

the closer a process gets to its aim – that is, the better – the more its efficiency – that is, its speed – increases.




Figure 3

Among natural changes, local motion – that is, a change of place – plays an important role because it occurs both in the sublunar world and in the heavens. In both cases, it results from the interaction between a mobile object and its mover; but while a sublunar local motion is a process towards perfection, the mobile object and the mover involved in a celestial motion are both eternal and complete, so that they cannot aim to any further perfection. As a result, while a natural sublunar element, for instance a falling stone,¹² naturally moves on a finite, oriented path,¹³ in a non-uniform way,¹⁴ the local motion of celestial bodies is an infinite, non-oriented, uniform process.

It is non-oriented because, given that any point A is equivalent and indistinguishable from any point B, it is impossible to order them.¹⁵ It is uniform because, having no aim, there is no reason for its speed to increase approaching a given point.¹⁶ Finally, it is infinite because, having no aim, it has no end (and no beginning).

¹² The question of the mover in natural locomotion is a complex one. I accept here Aristotle's statement that the mover of a heavy (resp. light) element is what made it heavy (resp. light), as stated in *Ph.* VIII 4.255b6-256a3. For a detailed analysis of the problem, see Bodnár (1997).

¹³ Once motion is an oriented process, its trajectory is an oriented path, too.

¹⁴ In modern terms, the motion of a stone is an accelerated rectilinear motion.

¹⁵ In Aristotle's words, celestial beings have only a "from here to there" (ποθὲν ποῖ) potentiality (*Metaph.* Θ 8.1050b20-22; Λ 2.1069b25-26). I think that it is not by chance that, in the first case, where the reference to celestial beings is explicit, Aristotle uses 'here' and 'there', avoiding any reference to place: place, in its proper sense, is something qualitatively characterized. Cf. *Metaph.* H 1.1042b5-6, where the matter, and hence the potentiality, is called "local" (τοπική).

¹⁶ *Ph.* VIII 9.265b11-16.




Figure 4

As Aristotle shows in *Ph.* VIII, the only motion in his cosmos that complies with these constraints is uniform circular motion,¹⁷ so this must be the motion of celestial beings. I will briefly go over the main topics here, slightly reformulating them.

First, from a purely geometrical point of view, the constraint of uniformity – every portion of motion must be equivalent to every other – reduces the number of possible paths to two: the straight line and the circle. The straight line and the circle are the only known examples of homeomeric lines, that is, lines that perfectly overlap with themselves.¹⁸

Moving from purely geometric considerations to cosmological ones, the possibility of a straight path is definitely excluded. Since Aristotle's cosmos is oriented – it is qualitatively characterised and involves a difference in degrees of perfection going from the center to the periphery – two points at a different distance from the center are different not only geometrically but also qualitatively. When, however, a straight line is placed with respect to the center, their points lie at a different distance from it. But if they lie at a

¹⁷ *Ph.* VIII 10.267b2-5.

¹⁸ Something which is homeomeric (ὁμοιομερής) has parts similar to each other and to the whole (*Cael.* III 4.302b15-20; *GC* I 10.328a10-12; *PA* II 1-2; *Mete.* IV 10.388a10-20; *HA* 486a4-5; cf. *Plat. Prt.* 329d6-8). In fact, also the spiral line satisfies the request, but Aristotle does not list it among the homeomeric lines. On the opposition between circle and straight line, see especially *Metaph.* Δ 6.1016b16-17.

different distance from the center, they do not have the same degree of perfection, and they cannot define the path of a uniform motion.

On the contrary, the circle is defined exactly as the locus of points equidistant from a given point, called the center of the circle. Therefore, it is enough that the center of the circle coincides with the center of the cosmos for there to be a uniform path on which a uniform motion can take place.




Figure 5

Moreover, a uniform circular motion can be continuous and infinite, while a continuous infinite rectilinear motion is incompatible with the finiteness of Aristotle's cosmos. Let us see how this immediately follows from the definition of the infinite discussed in Section 1.

2.2 Continuity and Infiniteness

First of all, Aristotle's definition excludes the possibility of a rectilinear motion which is infinite because its path is infinite: moving in a straight line, and more generally in an open line, at a given point one will reach the boundary of the cosmos, and it will be impossible to go on. In other words, the condition **D1** is not satisfied.

But an infinite rectilinear motion on a finite path must also be excluded. Of course, it is possible to go on infinitely on a segment, running through it in one direction and then in the opposite direction, and repeating that journey; but the outcome of this reiteration is not a unique, continuous motion.

It is a series of disconnected, limited motions, and, for this reason. It cannot be the natural motion of the heavens.

Indeed, when the mobile object reaches the turning point, it must use this point as two: as the end of its outward journey and as the beginning of its return. This division cannot be only potential – as when the traveling body passes the middle point of a straight line – but must be an actual one. But the actualization of a division breaks continuity; such a break of continuity gives rise to limits, and this prevents infinity of motion.

While in a rectilinear motion it is impossible to go from the beginning to the end and again from the end to the beginning, and so on, without changing the direction of motion, thus breaking its continuity, such a break is not needed in circular motion.¹⁹ Imagine curving the segment until its ends A and B join, resulting in a circle; in this case any order between points is destroyed, and every point can serve indifferently as a beginning or as an end.




Figure 6

Imagine one arrives at a supposed end: one can call this end a beginning and go on from this new beginning to an end. But now one can call this end a beginning and go on from this new beginning to an end. And then one can call this end a beginning and go on from this new beginning to an end... and so on. As was anticipated in Section 1, such a motion is a perfect example of a purely iterative process: go from a beginning to an end and call it a beginning (*first step*);

¹⁹ A detailed comparison between rectilinear and circular motion is made in *Ph.* VIII 8 and 9.

then go from this new beginning to an end, and call it a beginning (*second step*), and so on, over and over again (*next steps*), as in Figure 2.

In fact, this is another way of saying that every portion of a circular motion is perfectly equivalent to the one following it, and to the one preceding it, so that motion can go on indefinitely: why should it stop here instead of there? And why should it have started here instead of there?

Moreover, the way of being infinite which is peculiar to uniform circular motion – **D1** and **D2** are satisfied, **D3** is not – is something more perfect than being infinite in a proper way. Indeed, Aristotle often stresses the incomplete nature of the infinite, contrasting it with the perfection of the whole: the infinite is not that beyond which there is nothing – as in the case of a whole – but that beyond which there is always (*ἄπει*) something. In other words, a genuine infinite is always lacking something.

In the case of circular motion, however, this is not completely true. It is true that there is always something beyond, but it is false that this something is absolutely lacking – in some sense, it is already present, so that circular motion is complete.²⁰ And in some sense, it is always (*ἄπει*) present, so that circular motion can be read both as an instance of motion (an ongoing procedure always lacking something) and as an instance of being (a persisting, complete state); uniform circular motion is *ἄπει* both in the mathematical iterative sense of going on over and over again, without limit, and in the metaphysical absolute sense of being eternal. I will elaborate on this point, which is crucial for my analysis, in the following sections.

3. Circular Motion between Necessary Beings and Physical Bodies

For Aristotle, mathematical objects are nothing but physical objects, just considered by the mathematician under a particular (and hence partial) perspective, that is, disregarding change.²¹ In order to obtain a mathematical sphere from a sphere of bronze, for instance, the mathematician has to

²⁰ *Ph.* VIII 8.264b27-28; 9.265a16-22; *Cael.* I 2.269a18-21. See also Quarantotto (2015), where circular motion is read as an *energeia* in the sense of *Metaph.* Θ 6.

²¹ In Aristotle's system, to disregard change means to disregard any qualitative differences, which means to disregard any sort of teleology. For this reason, I will treat the three features as equivalent.

subtract all features of bronze; in order to obtain a geometrical trajectory from a physical change, he has to subtract every teleological feature, that is, those qualitatively differentiating the beginning from the end. But in order to obtain a mathematical object from a uniform circular motion, he does not have to subtract anything: since it is devoid of any qualitative feature, the physical object ‘uniform circular motion’ must coincide with the mathematical object ‘uniform circular motion’.²² But mathematical objects are eternal and necessary, and so, too, must circular motion be.

Summarizing, we have an object that, on the one hand, as I have shown in Section 2.2, is both infinite (imperfect) and complete, and, on the other hand, is both mathematical (necessary, outside time) and physical. I will use this double nature of the uniform circular motion in order to build up a sort of connection between the eternity of necessary beings, complete and perfect, which $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ are the same, and the time of sublunar contingent beings, incomplete and imperfect, which $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ are changing (toward their completion).

The idea is to interpret the state of $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ *being in circular motion* in two slightly different manners: as a continuous sequence of states of being and as a continuous sequence of states of change.²³ As a sequence of states of being, complete and perfect, uniform circular motion pertains to eternal beings: while eternal unmoved beings $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ are, celestial beings $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ are in circular motion. In a similar way, if circular motion is read as a sequence of states of change, it pertains to sublunar beings: while particular sublunar beings $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ are in motion, the sublunar world in its totality $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ is in circular motion.

3.1 Necessary Beings: To- $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ -Be

Both in Greek mathematics and in the Aristotelian corpus, the adverb $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ has a precise iterative meaning when it is associated with an action verb, the indefinite repetition of which it denotes. Nevertheless, the same adverb assumes in Aristotle a slightly different meaning when it is associated with the verb *to be*. In this case, the separation between the verb and the adverbial particle seems to disappear, as if *to- $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ -be* were for Aristotle a new verb,

²² It is not by chance that astronomy in ancient Greece was considered a branch of mathematics.

²³ I employ the phrase ‘states of motion’ to mean an extended portion, or a ‘segment’ of movement, and not a snapshot, or point. In fact, like anything which is continuous, a movement is made of segments and not of points.

completely distinct from the verb *to be*.²⁴ For here we have no iteration of an action – the action of *being* – but instead a single indivisible action, which makes *to-ἀεί-βῆ* equivalent to *to be eternally*.

For Aristotle, things that *eternally are* (τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα) are unchangeable and necessary,²⁵ and belong to three main classes: mathematical objects (and propositions), first principles, and celestial (divine) beings.

Mathematical objects (and first principles, if read as indemonstrable propositions) *eternally are* because they ἀεί are true.²⁶ They are necessary, so that every time one deduces,²⁷ or verifies them, the result is the same.²⁸ In this sense, they are unchangeable, and they are outside time. Aristotle's typical examples of such kinds of object are the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square or the property of the interior angles of a triangle of summing up to two right angles.

Analogously, celestial beings (and first principles, if read as first acting causes) *eternally are* because they are ἀεί the same. Once again, *to be* is obviously not an action verb: as pure actuality,²⁹ what *eternally is* cannot contain any differentiation.

In short, when it refers to eternal things, the adverb ἀεί loses the idea of processuality: *to-ἀεί-βῆ* (eternally)-*be* means immobility, no change, no time,³⁰ pure actuality.³¹ But except for the first unmoved mover, which *eternally is*,

²⁴ On the use of *to-ἀεί-βῆ*, see in particular *Cael.* I 12 and Thomas Aquinas's commentary. Thomas's proposal of interpretation in this sense, as discussed in Williams (1965), is at the basis of Waterlow (1982). On the consequent coincidence between possibility and actuality of what ἀεί-is, see also *Ph.* III 1.203b30.

²⁵ On the relation between always and necessarily, see *De Int.* 9; *Metaph.* Δ 5.1015b9-15 and *Metaph.* E 2.

²⁶ On the applicability of such a criterion to eternal divine beings as well, see *Metaph.* α 2.993b26-31.

²⁷ Differently from first principles, mathematical truths might have something 'before' them: another mathematical truth, which acts as the cause. See *Ph.* VIII 1.252b2-5; *GA* II 6.742b26-35.

²⁸ See especially Aristotle's discussion of the permanent properties (τὰ ἀεὶ ἴδια) in *Top.* V 1, and 128b39-129a2.

²⁹ *Metaph.* Θ 8.1050b16-18.

³⁰ *Ph.* IV 12.221b3-4: ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ αἰεὶ ὄντα, ἢ αἰεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ.

³¹ On the relation between immobility and lack of purpose, see, e.g., *Metaph.* B 2.996a21-b1.

and is unmoved, celestial beings both *eternally are* and *eternally are moved* (in circle);³² how to reconcile the two forms of being?

3.2 The Heavens: *To-ἄει-Be in Circular Motion*

As discussed in Section 2, circular motion is a rather ambiguous object in Aristotle's system. It is a local motion – the first local motion – but it is only improperly located.³³ It has neither end nor beginning, because it lacks any telological perspective;³⁴ but it has an end and a (new) beginning at every point, because it is continuous and infinite.³⁵ It is a natural object, for it is the motion of the aether, which is a natural body;³⁶ however, it is not a change, because the nature of the aether is not a principle of change, but a principle of being (yet in motion), and as such it is not a genuine potentiality. It is instead an act, whose only possible form of being is to persist in its state of motion.³⁷

One can then read uniform circular motion both as an infinite sequence of states of motion and as an eternal persistence of the same state of being. Grammatically, it is sufficient either to link or not to link the adverbial *ἄει* to the verb *to be*.

In this sense, the linked form, the *ἄει-being* in circular motion, is the proper state of celestial beings: something very similar to, and absolutely compatible with, their *ἄει-being*, where instead of having a single, local (punctual) act of being, we have a single, local act of being in circular motion. Indeed, since uniform circular motion is not only infinite, but also periodic, it cannot even bear the basic differentiation between before and after, even in a purely logical sense: every step both precedes and follows every other step, so that they are completely indistinguishable. For this reason, the iteration involved in a uniform circular motion is something more than the repetition of an action: it is the iteration of a unique (numerically

³² *Ph.* IV 4.211a13-14; VIII 10.267b16-17; *Metaph.* Γ 8.1012b30-31; H 4.1044b6-9.

³³ *Ph.* IV 5.212b7-13. See also I 3.186a16-18; VI 9.240a29-b7.

³⁴ *Cael.* I 3; *Cael.* II 3.286a7-12.

³⁵ *Ph.* VIII 8.264b9-28; 9.265a27-b1.

³⁶ *Cael.* I 2.

³⁷ *Cael.* I 9.279b1-3: Καὶ ἅπανστον δὴ κίνησιν κινεῖται εὐλόγως· πάντα γὰρ παύεται κινούμενα ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον, τοῦ δὲ κύκλῳ σώματος ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος ὅθεν ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃν τελευτᾷ.

and specifically) state. But this is the same as to say an everlasting single state, that is, a manifestation of actuality.³⁸

In this way a local correspondence has been built up between the unique act of being of eternal beings and each single identical step of their being in circular motion. Whether eternity is read as a sort of ‘static’ process, or uniform circular motion is read as a sort of ‘processual’ state, in any case they can be obtained from each other.

3.3 *Physical Bodies: To- $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ -Change*

Given the continuity between the mode of being of uniform circular motion and the mode of being of eternal beings, in what follows I suggest an analogous way of establishing a relationship of continuity between the mode of being of uniform circular motion and the mode of being of the sublunar processes of change.

Again, the crucial point will be the notion of iteration, since a local correspondence will be built up between the infinite (iterative) motion of the heavens and the infinite (iterative) chain of finite changes which characterizes Aristotle’s sublunar world. In fact, even if physical changes, individually taken, are finite and oriented, they are part of a unique universal process, which does not have the nature of a change but rather of a motion on a circle and which, as Aristotle says, imitates the perfection of eternal beings.

To see how this imitation works, we have to go back to the semantic framework of Section 3.1, where the adverbial $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ was not linked to the verb *to be*, in a single composed verbal form, but was acting on the verb, as an iterative operator, as in mathematics: not *to- $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ -be* in circular motion, which is the proper state of celestial beings, but *to- $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ -be* in motion on a circle.³⁹ If read in

³⁸ *Cael.* I 9, *passim*. Cf. *Metaph.* E 2.1026b27-29; *Ph.* VIII 6.259b33-260a19.

³⁹ I employ the phrase “motion on a circle” for the unceasing chain of sublunar changes in order to emphasize the difference from the celestial circular motion of the heavens, which is a proper “motion in circle”. In the latter case, we have a single subject, performing a single movement, while in the first case we have infinitely many individual limited motions which are connected, or literally strung together, so that they perform a motion that covers a circle. I would like to thank the anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.

this way, as the indefinite iteration of the action of moving in circle, the notion of uniform circular motion is consistent with that of a physical process.⁴⁰

3.3.1 *To-àei-Be in Motion on a Circle*

The process of change that characterizes the sublunar world is made up of finite and separated teleological sub-processes. Since each of these sub-processes has well-defined and qualitatively characterized extremes, two changes cannot be continuous, but only contiguous, like two legs of a relay race,⁴¹ because the ending point of the first change, as such, is qualitatively different from the starting point of the second one. Moreover, they have a different subject, and that they can be viewed as a unique continuous process is absolutely not obvious. But the reference to the uniform circular motion of the heavens gives a solution to both the difficulties. Let see how.

As Aristotle explains in *De generatione et corruptione*,⁴² physical changes can combine to form a single, infinite, periodic process: a circular motion which imitates, as far as possible, the perfection of eternal beings. This combination involves the two levels of inanimate and animate beings.

At the level of inanimate beings, the infinite process is realized by means of a composition of locomotion, alteration and changes of elements into each other.⁴³ A slightly different state of affairs is represented at the level of animate beings: because they are composed of elements, they are subjected (at a purely material level) to the kind of changes just seen; but because they are animated, they are subjected to another process, in which eternity manifests itself in a more perfect way. This is the continuous generation of individuals, which, as Aristotle affirms in *De generatione animalium* and in *De generatione et corruptione*, is the best possible way for animated beings to imitate eternity:

⁴⁰ In this perspective, the notion of uniform circular motion is strictly related to the notion of (infinite) time, which is absolutely extraneous to the notion of eternity, and impossible to be inferred from it.

⁴¹ *Ph.* V 4.

⁴² *GC* II 10.

⁴³ *GC* II 10.337a4-6: “When from water air comes to be, and from air fire, and again (πάλιν) from fire water, we say that generation has come round in circle because it has come back again (πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν)”.

For these reasons there is generation of animals. For, since the nature of such kind cannot be eternal, that which comes into being is eternal in the way that is possible for it. Now it is not possible in number (for the being of existing things is in the particular, and if this were such it would be eternal) but it is possible in form.⁴⁴ That is why there is continuously (*ἀεί*) a kind – of men and of animals and of plants.⁴⁵

This means that, if it is seen from a sufficient ‘distance’ – that is, if it is considered at a certain level of generality – the global process appears to be composed of identical steps, where a single step is not the generation (and corruption) of particular individuals, but the instantiations of the same, identical form.

The idea, as usual, is to disregard some qualitative feature of the processes involved. Take a natural change, a process of generating men, for example, where the beginning (the birth of the father) and the end (the birth of the son) are naturally separated and pertain to two separate individuals. Now disregard any accidental difference between the two men, and consider them as two instances, or two states, of the same subject: the human form.

What we see at this level is a purely iterative process: go from a father to a son, and call him a father (*first step*); then go from this new father to a son, and call him a father (*second step*); then go from this new father to a son, and call him a father (*third step*), and so on, over and over again (*next steps*).⁴⁶ Or, in more abstract terms of form: a human form is generated (*first step*); then a human form is generated (*second step*); then a human form is generated (*third step*), and so on, over and over again (*next steps*).

This can be done for every species, so that there are many circular processes of the generation of a form, just as there are many circular celestial motions.

⁴⁴ *De an.* II 4.415a26-b7: “In fact, this is the most natural function of animate beings, [...] to reproduce another like themselves (*ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό*), an animal an animal, a plant a plant, in order that they partake of the *ἀεί* and the divine in the only way they can [...] Since they cannot partake of the *ἀεί* and the divine by continuity, for no perishable thing can remain numerically one and the same, they partake of it in the only way they can, some to a greater and some to a lesser extent: what persists is not the same, but something like it, one not numerically but specifically” (cf. *De an.* II 4.416b14-17; *Metaph.* Γ 5.1010a24-25). On the subject see Lennox (2001) and Quarantotto (2005).

⁴⁵ *GA* II 1.731b32-732a1.

⁴⁶ Like in the case of circular motion as discussed in Section 2, there is no a last step but there is neither a first step. Indeed, one must imagine indefinitely carrying on the procedure also in the opposite direction, so that the procedure will never end and has always yet started.

Of course, in Aristotle's world, nothing actually exists as a form separated from physical bodies; but to acknowledge it as something common and preserved in the process of generation allows Aristotle to treat the process as eternal and necessary, and to study it with the instruments of a demonstrative science, disregarding the possibility of failure connected with the individual. The coincidence, at any step, of the form as beginning (formal cause) and as end (final cause) transforms the hypothetical necessity,⁴⁷ which holds at the level of the single step, into an absolute necessity acting at the level of the process. While any step is completely subject to the indeterminacy of physical world, the iterative structure of the process as a whole, considered from the point of view of the form, is completely determined by the fact that it is nothing but the manifestation, in the sublunar world, of the necessity of eternal beings, with the mediation of the motion of the heavens.

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⁴⁷ Aristotle firmly denies any form of determinism, but the question of how reconcile passages apparently contradictory is not straightforward. See for instance McCall (1969), McKim (1971), Williams (1978).

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SANTIAGO CHAME

EL ARGUMENTO DE *METAPHYSICA* Θ 1
SEGÚN EL SEMINARIO DE LONDRES:
EL USO DEL ANÁLISIS FOCAL Y EL PROBLEMA
DE LOS ENUNCIADOS PROGRAMÁTICOS

Abstract

The London seminar's famous notes on the central books of the *Metaphysics* constitute crucial bibliography for anyone working on Aristotle's ontology. In this article, I provide an analysis of a representative passage of these notes, namely, the section devoted to *Metaphysics* Θ 1 (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, pp. 46-51). I will first reconstruct the main lines of interpretation put forward by the Londinenses. I will pay particular attention to Owen's introductory analysis, which makes use of focal meaning analysis in order to explain the link between the various applications of the initial motion sense of δύναμις. I will also analyze the ensuing commentary on the so-called programmatic statements (*Metaph.* Θ 1.1045b37-1046a4). Second, I will make some considerations on the method of the notes. Finally, I will analyze the connection between *Metaph.* Θ 1 and *Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a35-b9. This will allow us to discuss in a different light the reading by the Londinenses of this important chapter.

Keywords

Capacity, Activity, Potency,
Act, Motion

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Las notas del célebre seminario de Londres sobre los libros centrales de la *Metafísica* constituyen bibliografía incluíble para cualquier estudioso de Aristóteles.¹ Quizás lo más característico de estas notas sea su metodología, típicamente oxoniense: se presentan discusiones muy apegadas al texto aristotélico, sin un compromiso *a priori* con hipótesis de lectura sistemáticas. En este sentido, las notas pueden considerarse como la contrapartida de, por ejemplo, el método jaegeriano, que fundamenta y organiza la interpretación del texto aristotélico a partir de la hipótesis genética.

El propósito del presente artículo es ofrecer un análisis de un pasaje representativo de estas notas, a saber, la sección dedicada a *Metaph.* Θ 1 (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, pp. 46-51). Nuestra intención es, en primer lugar, reconstruir los ejes de la lectura llevada por los londinenses. Prestaremos especial atención al análisis introductorio de Owen, fundador del seminario, en el cual se hace uso del *focal meaning analysis* para explicar el vínculo entre las diversas aplicaciones del sentido inicial de δύνανμις (secciones 1-2).² También analizaremos el sucesivo comentario de los llamados enunciados programáticos (*Metaph.* Θ 1.1045b37-1046a4) (sección 3). En segundo lugar, nos proponemos realizar algunas consideraciones sobre el método de las notas (sección 4). Por último, analizaremos el vínculo entre *Metaph.* Θ 1 y un pasaje que los londinenses no tienen en cuenta: *Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a35-b9 (sección 5). Esto nos permitirá reconsiderar algunas de las lecturas propuestas por los londinenses desde una perspectiva diversa.³

¹ Las notas se dividen en dos publicaciones, una dedicada a *Metaph.* Z (Burnyeat *et al.* 1979), otra a *Metaph.* H y Θ (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984). En este trabajo nos centraremos en la segunda de estas publicaciones, y en particular, en el comentario al primer capítulo de *Metaph.* Θ.

² En el prefacio a las notas dedicadas a *Metaph.* H y Θ (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, p. i), Woods señala que en varias ocasiones Owen distribuyó notas introductorias de su autoría referidas a varios capítulos individuales del libro Θ (en particular, caps. 1-4 y 8-10). En la versión publicada de las notas, los textos introductorios de Owen se incluyen oportunamente al inicio de los capítulos en cuestión. Estas notas presentan esquemas sobre los puntos centrales de los diversos capítulos de Θ y orientan en manera decisiva la discusión posterior.

³ Las discusiones sobre la bibliografía reciente de *Metaph.* Θ serán confinadas a las notas. Prestaremos especial atención a los puntos de contacto y de divergencia de la literatura reciente en relación con las lecturas propuestas por los londinenses.

1. El argumento de *Metaphysica* Θ 1 y la lectura de G.E.L. Owen

El primer capítulo de *Metafísica* Θ tiene un doble propósito. En primer lugar, Aristóteles presenta el objeto del tratado, a saber, el estudio de los conceptos de potencia (δύναμις) y acto (ἐνέργεια), y establece sumariamente el programa y la estructura de la discusión subsiguiente (1045b27-1046a4). Aristóteles anuncia que, dado que ya ha hablado de lo que es en sentido primero (i.e., la sustancia), y dado que lo que es se dice además según la potencia y el acto (ἐντελέχεια)⁴ y la función (ἔργον)⁵ (1045b33-34), debemos ahora abocarnos al estudio de estas nociones. El Estagirita indica que se debe comenzar por el estudio de la noción más familiar y conocida de potencia,⁶ que es aquella referida al movimiento (κίνησις), aunque aclara que esta no es la noción más útil para el proyecto que se propone llevar a cabo en el tratado

⁴ Es preciso notar que el término ἐντελέχεια ocurre seis veces en cuatro pasajes del libro Θ (además del pasaje citado arriba, en 1047a30-1047b2, 1049a5-6 y 1050a23) y es mucho menos frecuente que el término ἐνέργεια (sesenta y siete ocurrencias). En dos de aquellos cuatro pasajes (1047a30-1047b2, 1050a21-23) el término se usa simplemente para expresar su conexión intrínseca con ἐνέργεια. Se ha sugerido que hay una diferencia de sentido entre ἐνέργεια (que denotaría ‘actividad’) y ἐντελέχεια (más cercano a la noción de ‘actualidad’), pero los intérpretes que sostienen esta distinción usualmente tienen dificultades para conciliarla con el propio texto de Aristóteles. Por ejemplo, Bonitz (1849, p. 388; 1870, *s.v.* ἐντελέχεια) se ve forzado a admitir que Aristóteles no es sistemático en el uso de ambos términos y que no mantiene la supuesta distinción en todos los contextos. En efecto, los términos parecen tener un uso intercambiable (nótese, por ejemplo, las versiones paralelas de la definición aristotélica del movimiento en *Phys.* III 1.201a9-b15 y *Metaph.* K 9.1065b14-1066a6, que hacen uso de ambos términos). Al respecto cf. Reale (1962) p. 178; Blair (1967) p. 110 y (1992) pp. 88-9, 104, 114; Bague (1991) p. 114; y Coope (2009) p. 290 n. 2. Owen *et al.* no se expiden sobre la cuestión en su comentario a Θ 1.

⁵ Sobre el vínculo entre ἐνέργεια/ἐντελέχεια y ἔργον cf. Θ 8.1050a21-23: τοῦνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν. Distintas interpretaciones sobre la conexión etimológica entre los términos ἐνέργεια y ἔργον pueden hallarse en Bonitz (1849) p. 387; von Fritz (1963) [1938] pp. 66-7; Graham (1987) pp. 186-7; Berti (1990) p. 49; Blair (1992) pp. 17-20; Yepes Stork (1993) pp. 160-2; y Beere (2008) p. 94 n. 6.

⁶ Como veremos más adelante (cf. *infra*, p. 79), los londinenses traducen μάλιστα κυρίως en 1045b36 como “in the strictest sense” (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, p. 49). En contraste, otros autores entienden que con μάλιστα κυρίως Aristóteles se refiere no a un sentido ‘estricto’ de δύναμις sino al sentido más establecido, familiar y aceptado del término (cf. Berti 1990, p. 47; Menn 1994, p. 92; Anagnostopoulos 2011, p. 423; Kosman 2013, p. 37). La diferencia tiene un impacto significativo en la interpretación general del tratado, pero no podemos adentrarnos en esta cuestión aquí por obvios motivos de espacio.

(1045b35-1046a1). En efecto, tanto el concepto de potencia como el de acto (*ἐνέργεια*) se extienden más allá (*ἐπὶ πλεόν*) del movimiento (1046a1-2). El análisis de este sentido ulterior tendrá lugar, nos informa Aristóteles, en las discusiones concernientes al acto, que siguen al análisis del sentido inicial de potencia ligado al movimiento (1046a2-4).

El segundo propósito de *Metaph.* Θ 1 consiste precisamente en el análisis del primer sentido de potencia. Este análisis ocupa la mayor parte del capítulo (desde 1046a4 hasta 1046a35). Todo este pasaje es paralelo a *Metaph.* Δ 12, texto abocado al estudio de los diversos sentidos de los términos *δύναμις* y *δυνατόν*.

Como mencionamos previamente, la discusión sobre este pasaje en el seminario de Londres se abre con las notas de G.E.L. Owen (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, pp. 46-8). Estas notas consisten en un contrapunto entre el análisis de *δύναμις* de Δ 12 y el de Θ 1. En efecto, el propósito central del comentario de Owen es elucidar el concepto de *δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν*, que es, como indica Aristóteles, el sentido dominante del término. Los enunciados programáticos se discuten por Owen posteriormente (pp. 48-9).⁷

Un dato emergente de *Metaph.* Θ 1 es que la noción de *δύναμις* es en sí particularmente *ambigua*; no sólo existe una ambigüedad entre dos sentidos principales (aquel menos útil ligado al movimiento y aquel otro de mayor utilidad, que va más allá de la esfera del movimiento), sino que al interno de cada uno de estos dos sentidos encontramos a su vez diversos significados del término. La primera sección del libro Θ (caps. 1-5)⁸ está abocada al estudio del primer grupo de sentidos, y pareciera que Owen se propone, en su nota sobre Θ 1, detallar cuidadosamente la plurivocidad del término *δύναμις* en su sentido cinético.

Owen interpreta que el análisis aristotélico de la *δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν* sigue el modelo que célebremente llamó *focal meaning analysis* (Owen 1960,

⁷ En esto, la nota de Owen se diferencia del comentario de Bonitz y Ross. Estos autores parecen presentar un interés inverso al de Owen, y se ocupan en mayor medida de comentar el primer pasaje programático, en detrimento de la discusión posterior sobre el sentido *κύριος* de la potencia (cf. Ross 1924, I p. cxxiv; II pp. 240-1; y Bonitz 1949, pp. 378-81). Sobre esta cuestión véase la cuarta sección *infra*.

⁸ O al menos los capítulos 1-2 y 5; los capítulos 3-4 se desvían del programa delineado en Θ 1. Cf. *infra*, n. 15.

presentado en el *Symposium Aristotelicum* de 1957). Este dispositivo teórico (según el cual los diversos sentidos de un término remiten focalmente a un sentido primario) fue ideado por Owen para explicar el procedimiento aristotélico respecto de la plurivocidad de nociones tales como la amistad, la salud y (según Owen, más tardíamente) lo que es (τὸ ὄν).⁹ Owen considera que Aristóteles procede de manera análoga a la hora de explicar el vínculo entre los diversos sentidos de δύνανμις detallados en la segunda parte de Θ 1.¹⁰ A continuación, analizaremos más en detalle el comentario de Owen para luego detenernos en el resto del comentario de los londinenses (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, pp. 48-51), que sigue linealmente el orden de la exposición aristotélica en Θ 1.

⁹ Las respuestas a la propuesta general de Owen (más allá de su posible aplicación o no a Θ 1) son muy numerosas; remitimos al lector al ensayo de Berti (1971), que en la nota 5 menciona las principales réplicas en la etapa inmediatamente posterior a la aparición del ensayo de Owen. Trabajos posteriores particularmente relevantes son aquellos de Hintikka (1971), Ferejohn (1980) e Irwin (1981) (quien propuso reemplazar la expresión *focal meaning* por *focal connection*, precisamente para evitar la impresión de que el análisis πρὸς ἓν concierne exclusivamente al ámbito semántico). Estudios más recientes sobre la cuestión son aquellos de Shields (1999), Yu (2001), Ward (2008) y Brakas (2011). Los trabajos de Shields y Ward suelen considerarse como superadores en relación con algunos aspectos de la teoría seminal de Owen. Además del concepto de “core-dependent homonymy” introducido por Shields, Ward introdujo el de “core-related homonymy”; según Ward (2008) p. 1, este concepto designa un punto medio entre la sinonimia y la no-sinonimia que “would include those that have a common term and some, but not all, common characteristics”.

¹⁰ Las posiciones de los comentaristas más recientes del libro Θ respecto del uso del *focal meaning analysis* en el contexto de Θ 1 son diversas. Si bien Ide (1992) p. 4 y Makin (2006) pp. 17, 24 aceptan la lectura de Owen a grandes rasgos, Beere (2009) pp. 34-8 la rechaza explícitamente. Por otra parte, Lefebvre (2018) pp. 450-3 prescinde del *focal meaning* al examinar al vínculo entre sentido primario y sentidos derivados de δύνανμις. Respecto de la posición de Beere, este autor considera que el *focal meaning analysis* limita la investigación al campo específicamente semántico (cf. p. 35 n. 3). Por el contrario, Beere propone seguir a Shields (1999), quien plantea la noción de “core-dependent homonymy” como sustituto al dispositivo de *focal meaning* (p. 36 n. 6). Esta noción no implicaría, según Beere, un compromiso estricto sea con un análisis de tipo semántico o con uno de tipo ontológico en el contexto del análisis de los múltiples sentidos de δύνανμις.

2. El contrapunto entre Δ 12 y Θ 1

Como dijimos, Owen comienza no por Θ 1 sino por Δ 12. Owen indica que una mención al análisis focal aparece tan sólo hacia el final de capítulo (*Metaph.* Δ 12.1019b35-1020a6) y casi como una postdata, pero no obstante considera que la descripción aristotélica de los distintos sentidos de δύναμις/δυνατόν se rige por este concepto. Es por ello que inmediatamente presenta un modelo de acuerdo a los parámetros del *focal analysis*: se distingue un primer sentido de δύναμις (δύναμις₁) como “principio de cambio en otro o (en la misma cosa) en tanto que otra” (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, p. 46, traduciendo Δ 12.1019a15-16), del cual dependen cuatro sentidos del adjetivo correspondiente δυνατόν:

Δυνατόν₁ – tener δύναμις₁;

Δυνατόν₂ – estar sujeto a otra cosa que tiene δύναμις₁ sobre la primera;

Δυνατόν₃ – ni δυνατόν₁ ni δυνατόν₂, es decir la privación. Owen llama la atención sobre 1020a3 (τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν), desarrollado previamente en 1019a26-33 y 1019b5-10, 10-11. Este último texto presenta una dificultad en relación con la noción de privación: si la στέρησις se considera una ἔξις (1019b7) entonces toda cosa que carezca de algo sería capaz; pero esto sería solo por mera homonimia. Owen conecta este pasaje además con la noción de ἔξις ἀπαθείας mencionada en Θ 1.1046a13, es decir, la capacidad que tiene algo de no cambiar por la afección de otro, o de ello mismo en tanto que otro;

Δυνατόν₄ – tener δύναμις₁ en algún modo especial; Owen señala 1020a3-4 (puntualmente, el adverbio ὥδι) y agrega un ejemplo: “puede inspirarnos, pero sólo los viernes? No, el ejemplo primario es ‘bien’”. Con este ejemplo, Owen parece establecer una distinción entre las condiciones generales que pueden afectar a una capacidad, como en el caso de una restricción temporal (“sólo los viernes”), de la condición que Aristóteles parece tener en mente con ὥδι, a saber, la capacidad de hacer algo correctamente. Para apoyar su lectura, Owen nos dirige al adverbio καλῶς en 1019b13 y 1046a16-19 (sobre este punto, véase *infra*, pp. 80-1).

Owen señala que mientras que el sentido primario de δύναμις (δύναμις₁) aparece intacto en las cuatro variantes de δυνατόν, no parece ocurrir lo mismo en

el caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_1$ en relación con $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_{2-4}$. Puntualmente, se menciona el caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_4$, donde $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_1$ está sujeto a modificaciones no especificadas. Pero la dificultad se resuelve, observa Owen, si se tiene en cuenta un pasaje paralelo en *EE* VII 2.1236a7-33, donde se analiza el concepto de $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\iota\alpha$:

$\Phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\iota\alpha_1$ – deseo por lo bueno y lo placentero (1235b18-19);

$\Phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\iota\alpha_2$ – deseo por el bien del agente (1235b25-26, 32-35; Owen pregunta: ¿y por tanto condicionalmente placentero?);

$\Phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\iota\alpha_3$ – deseo por el placer del agente (y, por tanto, aparentemente bueno, 1235b26-29).

En los casos 2 y 3 aparece la fórmula primaria, pero con calificativos. Sin estas calificaciones, ‘bien’ y ‘placer’ deben entenderse en sentido absoluto ($\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$), aunque $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ no aparece en la definición primaria de $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\iota\alpha$. Owen sugiere que el caso es paralelo al de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_4$, donde Aristóteles introduce una calificación (no específica) a la noción de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_1$. Con lo cual no habría dificultad en encontrar el sentido primario de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu$ en $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_4$.

Owen utiliza este esquema de Δ 12 para interpretar el vínculo entre los diversos sentidos de $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma/\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu$ en Θ 1. En primer lugar, se señala que no hay una secuencia de $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_{2-4}$ que corresponda a $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_{2-4}$ en Δ 12, pero que no obstante Θ 1 gira en torno a las nociones de $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_{1-4}$ correspondientes:

$\Delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_1$ – principio de cambio en otro o (en una misma cosa) en tanto que otra (1046a10-11);

$\Delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_2$ – principio en un paciente para sufrir un cambio efectuado por otro o (por una misma cosa) en tanto que otra. Owen sugiere que tras la definición se debe sobreentender que el cambio es a su vez efectuado por “un principio de cambio (i.e., algo que es o tiene $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_1$)” (lo cual vuelve manifiesto el modo en que $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_1$ opera en la definición de $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_2$);

$\Delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_3$ – estado determinado de no ser afectado para peor o de ser destruido por otro o (por una misma cosa) en tanto que otra, es decir, por aquello que es o tiene $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_1$ (este complemento, implícito en $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_2$ es explícito en el caso de $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_3$; cf. 1046a13-15);

$\Delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_{4-6}$ – como en el caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_{1-3}$ pero con el agregado ‘bien’; esto no parece presentar problemas en el caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_1$ y $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_2$, pero se presenta una dificultad en el caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_3$ (en efecto, no resulta inmediatamente claro cómo se debe interpretar la expresión “no ser afectado bien para peor”); Owen propone interpretar la expresión en modo que sugiera una resistencia específicamente notable para resistir el daño/destrucción.

Owen observa que este esquema se corresponde con el esquema de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu_{1-4}$ en Δ 12. Por otra parte, señala que en 1046a6-9 se insiste en el hecho de que la relación entre los sentidos derivados y el sentido primario no es de mera similitud, lo cual derivaría en simple homonimia.¹¹ Pero ¿cuál es la naturaleza específica de esta relación (más fuerte que la mera similitud) entre sentido primario y sentidos derivados? Owen señala que en el caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma/\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\nu$, a diferencia del vínculo entre el sentido primario de $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\acute{\nu}$ (i.e., $\sigma\acute{o}\sigma\iota\alpha$) y sus sentidos derivados, y en modo similar al vínculo entre el sentido primario de salud o de médico respecto de sus sentidos derivados, un caso derivado de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ requiere y puede coincidir con un caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma_1$. Esto sugiere que, en el caso de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ y sus sentidos derivados, la prioridad lógica no implica una prioridad en el orden de la naturaleza (como en el caso de $\delta\acute{\nu}$ y $\sigma\acute{o}\sigma\iota\alpha$). Se trata por supuesto de los dos componentes (prioridad lógica, prioridad natural) que Owen destacó ya en su trabajo de 1960 sobre *focal meaning analysis*.¹²

3. El comentario textual de Θ 1

Tras arribar a esta conclusión, el texto abandona el contrapunto entre Δ 12 y Θ 1 y sigue linealmente el orden de la exposición aristotélica (pp. 48-51; se reporta la discusión entre los demás integrantes del seminario en función de las notas de Owen). En la p. 48 se señala que las primeras líneas del capítulo remiten a Z (cf. *Metaph.* Θ 1.1045b28: $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\eta\tau\alpha\iota$), y en particular a Z 1

¹¹ Al respecto, se señalan dos pasajes: a) *EE* 1236a7-33, citado anteriormente, donde se explica el concepto de $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$ sin recurrir a la noción de similitud, y b) *EN* 1158b19-21, 35-1157a3, donde se hace uso de la similitud sin recurrir al *focal meaning*.

¹² Cf. en especial Owen (1960) pp. 170-2.

(1045b32: ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις). Otras referencias a Z en Θ, según los londinenses, son aquellas de Θ 8.1049b27-29, y notablemente, Θ 1.1045b35-1046a1. Esta última referencia implica una toma de posición por parte de los londinenses respecto de la estructura y el propósito del libro: en su lectura, Aristóteles sostiene en este pasaje que aquello que es más útil¹³ en el contexto actual (i.e., el libro Θ) es la noción de δύναμις como potencialidad (*potentiality*) anunciada en H 6.1045a20-33. De esta afirmación se extraen dos consecuencias: 1) que ZH conforman una unidad y 2) que la investigación llevada a cabo en Θ está íntimamente ligada a las dificultades de ZH, y a la noción de potencia introducida en H como eventual solución al problema de la unidad de la definición de una sustancia.¹⁴

A continuación (p. 49), se presenta y comenta someramente la estructura del libro: Aristóteles primero promete discutir δύναμις en su sentido estricto, es decir, en relación con el movimiento, tarea que en Θ 6.1048a25-26 se dice ya fue realizada. Además, Aristóteles promete estudiar los otros tipos de δύναμις en las discusiones concernientes al acto, lo cual se repite en 1048a26-27. Los paralelos entre Θ 1 y Θ 6 pueden ser invocados como una

¹³ Owen *et al.* siguen a Ross (1924) y a Jaeger (1957) y se diferencian de Bekker (1831) Schwegler (1847) y Christ (1906) [1886], al preferir la lectura de Ab (χρησιμωτάτη) por sobre la de EJ (χρησιμῆ) en 1045b36. El hecho no es del todo irrelevante, dado que, al optar por el superlativo, el texto parece conferir algún tipo de ‘utilidad’ a la noción de δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν (matiz que se pierde al elegir el nominativo, según el cual pareciera que *sólo* la noción ulterior de potencia es de utilidad para los propósitos de Aristóteles en Θ). En su reciente traducción de la *Metafísica*, Berti (2017) pp. 367, 398 n. 1 opta por el nominativo. Al respecto véase también Beere (2009) p. 23 n. 6 y Lefebvre (2018) p. 25 n. 2.

¹⁴ La lectura unitarista de *Metaph.* Θ, según la cual el libro forma parte integral del bloque ZHΘ, fue defendida con fuerza por Jaeger 1923 (véase también la nota a 1045b32 en el aparato crítico de su edición de la *Metafísica*, donde considera que ZHΘ constituyen un *unam methodum*). Esta línea de lectura fue ampliamente explorada por Kosman (1984) y Gill (1989). Por el contrario, Witt (2003) pp. 8-9 y Beere (2009) pp. 22-3 rechazan la lectura unitarista y consideran que el libro Θ representa en alguna medida un proyecto independiente al de ZH. Menn (1994) pp. 105-6 conecta explícitamente el programa de Θ con la problemática de los primeros principios y el primer motor inmóvil en *Metaph.* Λ. Gonzalez (2019) también considera que el argumento de Θ está íntimamente ligado a la noción de actividad que luego será fundamental en la caracterización de la sustancia inmaterial y del primer motor. En una posición intermedia se ubica Lefebvre (2018) pp. 360-1. Sobre la interpretación de los londinenses, cf. secciones cuatro y cinco *infra*.

confirmación del programa del libro, y a ello se añade una distinción terminológica existente entre los dos bloques del tratado (caps. 1-5 y 6-9): en los primeros capítulos predomina el uso del término δύναμις, mientras que en los capítulos posteriores se recurre con mayor insistencia a la expresión δυνάμει ὄν; en ambos bloques figura el término δυνατόν, aunque, según los londinenses, en el primero este corresponde a δύναμις y en el segundo a δυνάμει. No obstante, los londinenses advierten que el criterio no se respeta en modo absoluto: en Θ 8 predomina δύναμις como término general, y en Θ 3-4 (nótese δυνάμει en 1047b1) se expande el significado restringido de δύναμις en anticipación de la discusión posterior, llevada a cabo en la segunda sección del tratado.¹⁵

Se comenta luego la segunda parte del capítulo, que concierne a los diversos sentidos de δύναμις. Se regresa nuevamente a la conexión entre Θ 1 y Δ 12, aunque en esta ocasión se insiste en dos cuestiones: 1) se señala que en Θ 1 el término δύναμις está acompañado no sólo por el adjetivo δυνατόν sino

¹⁵ La discusión de δύναμις en *Metaph.* Θ 3.1047a24-29 y toda aquella correspondiente a Θ 4 pareciera involucrar un concepto más amplio de δύναμις/δυνατόν que aquel de potencia o capacidad en sentido físico. Bonitz (1849) p. 380 y Ross (1924) II p. 241, notando la incongruencia entre estos pasajes y los enunciados programáticos de Θ 1, sostuvieron que Aristóteles evidentemente confunde los dos sentidos de δύναμις y que no es sistemático en el uso de los mismos. Pero quizás la incongruencia pueda explicarse si tenemos en cuenta el carácter *parentético* de Θ 3-4; Θ 5 parece retomar directamente la discusión llevada a cabo en Θ 2, con lo cual la discusión en 3-4 podría considerarse en cierta medida independiente del tratamiento estricto de la δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν aludida en Θ 1. No obstante, esto no implica necesariamente que los capítulos constituyan una *digresión* en el contexto más amplio del tratado, es decir, que no cumplan una función importante en el argumento aristotélico en *Metaph.* Θ. Otra particularidad del capítulo 3 es el uso de los términos ἐνέργεια y ἐντελέχεια. La presentación de Aristóteles de la tesis megárica incluye una forma conjugada del término ἐνέργεια, y si tenemos en cuenta esta forma conjugada, el término aparece diez veces en el capítulo, mientras que ἐντελέχεια figura en dos ocasiones. Esto marca un contraste con los capítulos 2, 4 y 5, en los cuales ambos términos se encuentran notablemente ausentes. Nuevamente, no es del todo claro que Aristóteles use una noción exclusivamente cinética de ἐνέργεια en el capítulo (tal como debería ser según el programa anunciado en Θ 1). En primer lugar, porque uno de los ejemplos utilizados en la primera parte de la refutación a los megáricos es aquel de la vista (Θ 3.1047a8-10), acción que es distinguida tajantemente del movimiento en *Metaph.* Θ 6.1048b23-24 (cf. además *DA* III 7.431a4-7; *EN* X 4.1174a13-b14; *Metaph.* Θ 8.1050a23-25). En segundo lugar, porque en el cierre del capítulo (Θ 3.1047a30-b2) se insiste en el hecho de que la noción de ἐνέργεια se extiende más allá del movimiento y porque en 1047b1-2 se introducen los giros en dativo δυνάμει (ὄν) y ἐντελεχείᾳ (ὄν). Sobre *Metaph.* Θ 3 véase Chame (2022a).

también por el infinitivo δύνασθαι (1046a5) y 2) se enfatiza que el uso de δύναμις en conjunto con el modificador adverbial καλῶς no constituye un sentido específico adicional de δύναμις/δυνατόν (δυνατόν₄ en Δ 12, cf. 1020a3-4) sino que καλῶς puede acompañar a los diversos sentidos de δύναμις señalados previamente (i.e., δύναμις₁₋₃). Este último punto suscita discusión, dado que se juzga que la modificación adverbial, tal como la introduce Aristóteles, no es lo suficientemente clara. Para intentar comprender mejor esto, se considera el caso de un hombre ebrio, que al caminar y hablar, ‘puede’ realizar estas acciones, pero que evidentemente no las realiza en modo correcto (y por tanto, es lícito afirmar que ‘no puede’ realizarlas). En este tipo de contextos, el calificativo καλῶς parece cumplir su cometido de modo más claro: se trata de señalar el modo en que una capacidad puede realizarse correctamente.

Se señala además que, a diferencia de Δ 12, en Θ 1 parece sugerirse que καλῶς puede aplicarse incluso a un caso de δύναμις₃ (ἐξίς ἀπαθείας, estado determinado de no ser afectado para peor o de ser destruido por otro). Nuevamente, esto no resulta inmediatamente claro. Un posible ejemplo que puede ayudar a entender esto es el de una planta incapaz de resistir una helada por la mañana; este ejemplo puede bien referirse a una planta que, si bien no muere por la helada, no la soporta bien. Es así que en un sentido soporta la helada (dado que no muere) pero en otro no, como sería en el caso de alguna planta habituada a un clima polar. Otro posible ejemplo es la diferencia entre algo combustible (algo que puede ser quemado) y algo inflamable (algo que puede ser quemado fácilmente). Todos estos ejemplos apuntan a describir el modo peculiar en que una acción puede realizarse de un modo correcto o particularmente satisfactorio, modo que Aristóteles parece querer capturar con el adverbio καλῶς.

De todos modos, la modificación adverbial se juzga oscura en términos generales dado que no parece que el adverbio indique un sentido preciso de ‘poder’ (*can*) tal como el que opera en los ejemplos ofrecidos.

Otro punto oscuro señalado por los londinenses: ¿en qué medida la referencia a δύναμις₁ ayuda a elucidar las nociones de δύναμις₂₋₃? Se observa que el hecho de que un movimiento requiere un agente diverso al paciente no explica la presencia de δύναμις₁ en las definiciones de δύναμις₂₋₃.

Se mencionan luego los casos que se excluyen como mera homonimia (1046a6-9): *a*) el uso geométrico de δύναμις, el cual no parece presentar dificultades y *b*) el caso en el cual decimos que algo es δυνατὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα (1046a8) porque las cosas son o no son de una manera (τῷ εἶναι πως ἢ μὴ εἶναι, a8-9). Se interpreta que Aristóteles alude aquí a aquellos sentidos de δύναμις y ἀδυναμία que no tienen relación con el sentido primario de δύναμις, tal como indica Aristóteles en *Metaph.* Δ 12.1019b34-35. Este pasaje parece aludir a un sentido exclusivamente lógico de δυνατόν y ἀδύνατον: δυνατόν es aquello cuyo contrario no es necesariamente falso, y ἀδύνατον es aquello cuyo contrario es necesariamente verdadero (cf. 1019b21-33).¹⁶

Owen *et al.* observan que existe una continuidad entre ambos usos homónimos: el segundo caso es ejemplificado por medio un ejemplo matemático (1029b22-23), y el primero usa δύνασθαι en sentido matemático (lo cual implica que el sentido matemático no se extrae de un sentido no-matemático).

Aristóteles continúa 1046a19-29 con la cuestión de la identidad entre potencia activa (δύναμις₁) y potencia pasiva (δύναμις₂). Los londinenses remiten a *Phys.* III 3, donde el Estagirita se expide respecto de la identidad entre agente y paciente en el caso de un proceso (κίνησις) de aprendizaje. Allí se explica que se trata de un mismo movimiento que puede ser descripto en modos diversos desde la perspectiva del agente o el paciente. El cambio, no obstante, se ubica en el paciente y la potencia activa (el principio de cambio, δύναμις₁) en el agente.

Aristóteles afirma en 1046a28-29 que en la medida en que una cosa es una unidad natural (συμπέφυκεν), no padece ella misma por la acción de sí misma (dado que es una unidad, y no otra cosa distinta). La aparición del

¹⁶ El texto en Θ 1.1046a6-9 es oscuro y no hay consenso respecto de su sentido entre los intérpretes. Owen *et al.* siguen la puntuación de Bonitz, Ross y Jaeger, quienes introducen una coma tras λέγονται en 1046a7 (también Makin 2006, pp. 1, 22). Sin embargo, Lefebvre (2018) 130 n. 1 recuerda que Schwegler (1847) I p. 182 traspone la coma tras ἐν γεωμετρίας en 1046a8 (esta es, de hecho, la puntuación de Bekker 1831). Esta opción fue seguida por Heidegger en su curso del semestre de verano de 1931 (*GA* 33, 59-60) y es adoptada por el propio Lefebvre. Según Lefebvre, Aristóteles no incluiría los usos modales de δυνατόν/ἀδύνατον entre los sentidos homónimos de δύναμις, sino tan sólo la geometría y otros usos no especificados. Beere (2009) pp. 38-9 considera que sólo se trata de un caso homónimo, el de la geometría, pero sigue no obstante la puntuación de Ross y Jaeger, lo cual, como nota Lefebvre, dificulta la interpretación del pasaje (cf. 39 n. 12).

término συμπεφυκεν en 1046a28 permite a los londinenses reconsiderar una cuestión tratada en el seminario sobre Z (pero no registrada en la publicación de los apuntes del seminario, cf. Burnyeat *et al.* 1979, p. 147), a saber, si συμφύσει en *Metaph.* Z 16.1040b15 debería transponerse luego de φύσει. Dado que no hay evidencia de corrupción aquí en Θ 1.1046a28-29, y teniendo en cuenta Λ 3.1070a10-11, se considera preferible (o al menos persuasivo) la transposición en el caso de Z 16.1040b15.

Por último, Aristóteles se refiere en 1046a19-35 a las nociones de incapacidad e incapaz (ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον, 1046a29). Los londinenses remiten directamente a *Metaph.* Δ 12.1019b15-21 como paralelo de Θ 1.1046a29-35 (en el texto se imprime erróneamente 1046a19-35; la sección 1046a19-29 fue abordada previamente). De este modo concluyen las notas sobre Θ 1.

4. El método del seminario de Londres

Llegados a este punto, podemos realizar algunas consideraciones generales sobre el método que guía la discusión de los londinenses. Conviene comenzar por una cuestión estructural muy significativa: las notas se concentran casi exclusivamente en el análisis focal de δύναμις (*Metaph.* Θ 1.1046a4-35) y en cierta medida desatienden los llamados enunciados programáticos (*Metaph.* Θ 1.1045b27-1046a4). En este respecto, la nota introductoria de Owen marca el tono de la discusión posterior, ya que directamente no trata la cuestión del programa de Θ.

Si bien esto puede resultar sorprendente a primera vista, se comprende perfectamente si se tienen en cuenta el contexto y la lógica detrás del seminario de Londres. Es preciso tener en cuenta que los enunciados programáticos se conectan con preguntas y cuestiones de largo alcance: ¿cuál es el objetivo del libro Θ? ¿Cómo comprender el contraste entre el sentido inicial de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια, vinculado al movimiento, y el sentido ‘útil’ de ambos conceptos, que se extiende más allá (ἐπὶ πλεόν) del movimiento? ¿Cuál es el vínculo del tratado con los libros ZH? E incluso, yendo más allá, ¿cuál es la función del argumento de Θ en el contexto más amplio de la *Metafísica*? Todas estas preguntas implican una toma de posición sobre temas extremadamente controvertidos y que trascienden los límites de un análisis textual a la manera del seminario de Londres.

En efecto, las notas del seminario, registradas originalmente sin la intención de ser publicadas, nos introducen en un método de trabajo extremadamente singular, que resulta en gran medida un ejemplo para los estudiosos de Aristóteles que al día de hoy discuten la obra del Estagirita en formato seminarial. Se trata de leer el texto sin apoyos externos, es decir, sin recurrir a otros pasajes o a otras obras, necesariamente situadas en diferentes contextos. Esta perspectiva involucra dos grandes ventajas: por un lado, evita el riesgo de la sobre-sistematización a la hora de interpretar los textos; por el otro, da lugar a lecturas e interpretaciones originales y agudas, que por lo general quedan obturadas por la necesidad de insertar el texto dentro del marco de una hipótesis sistemática determinada. Una de las pocas excepciones a este principio hermenéutico es el uso del libro Δ de la *Metafísica*, tal como vimos en ocasión del paralelo entre *Metaph.* Θ 1 y Δ 12. Pero incluso en este caso se trata de un texto muy peculiar, el llamado ‘diccionario’ de términos filosóficos. Con lo cual podría considerarse que no se trata de un intento de sistematización, sino por el contrario una profundización en el léxico filosófico utilizado por Aristóteles.

No obstante, el método implica sin duda, e incluso deliberadamente, ciertos límites. Algunos autores, quizás comprendiendo sólo en parte, han señalado que las notas pierden de vista los aspectos estructurales o de mayor amplitud del argumento aristotélico.¹⁷ Quizás más adecuado sería decir que las notas no presentan lecturas definitivas, ni tienen una intención monográfica, sino que constituyen más bien un auxilio para la interpretación y la discusión de pasajes notoriamente oscuros.¹⁸

En este sentido, las notas pueden considerarse como un punto de partida para la reflexión filosófica sobre los libros centrales de la *Metafísica*. En esta línea, quizás podamos incorporar un pasaje adicional, que no es tenido en cuenta en las notas y que se encuentra también en el libro Δ , para profundizar en el análisis de los llamados enunciados programáticos.

Como vimos, Owen establece un contrapunto entre *Metaph.* Δ 12 y Θ 1 en su nota introductoria. Sin embargo, existe otro pasaje en Δ que también

¹⁷ Cf. Irwin (1983) y Ide (1990).

¹⁸ Véase al respecto el prefacio de Kirwan a la edición de las notas sobre el libro Z (Burnyeat *et al.* 1979, p. i).

puede conectarse con Θ 1, a saber, Δ 7.1017a35-b9. Este pasaje permite esclarecer los enunciados programáticos de Θ 1, en especial dos cuestiones centrales: *a)* qué concepto de κίνησις tiene en mente Aristóteles en este pasaje, y *b)* cuál es el vínculo entre el aspecto modal de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια y el sentido útil de estos conceptos. Si bien un análisis de este pasaje requiere una reflexión más amplia y detallada de la que puedo ofrecer aquí, a continuación presentaré muy brevemente una posible hipótesis de lectura respecto del vínculo entre *Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a35-b9 y Θ 1.1045b27-1046a4. Esto nos ayudará a discutir y ampliar la hipótesis de lectura presentada por los londinenses en sus notas.

5. Un paralelo entre *Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a35-b9 y Θ 1.1045b27-1046a4

Como señalamos previamente, los londinenses sostienen que la noción relevante de δύναμις introducida en 1045b35-46a1 se conecta con la aporía sobre la unidad de los compuestos sustanciales esbozada hacia el final del libro H.¹⁹ Esto puede sugerir que δύναμις en su sentido útil debe comprenderse necesariamente en términos modales (en el sentido de una modalidad ontológica), es decir, como ‘potencialidad’, mientras que la noción de capacidad se vería reducida al sentido inicial de δύναμις vinculado al movimiento. No obstante, quizás podamos matizar esta impresión si tenemos en cuenta lo dicho por Aristóteles hacia el final de Δ 7. En este capítulo, dedicado a los varios modos en que se dice lo que es (τὸ ὄν), Aristóteles se refiere brevemente a δύναμις-ἐνέργεια como sentidos del ser:

Además y respecto de estos sentidos enumerados, ‘ser’ (εἶναι) y ‘lo que es’ (τὸ ὄν) significan tanto lo que se dice que es en potencia (δυνάμει) como lo que se dice que es en acto (ἐντελεχείᾳ): efectivamente, tanto del que puede ver como del que está viendo en acto (καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ) decimos que es alguien que ve (ὁρῶν), y del mismo [decimos] que conoce (ἐπίστασθαι) tanto el que puede ejercitar su conocimiento (τὸ δυνάμενον χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ) como el que lo está ejercitando (τὸ χρώμενον), y que está quieto (ἡρεμοῦν) tanto aquel que permanece quieto (ὃ ἤδη ὑπάρχει ἡρεμία) como el que es capaz de estar quieto (τὸ δυνάμενον ἡρεμεῖν). Y lo mismo en el caso de las sustancias (τῶν οὐσιῶν): también, desde luego, decimos que en la piedra está la estatua de Hermes, que [en

¹⁹ Cf. Burnyeat *et al.* (1984) p. 48: “In 1, 1045b35-46a1, what is most useful for the business *now* in hand is evidently the notion of *dunamis* – potentiality taken from H6, esp. 1045a20-33)” (énfasis en el original).

la línea] está la semilínea, y que es trigo lo no madurado aún. En otro lugar habrá de definirse cuándo algo es capaz (*δυνατόν*) y cuándo no lo es aún. (*Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a35-b9, trad. Calvo Martínez, modificada)

El pasaje comienza señalando que potencia y acto constituyen sentidos en los que se dice lo que es, en claro paralelo al inicio de *Metaph.* Θ 1 (cf. 1045b32-35). No obstante, nótese que a diferencia de Θ 1 se introducen los conceptos como dativos adverbializados: *δυνάμει* ('en potencia') y *ἐντελέχεια* ('en acto'). Luego se presentan una serie de ejemplos, que pueden ser organizados en dos tipos: *a*) el contraste entre una capacidad y la actividad correspondiente (la visión, el ejercicio del conocimiento, i.e., el pensamiento, y el acto de estar quieto); *b*) el contraste entre una sustancia plenamente realizada y la materia que la compone (el Hermes y la piedra, la semilínea y la línea, el trigo y la simiente).²⁰

¿Cuál es el vínculo entre este pasaje y *Metaph.* Θ 1? Inmediatamente notamos que no pareciera haber mención alguna, ni siquiera implícitamente a través de los ejemplos, del sentido inicial o primario de *δύναμις* como principio de movimiento. Tanto en Δ 12 como en la segunda sección de Θ 1 (1046a4-35) se presentan los casos de técnicas tales como la construcción o la medicina, o de movimientos naturales tales como la capacidad que el fuego tiene de calentar. Por el contrario, en el pasaje de Δ 7 se presentan casos de sustancias y de actividades que Aristóteles no considera movimientos, sino que *se distinguen esencialmente del movimiento*, tales como la visión o el pensamiento.²¹ La única capacidad que podría relacionarse con el movimiento es la capacidad para estar quieto (*ἡρεμεῖν*), pero incluso en este caso no hay movimiento sino reposo.²² Dicho de

²⁰ Los ejemplos reaparecen en *Metaph.* Θ 6.1048a32-b3, en el contexto de la elucidación del concepto de acto. En este pasaje Aristóteles afirma explícitamente que no se puede ofrecer una definición del acto, sino que es preciso captar la analogía por medio de la inducción a partir de los casos particulares (1048a35-37). Es notable que a diferencia del pasaje de Δ 7, en Θ 6 Aristóteles utiliza el término *ἐνέργεια* en lugar de *ἐντελέχεια* (cf. Θ 6.1048a26, 31, 35; 1048b5-6). Sobre el vínculo entre *ἐνέργεια* y *ἐντελέχεια* cf. *supra*, nn. 4-5.

²¹ Cf. *Metaph.* Θ 6.1048b18-35, 8.1050a23-b2; *DA* II 5, III 7.431a4-8; *EN* X 4. Sobre esta distinción véase Gonzalez (2019). Contrariamente a lo que usualmente se sostiene, Aristóteles ya es consciente de esta distinción en textos tempranos como el *Protréptico* (cf. VII 43.10-25 Pistelli/B68-70 Düring). Al respecto véase Chame (2022b).

²² Esta capacidad se menciona en *Metaph.* Θ 9.1051a9. Allí se presenta al acto de estar quieto como el contrario (*ἐναντίον*) del movimiento y se afirma que la capacidad es una y la misma para ambas acciones. En contraste, en Δ 7 se habla sencillamente de una capacidad para la quietud (*τὸ δυνάμενον ἡρεμεῖν*, 1017b6). Véase también *EN* VII 14.1153b26-28: "Por ello

otro modo, los ejemplos de capacidades/actividades mencionados en Δ 7.1017a35-b9 no parecen entrar en la definición de δύναμις como principio de movimiento o cambio (cf. Δ 12.1019a15: ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς; Θ 1.1046^a11: ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς). Se impone entonces una conclusión: tanto Δ 12 como Θ 1.1046a4-35 se limitan a tematizar *el sentido estricto de δύναμις como principio de movimiento*, dejando de lado los sentidos de δύναμις que van más allá del movimiento. Conversamente, Δ 7.1017a35-b9 se refiere al sentido no-cinético de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια, aludido en *Metaph.* Θ 1.1046a1-4.

Esta lectura permite cuestionar dos interpretaciones corrientes del argumento de *Metaph.* Θ. La primera sostiene que, en el contexto de Θ 1, por ‘movimiento’ (κίνησις) Aristóteles entiende ‘actividad’ en sentido general.²³ Siguiendo este razonamiento, el contraste que establecería Aristóteles en el tratado sería uno entre un sentido inicial de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια entendido en términos de capacidad/actividad, y un ulterior sentido modal, potencialidad/actualidad, asimilando la estructura del tratado con la analogía establecida en *Metaph.* Θ 6.1048b6-9.²⁴ Pero si esto fuera así, entonces los ejemplos de capacidades para diversas actividades en *Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a35-b9 deberían subsumirse bajo la definición de δύναμις como capacidad para efectuar un movimiento, lo cual es explícitamente negado por Aristóteles a lo largo del *corpus* y en el mismo libro Θ (cf. *supra*, n. 21).²⁵ Con lo cual el pasaje de Δ 7 presenta dos casos de δύναμις-

dios goza siempre de un placer único y simple, pues no sólo existe una actividad del movimiento, sino también de la inmovilidad, y el placer está más en la quietud que en el movimiento (διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκίνησις, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει)” (traducción propia).

²³ La asimilación entre κίνησις y ἐνέργεια es defendida de diversas maneras por Graham (1987) p. 98; Charlton (1990) p. 8; Menn (1994) pp. 92, 111; Makin (2006) pp. 134-8; Burnyeat (2008) pp. 222-4; Beere (2009) pp. 200, 227-8; Charles (2015) pp. 190, 204; Lefebvre (2018) p. 481; y Senteny (2020) pp. 139, 158. Para una crítica de esta asimilación, cf. Natali (1991) y (2013); Kosman (2013); Gonzalez (2019); y Chame (2022b).

²⁴ “No todas las cosas se dice que están en acto del mismo modo, excepto por medio de la analogía: [...] unas son como el movimiento en relación con la potencia (ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν), otras cosas lo son, a su vez, como la sustancia en relación con cierto tipo de materia (ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινὰ ὕλην)” (trad. Calvo Martínez, modificada).

²⁵ Podría argumentarse que tanto en Θ 1 como en Θ 6.1048b6-9 Aristóteles está utilizando el término movimiento (κίνησις) en un sentido laxo, capaz de incluir tanto los movimientos en sentido estricto como las actividades que contienen su propio τέλος. Sin embargo, este supuesto sentido genérico de κίνησις no cuenta con un fundamento textual, como argumento en Chame (2022b).

ἐνέργεια que se extienden más allá del movimiento, el caso de las actividades no-cinéticas y el caso de las sustancias. Esto invalida el esquema de oposición entre capacidad/actividad (sentido menos útil) y potencialidad/actualidad (sentido útil). En conclusión, el pasaje de Δ 7 trata sobre δύναμις-ἐνέργεια en su sentido útil,²⁶ pero sin excluir los casos del contraste capacidad/actividad. Como corolario, notamos que el uso de κίνησις en Θ 1 remite al sentido restringido y técnico de movimiento,²⁷ y no a un sentido amplio capaz de contener el tipo de actividades no-cinéticas.

Una lectura atenta de este pasaje también permite cuestionar una segunda interpretación corriente del libro Θ. En efecto, Aristóteles introduce los conceptos de δύναμις y ἐνέργεια como sentidos del ser por medio de las construcciones adverbializadas en dativo δυνάμει ὄν y ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν. Ahora bien, algunos interpretes consideran que estas expresiones constituyen una suerte de principio terminológico, por medio del cual Aristóteles designaría el sentido modal (y ‘útil’) de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια. Este sentido ‘ontológico’ reuniría analógicamente todas las aplicaciones de los términos bajo un único concepto, a saber, el de potencialidad/actualidad.²⁸ Pero en este pasaje, tal como sucede en Θ 3 y Θ 6, Aristóteles alterna entre la construcción en dativo y el adjetivo sustantivado τὸ δυνατόν, sin que pareciera introducirse ningún cambio de sentido en el paso de una forma a la otra.²⁹ Esta simple alternancia

²⁶ Esto no debería sorprendernos, dado que el pasaje de Δ 7 trata sobre δύναμις-ἐνέργεια como sentidos del ser, es decir, en términos que exceden la concepción meramente cinética de estos conceptos.

²⁷ Tal como se lo define en *Phys.* III 1.201a10-11, acto de lo que es capaz *qua* capaz (τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἢ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστίν), i.e., acto *incompleto* (201b31-32: ἢ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι τις δοκεῖ, ἀτελής δέ·). Este tipo de acto incompleto se opone al acto completo, no-cinético, expresamente llamado τελεία ἐνέργεια en *EN* X 4.1174b16-17 (τελεία πράξις en *Metaph.* Θ 6.1048b20-23; ἀπλῶς ἐνέργεια, precisado como el acto de aquello que ha sido completado, ἢ τοῦ τετελεσμένου, en *DA* III 7.431a7).

²⁸ Esta es la lectura de Frede (1994) pp. 183-4, seguido con matices por Witt (2003), Makin (2006), Burnyeat (2008), Beere (2009) y Lefebvre (2018) pp. 27-8. Para una crítica a la lectura de Frede sobre los enunciados programáticos de *Metaph.* Θ 1, véase Anagnostopoulos (2011).

²⁹ Cf. δυνάμει en *Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a36, 1017b2-3; el participio δυνάμενον en 1017b4 y b6; δυνατόν en 1017b8. Con respecto a Θ 3, cf. el uso de δυνατόν en 1047a20-29 y de δυνάμει en 1047b1. Respecto de Θ 6, cf. δυνατόν en 1048a27-30, 34, 1048b6 y δυνάμει en 1048a30-32, 1048b9-17. Como notamos más arriba (cf. p. 80), la alternancia entre δύναμις, δυνατόν y δυνάμει a lo largo de *Metaph.* Θ no pasa por alto a los londinenses (cf. Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, p. 49).

sugiere que Aristóteles no establece un principio terminológico específico capaz de *aislar* el sentido útil de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια.³⁰ Es decir, no existen elementos textuales suficientes para asimilar el sentido útil tan sólo con las expresiones en dativo, y de este modo justificar la interpretación modal del sentido ontológico de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια, reduciendo el uso en nominativo al sentido inicial entendido en términos de capacidad/actividad.

Los londinenses no manifiestan expresamente una opinión sobre estas cuestiones, aunque a lo largo de sus notas sobre Θ parecen adoptar tácitamente algunas de las premisas involucradas en las dos hipótesis de lectura mencionadas.³¹ Esto se deja entrever incluso en su tratamiento de Θ 1.1045b27-1046a4. El trabajo de las notas parte de la idea que el sentido más útil de δύναμις es el sentido modal ‘potencialidad’, que este sentido se instancia en el peculiar vínculo que la materia entabla con la forma sustancial, y que por tanto se deja en segundo plano la capacidad como correlato de la actividad. Sin embargo, como hemos visto, algunos pasajes – como *Metaph.* Δ 7.1017a35-b9 – parecen sugerir que Aristóteles no deja completamente de lado las nociones de capacidad y actividad al momento de delinear el sentido de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια que se extiende más allá del movimiento.³²

³⁰ Este argumento es desarrollado extensamente por Anagnostopoulos (2011).

³¹ Esto se ve especialmente en sus comentarios de Θ 6-8. E.g., Burnyeat *et al.* (1984) p. 125: “Θ 6 is concerned not with δυνάμεις τοῦ κινῆσαι and similar potencies, as in Θ 1-2 and Θ 5, but with what is δυνάμει as opposed to what is ἐνέργεια”; p. 131: “The talk in this chapter [sc. Θ 7] is not of having a δύναμις to be F but of being δυνάμει F. The question is not ‘When does something have a capacity to be(come) a man?’, but ‘When is something potentially a man/a potential man?’”. Véase también la nota a *Metaph.* Θ 8.1050a35 (Burnyeat *et al.* 1984, p. 144), donde pareciera que se asimilaran κίνησις y ἐνέργεια.

³² La idea de que la noción útil de δύναμις debe comprenderse en términos de capacidad fue defendida por Ross. Según este autor, el sentido útil es “a potentiality in A of passing into some new state or engaging in some new activity” (Ross 1924, II p. 240); “Potentiality, on the other hand, is a capacity in A of passing into a new state of itself” (I p. cxxiv). Obsérvese que aunque Ross habla de potencialidad (término frecuentemente asociado a la interpretación modal de Θ), sostiene que el sentido útil de δύναμις es un tipo específico de capacidad, opuesto a la mera capacidad de producir un cambio. Muchos intérpretes han seguido el esquema general de la interpretación de Ross, aunque difieren en cuanto a qué tipo de capacidad debe identificarse con el sentido útil. Por ejemplo, Kosman (1984) y (2013), Blair (1992) y González (2019) identifican el sentido útil de δύναμις-ἐνέργεια con el tipo de capacidad y actividad no-cinética de la que habla Aristóteles en *Metaph.* Θ 6.1048b18-35. Anagnostopoulos (2011) también parece aceptar la reconstrucción ‘horizontal’ de Ross del argumento de Θ, pero cree que el sentido útil de δύναμις consiste en un tipo específico de

Mi intención al llamar la atención sobre este pasaje y sobre las dificultades que conlleva consiste en mostrar que la propuesta de lectura de los londinenses puede ampliarse incluso dentro de los confines de su propia metodología. Es decir, es posible (y quizás aconsejable) realizar un paralelo entre Δ 7 y Θ 1 al modo en que Owen contrasta Δ 12 y Θ 1.³³ Este paralelo revela que la noción de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ en su sentido útil no necesariamente se aleja de la noción básica de *capacidad*, ideada originalmente por Aristóteles como la posesión de un poder para actuar o para padecer,³⁴ en contraste con el correlativo ejercicio activo de tal poder.³⁵

6. Conclusión

Para concluir, detengámonos en los puntos centrales de lo dicho hasta ahora. En primer lugar, es preciso notar que el análisis de *Metaph.* Θ 1 por parte de Owen *et al.* no se presenta como una interpretación definitiva, sino más bien como una exploración crítica del texto. Esto es particularmente evidente en el caso de la nota de Owen que abre la discusión. El método de Owen consiste en mantenerse lo más apegado posible a la propia letra de Aristóteles, sin recurrir a elementos exógenos. Esta metodología permite a Owen y a los demás integrantes del seminario esclarecer pasajes de difícil interpretación.

capacidad para producir un cambio, a saber, la capacidad para el cambio sustancial: “the useful sense applies to pre-existent matter’s capacity to become substance” (p. 411). Al hacer foco en la noción de *capacidad* o *poder*, todos estos autores se distancian de la identificación unívoca entre las nociones de potencia ($\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$) y materia ($\upsilon\lambda\eta$), lectura que se remonta a Alejandro de Afrodisias (al respecto véase Fazzo 2002, pp. 47-9, 72, 84 n. 169, 142).

³³ El lector puede hallar una discusión adicional sobre este paralelo en Blair (1992) pp. 84-96, especialmente 90-3.

³⁴ Es importante no confundir las nociones de acción y pasión desde un punto de vista *categorial* ($\pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$) con las nociones transcategoriales de $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ - $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ como *sentidos del ser*. La cuestión es si $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ y $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ en su sentido útil necesariamente deben comprenderse en términos modales (como un complemento modal de las diversas categorías, las cuales pueden hallarse ‘en potencia’ o ‘en acto’) o si las nociones de capacidad y actividad pueden aplicarse transcategorialmente. Esta última opción no implica necesariamente una negación de la perspectiva modal; en efecto, las nociones de capacidad y actividad bien pueden involucrar un *aspecto* modal, según el cual las capacidades y las actividades confieren un cierto grado de realidad (i.e., ‘ser potencial’, ‘ser en acto’) a los entes capaces o activos en cuestión. Cf. Anagnostopoulos (2011) pp. 403-4.

³⁵ Para un tratamiento más detallado de este contraste, y más en general, de los orígenes y la naturaleza de la doctrina aristotélica del acto y la potencia, cf. Chame (2022b).

Por ejemplo, Owen presenta una explicación consistente de uno de los problemas centrales de Θ 1, a saber, ¿cuál es la naturaleza del vínculo entre el sentido primario y los sentidos derivados de $\deltaύναμις$? La respuesta de Owen, según la cual los diversos sentidos se relacionan focalmente con un sentido primario, presenta una reconstrucción accesible y muy plausible del argumento aristotélico. Si bien la propuesta de Owen no es aceptada en modo unánime y se considera superada en algunos aspectos (cf. *supra*, nn. 9-10), ciertamente cuenta con apoyo textual en el caso de Θ 1 (por ejemplo, textos paralelos en obras aparentemente tempranas como *EE* VII 2.1236a7-33, mencionado *supra*).

El método comporta deliberadamente ciertos límites. La propuesta de lectura inmanente forzosamente aísla por momentos los argumentos del contexto más amplio en el que se encuentran. Pero lejos de ser una carencia, tal limitación permite tomar las notas como un punto de partida para la investigación, en lugar de tomarlas como una propuesta definitiva y totalizante. En este sentido, hemos propuesto un paralelo entre Θ 1 y el pasaje final de Δ 7 (1017a35-b9), como una sugerencia en tren de continuidad con el trabajo de las notas. En efecto, tal paralelo permite ampliar la propuesta de lectura defendida en el seminario, ya que pone en relación el libro Θ no sólo con el problema de la unidad de la definición de la sustancia y de los compuestos sustanciales en general, como se hace en las notas, sino también con otras problemáticas y pasajes en los cuales la noción de actividad es de suma importancia.

En síntesis, podemos ciertamente afirmar que el análisis de Owen *et al.* constituye una herramienta importante para toda interpretación cuidada de un texto tan complejo y crucial para la ontología y la física aristotélicas como lo es *Metafísica* Θ .³⁶

³⁶ Versiones precedentes de este trabajo fueron discutidas en el seminario aristotélico “Enrico Berti” de la Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale, dirigido por la Prof. Silvia Fazzo. Agradezco a todos los participantes del seminario y a la Prof. Fazzo en particular por sus agudos comentarios.

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MARCO GHIONE – LAURA FOLLI – SILVIA FAZZO

LA TRADIZIONE A STAMPA DELLA *METAPHYSICA
NOVA* ARABO-LATINA NEGLI INCUNABOLI E
NELLE CINQUECENTINE

Abstract

This paper provides an annotated list of printed editions of Aristotle's *Metaphysica Nova*, i.e. of the Arabic-Latin 13th-century version of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which circulated within the Latin translation of Averroes' *Commentarium Magnum* (*Tafsīr mā ba'd al-ṭabī'at*). It is shown that this version – the impact of which was second to none – was never printed without at least one Greek-into-Latin version. From the 1473 *editio princeps* to the 1562 *Iunctas* edition, complementary material from the Greek into Latin and from the Arabic into Latin Aristotelian traditions was increasingly added. Links to relevant digital reproductions are also provided.

Keywords

Aristotle, Averroes, *Metaphysics*,
Metaphysica Nova, Arabic to Latin Translations

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Introduzione

Dal tardo medioevo alle soglie dell'età moderna, la *Metafisica* fu letta in Europa prevalentemente in latino. Mentre per le opere principali di Aristotele i commenti in greco vennero stampati nel corso XVI secolo, per la *Metafisica* questo non accadde: nemmeno il commento greco più importante, quello di Alessandro di Afrodisia, venne dato alle stampe prima del XIX secolo.¹ Una spiegazione possibile della prolungata latenza del commento greco di Alessandro nella prima età della stampa sta nell'efficacia e nell'autorevolezza del Commento Grande di Averroè, che, tradotto in latino a partire dall'inizio del XIII secolo, stampato molte volte dal 1473, rendeva comprensibile un testo potenzialmente oscuro ed ellittico. Di qui la congiunta fortuna della cosiddetta *Metaphysica Nova*, cioè – secondo uno degli appellativi che ricevette nella tradizione medievale – della versione latina del testo arabo commentato da Averroè. Questa versione costituì pertanto la base delle più diffuse edizioni a stampa della *Metafisica*, anche in un'epoca in cui per le opere di Aristotele da parte di molti si desiderava un contatto diretto con il testo greco. La diffusione del contributo arabo-latino all'esegesi della *Metafisica* si accompagnava tuttavia ad un emergente approccio filologico. Così, alla fine del XV secolo, una volta che il testo fu dato alle stampe, venne adottata una soluzione di compromesso, comune alle opere dell'intero *corpus* aristotelico: a tutti i *textus* del Commento Grande di Averroè tradotti dall'arabo furono aggiunte le corrispondenti sezioni di testo greco-latino. Da qui la complessità di contenuto delle stampe, oggetto di rassegna in questo nostro contributo.

¹ L'articolo, collegialmente discusso ed elaborato dagli autori, trae materia e linee di ricerca dall'attività del Seminario Aristotelico recentemente intitolato a "Enrico Berti" che dal 2020 ha focalizzato una parte di attenzione sulla traduzione arabo-latina come documento di rilievo nella storia testuale della *Metafisica* di Aristotele. In prevalenza, la lista delle edizioni e la sitografia sono di M. Ghione, le note a cura di L. Folli con M. Ghione, l'introduzione di S. Fazzo con M. Ghione. Cfr. al riguardo anche Fazzo (2004) in part. p. 13 e Fazzo (1999) in part. pp. 65-7, sul successo editoriale dei commenti greci alle principali opere di Aristotele, ma non di quelli alla *Metafisica*, nel XVI secolo; sulla lettura di Aristotele in greco, cfr. Bianchi (1996). Sull'appellativo di "*Metaphysica Nova*" per la versione arabo-latina nell'*Aristoteles Latinus* a partire da Lacombe *et al.* (1939) p. 64 e ss., cfr. Bouyges (1949) pp. 220-4.

Come sottolineato da Bouyges (1949), la *Metaphysica Nova* non è in origine opera a sé, ma è l'insieme delle traduzioni dei *textus* commentati da Averroè nel Commento Grande. Non contiene pertanto nessuna delle parti della *Metafisica* assenti in quel commento: né i libri *Kappa* (XI), *My* (XIII), *Ny* (XIV), né la prima parte di *Alpha meizon* (I), fino a 5.987a5, né la parte finale di *Lambda* (XII), 10.1075b11-1076a4. Come nell'originale arabo, il testo di *Alpha elatton* (II) precede *Alpha meizon* (I, da 987a5). Nei codici la *Metaphysica Nova* conta dunque in linea di massima undici libri, cioè II, I da 987a5, III-X, XII fino a 1075b11 (tranne, almeno, in quei casi dove i due libri *Alpha* appaiono accorpati e contano come uno solo, si vedano al riguardo le avvertenze di Bouyges 1949, p. 217). Nella tradizione a stampa, tuttavia, fin dall'*editio princeps* (1473, cfr. edizione n. 1 *infra*) l'edizione della *Metaphysica Nova* si adatta all'ordine e al contenuto della tradizione greca, e inizia con l'intero libro *Alpha meizon*, citato in traduzione dal greco, seguito dal libro *Alpha elatton*. Da allora in poi, da una stampa all'altra, si assiste a una progressiva normalizzazione del testo della *Metafisica* arabo-latina, con la quale le ripartizioni della tradizione greco-latina vengono gradualmente acquisite e le parti assenti nella tradizione arabo-latina vengono integrate.

Si ritiene che la traduzione arabo-latina della *Metafisica*, insieme a quella del commento di Averroè, sia stata compiuta da Michele Scoto nel periodo 1220-1224.² Fu forse la traduzione della *Metafisica* più influente in Europa, dal Medioevo fino all'età moderna. L'opera raggiunse la massima diffusione quando poté essere affidata alle stampe, nelle edizioni del XV e XVI secolo. Si tratta di un percorso editoriale straordinario. Non solo la *Metaphysica Nova* fu infatti oggetto di numerose ristampe, ma ogni sua nuova edizione istituì un momento di revisione e perfezionamento. Ciascuna di queste stampe si poneva a compimento di un processo editoriale articolato e complesso, giunto al traguardo con l'edizione veneziana Giunta del 1562. Questa edizione è stata riprodotta anastaticamente in Germania nel 1962 e resa così ancora oggi disponibile in molte biblioteche.³

² Cfr. Hasse (2010). Sull'attribuzione a Michele Scoto e sulla storia della *translatio* arabo-latina si vedano anche Martini (2001), Gautier (1982), Haskins (1921).

³ *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis. Octavum Volumen. Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome commentariis, Venetiis Apud Iunctas, 1562; rist. anast. Minerva, Frankfurt am Main 1962. In riferimento agli*

Le stampe della *Metaphysica Nova* si producevano in un'epoca che conosceva l'ampia circolazione del testo greco di Aristotele. Da qui l'iniziativa degli stampatori tutti, fin dalla *editio princeps* 1473, di affiancare e far precedere ogni *textus* arabo-latino dal corrispondente *textus* tradotto dal greco. La traduzione principale in uso dal greco fu inizialmente quella di Guglielmo Moerbeke, cui succedette negli esemplari successivi al 1552 la versione di Bessarione.⁴

Tali innovazioni, insieme a molti dettagli che si evolvono nel tempo, mostrano il divenire di un processo editoriale collettivo, in progresso da un'edizione all'altra. Almeno fino al 1562 si assiste ancora a un incremento di materiali: l'edizione dello stesso anno comprende la traduzione di un passo di *Metaphysica Theta* trasmesso solo in alcuni codici della tradizione manoscritta greca.⁵ Percorrendo la serie delle diverse edizioni emergono evidenze di un'attività di cooperazione diacronica, nella quale di fatto collaborano aristotelici di generazioni successive e di diverse collocazioni culturali e geografiche. Emerge, una volta di più, il valore del latino come lingua universale, capace di unire gli intellettuali al di là di ogni ordine di frontiere, sociali, culturali e cronologiche. Per questo, il presente contributo intende esaltare il valore e la fecondità di una siffatta tappa culturale della

incunaboli ed alle edizioni a stampa del XVI secolo di seguito citati, le abbreviazioni usate sono le seguenti; ISTC: Incunabula Short-Title Catalogue https://data.cerl.org/istc/_search; USTC: Universal Short-Title Catalogue <https://www.ustc.ac.uk/>.

⁴ A riprova, se servisse, dell'importanza delle stampe latine per la storia della tradizione aristotelica, giova notare che la prima suddivisione e numerazione di capitoli a noi nota della *Metafisica* si rinviene non sul greco, ma nella traduzione latina del cardinale Bessarione. Questa, dedicata a Alfonso I di Aragona, fu composta dal Cardinale Bessarione fra il 1446 e il 1451; cfr. Del Soldato (2021) p. 169. Fu stampata una prima volta a Parigi nel 1515, quindi e di nuovo a Venezia presso i tipi degli eredi di Aldo Manuzio l'anno seguente: *Aristotelis castigatissime recognitum Opus metaphysicum a Clariss. principe Bessarione Card. Niceno ...XIII libris distinctum*, Parisiis, apud Henr. Stephanum, 1515 (USTC 144394; copia digitale disponibile su <https://gallica.bnf.fr>); *Quae hoc in volumine tractantur Bessarionis cardinalis Niceni, & patriarchae Constantinopolitani in calumniatorem Platonis ... tractatus Eiusdem Metaphysicorum Aristotelis XIII librorum tralatia*, Venetiis, in aedibus haer. Aldi Manutii, 1516 (USTC 814296). Ivi, il testo della *Metafisica* si trova suddiviso in capitoli numerati con cifre romane, presumibilmente ad opera di Bessarione stesso. Sulla prima suddivisione dei capitoli del testo greco, attestata nella terza edizione di Basilea (1550), Fazzo (2012) pp. 39-41.

⁵ Fazzo-Folli-Ghione (2022).

prima età moderna, proponendo una rassegna dei primi cento anni della tradizione latina a stampa della *Metaphysica Nova* (1473-1574). Precisiamo invece di non esserci occupati delle edizioni a stampa che contengano solo sintesi o estratti della *Metaphysica Nova* o del Commento Grande di Averroè.⁶

Della tradizione testuale della *Metaphysica Nova* si sono occupati prevalentemente gli studiosi impegnati a indagare la tradizione del Commento Grande di Averroè: Maurice Bouyges, nella sua *Notice* introduttiva all'edizione della versione greco-araba della *Metafisica*, e Dag Nikolaus Hasse, futuro editore critico della versione arabo-latina del Commento Grande di Averroè e della *Metaphysica Nova*.⁷ Un fondamentale punto di riferimento è l'*Aristoteles Latinus*, vol. XXV 3.1, dedicato alla revisione/traduzione greco-latina di Guglielmo di Moerbeke (in parte una revisione della *Translatio Anonyma*), edita da Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, con un'introduzione mirabilmente approfondita.⁸ Ivi, fra l'altro, Vuillemin-Diem compone un importante elenco delle ventisette edizioni a stampa della traduzione di Moerbeke, in ordine cronologico indicando quali edizioni a stampa contengano anche la *Metaphysica Nova* con il relativo Commento di Averroè.⁹ Risulta a noi utile un confronto: vediamo infatti che i numeri 1, 3,

⁶ All'inizio del XVI secolo ebbero grande diffusione anche le edizioni della *Metafisica* di Aristotele accompagnate dal commento del filosofo Agostino Nifo. A cura dello stesso Nifo, discepolo a Padova di Nicoletto Vernia, uscì a Venezia tra il 1495 ed il 1496 per i tipi di Ottaviano Scoto l'intera opera di Aristotele (cfr. *infra*, edizione n. 4 e p. 107). L'edizione del solo libro dodicesimo della *Metafisica* con il commento di Nifo, che preserva una sintesi della traduzione di Guglielmo Moerbeke ed alcuni elementi del Commento Grande di Averroè, venne pubblicata a Venezia nel 1505: *Philosophorum hac nostra tempestate Monarchae Augustini Niphi Suessani In duodecimum post τὰ φυσικά seu metaphysices Aristotelis et Averrois volumen: commentarii in lucem castigatissimi nuperrime prodeuntes*, Venetiis, Simone da Lovere aere Alessandro Calcedonio, 1505 (USTC 844634); copia digitale disponibile su Münchener Digitalisierungszentrum (MDZ); <https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/>. L'opera ricevette successive edizioni a Venezia nel 1518 e nel 1526. Cfr. Lohr (1988) p. 284.

⁷ Quella di Bouyges (1967-1973), pp. lxvi-lxxxi, resta forse ancora oggi, a quasi un secolo di distanza, la rassegna più comprensiva di queste stampe. Hasse (2016) pp. 347-54 ha fornito un catalogo degli incunaboli e delle cinquecentine di Averroè.

⁸ Vuillemin-Diem (1995) pp. 46-8.

⁹ La *Metaphysica Nova* sembra essere, nel tempo, la quarta traduzione della *Metafisica* circolante nell'Occidente latino. Venne preceduta dalla *Metaphysica vetustissima*, redatta nel secolo XII da Giacomo Veneto, dalla *Metaphysica mediae translationis* o *Translatio Anonyma*, di autore ignoto, diffusa poco dopo gli esordi del XIII secolo, e dalla *Metaphysica Vetus*, che risulta dalla contaminazione delle prime due. Cfr. Vuillemin-Diem (1995) pp. 3-8.

4, 8, 14, 15, 20, 21 di Vuillemin-Diem, che coincidono rispettivamente con i numeri 1-6 e 8-9 della lista qui *infra*, comportano anche il commento di Averroè, e dunque anche la *Metaphysica Nova* arabo-latina. In tutti questi casi, il Commento Grande di Averroè costituisce il centro del progetto editoriale,¹⁰ infatti per ogni libro aristotelico si trovano progressivamente numerati i *commenta* di Averroè, non i *textus* aristotelici che precedono ogni *commentum* in duplice versione.

Come si vede, la fortuna della prima traduzione latina della *Metafisica* di ampia circolazione si lega strettamente a quella del commento arabo-latino: dal numero delle edizioni che si susseguono tra la fine del Quattrocento e la prima metà del Cinquecento risalta l'importanza che il commento di Averroè rivestiva in Italia in quel periodo, ed il desiderio di rendere disponibile quella sua fondamentale opera esegetica.¹¹

Colpiscono l'impatto e la diffusione di queste stampe aristoteliche, ciascuna delle quali meriterebbe uno studio specifico. Diviene pertanto naturale interrogarsi sulla genesi di ciascuna di esse, sui materiali usati e le loro reciproche relazioni. Riguardo invece all'interesse in generale di esaminare le edizioni a stampa consideriamo paradigmatico lo studio di Charles Burnett sulle due edizioni Giunta 1550-1552 e 1562.¹²

¹⁰ Le stampe ora indicate sono quelle degli anni 1473 (GW 2419), 1483 (GW 2337), 1489 (GW 2339), 1495-1496 (GW 2340, perpaucis correctionibus exceptis, ex editione Venetiis 1489 pendet), 1507 (I.A. *107.753a), 1516 (I.A. *107.838), 1529 Lugduni (I.A. *107.910), 1542 (Lugduni I.A. *108.040). I riferimenti catalografici sono quelli indicati nella nota precedente. Bouyges, *loc. cit.*, menziona la stampa del 1521 senza averla potuta esaminare.

¹¹ Nella lettera dedicatoria al cardinale Bernardo Salviati, che apre il primo volume dell'edizione Giunta del 1552, Tommaso Giunta in modo esplicito loda la cultura araba per la specifica sapienza filologica e in particolare riconosce come fondamentale, per la tradizione del testo aristotelico, l'opera filosofica e critica di Averroè: "...At Arabes, non contenti nudis interpretationibus, materiam totam, hoc est res ipsas de quibus tractandum fuerat, multo diligentius ac fusius sibi inspiciendas putaverunt, idque vel praecipuum in Averroè laudatur, cuius solidissima doctrina de Graecorum fontibus non magis hausta quam expressa usque eo enituit ut solus 'commentatoris' nomen sibi iure vendicaret, ac iam constet inter omnes qui proximis saeculis sunt philosophati, eas philosophiae partes quae ab Aristotele sunt omissae, ab alio hactenus nemine vel diligentius inspectas vel fundamentis solidioribus fuisse constitutas".

¹² Burnett (2013) p. 64. Conclude Burnett: "The changes from edition to edition of the Aristotle-Averroes volumes reflect, as I hope to have shown, the developments in the academic circles in Padua and can hint at not only the academic discussions going on there, but also at the tensions, loyalties, and passions of the personalities involved".

Esiste, si può dire, un intero universo intellettuale dietro a ciascuna di queste stampe, le quali indubbiamente trassero materia progressivamente, e quasi in modo cumulativo le une dalle altre, aspirando a essere sempre più innovative e complete fino alla monumentale impresa dell'editore Giunta, espressa in due straordinarie edizioni.

A tutt'oggi, uno studio d'insieme a riguardo non è stato ancora portato a compimento, probabilmente anche a causa della dispersione ed eterogeneità nei modi di reperibilità di documenti, che pure, come si vedrà, sono in larga parte accessibili online in riproduzione digitale. Confidiamo pertanto di fare cosa utile a qualcuno di coloro che si interesseranno a questa materia col rendere più agevolmente disponibili quei dati fondamentali. Essi potranno agevolare future ricerche, aperte a scopi ulteriori: inquadrare le edizioni censite nel contesto culturale della produzione (libraria e non) dell'epoca, non da ultimo nella prospettiva della storia del libro antico, dell'editoria e, in senso lato, della storia della filologia e dell'erudizione non solo aristotelica di età moderna. Le stampe che proponiamo sono infatti accomunate da elementi fortissimi di continuità, ma anche distinte ogni volta da immancabili differenze, che sarebbe assai difficile identificare senza poter raffrontare tra loro le diverse tappe della storia editoriale di questo testo, così importante e così composito nella configurazione che assume nel primo secolo della sua tradizione a stampa.

Di seguito presentiamo un elenco delle principali edizioni della *Metaphysica Nova*, stampate nei secoli XV e XVI. Senza alcuna esaustività, le note in calce indicano alcuni link alle versioni digitali di alcuni esemplari delle edizioni stesse.

La ricerca degli incunaboli e delle cinquecentine è oggi agevolata dai rispettivi cataloghi generali, fra i quali l'Incunabula Short-Title Catalogue (ISTC), l'Universal Short-Title Catalogue (USTC) e l'*Index Aureliensis. Catalogus librorum sedecimo saeculo impressorum, Aureliae Aquensis, aedibus Valentini Koerner* [poi] Baden-Baden, Heitz, 1962-2004, 14 v. (Bibliotheca bibliographica Aureliana).¹³

¹³ Cfr. *supra*, n. 2. Per gli incunaboli, il riferimento di Vuillemin-Diem porta la sigla *GW*: <https://www.gesamtkatalogderwiegendrucke.de/>. Il sito offre le schede catalografiche online con eventuali link alle riproduzioni digitali. Un contributo molto significativo cui non si può che guardare con gratitudine viene da parte degli editori del Rufus Project, che stanno ultimando una trascrizione della *Metaphysica Nova* secondo le finalità proprie del

Insomma, questo contributo, come ognuno vede, non intende sostituirsi a quello di esperti dell'analisi bibliologica che questi esemplari meriterebbero. È uno strumento preparato per gli scopi del nostro Seminario Aristotelico, che qui rendiamo pubblico, nella convinzione e speranza che ciascuna di queste edizioni si valuti meglio nel contesto delle altre, cui può e deve essere comparata.¹⁴ Le note supplementari, che seguono all'elenco, sono frutto di osservazioni testuali per noi di specifico interesse e aggiungono, dove se ne dà occasione, commenti di varia natura e talora anche estratti del testo originale. In vista di indagini future, saremo estremamente grati a chiunque ci voglia segnalare *desiderata, addenda e corrigenda*.

1. Titolo: *Metaphysica cum commentariis Averrois*.

Pubblicazione: Patavii: impens. Johannis Philippi Aureliani et fratrum. In folio. 198 cc., 1473 (ISTC ia01005000; USTC 997527) [*Editio princeps*].¹⁵

2. Titolo: *Aristotelis opera cum commentariis Averrois*.

Pubblicazione: Venetiis: Andreas [Torresanus] de Asula et Bartholomaeus Alexandrini [de Blavis]. In folio. 221 cc., 1483 (ISTC ia00963000).¹⁶

3. Titolo: *Aristotelis opera cum commentariis Averrois, Metaphysica*.

Pubblicazione: Venetiis: Bernardinus Stagninus, de Tridino. In folio. 94 cc., 1489 (ISTC ia00964000).¹⁷

loro progetto, ricco di riferimenti alla tradizione manoscritta. Cfr. Wood (2009); Wood-Lewis-Ottman (2013-2017) <http://rrp.stanford.edu/SMet01rb.shtml>.

¹⁴ Per la disponibilità digitale e cartacea delle edizioni consultate, esprimiamo un particolare ringraziamento alla Biblioteca Digital Hispanica, sezione digitale della Biblioteca Nacional de España, alla Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, all'Istituto Centrale per il Catalogo Unico delle biblioteche italiane, alla sezione Gallica della Bibliothèque nationale de France, al Repositorio Documental dell'Universidad de Valladolid.

¹⁵ <https://data.cerl.org/istc/ia01005000>

¹⁶ Copia digitale disponibile su Münchener Digitalisierungszentrum (MDZ); <https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/>

¹⁷ <https://data.cerl.org/istc/ia00964000>; <https://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/db/0004/bsb00045702/images/> (non presente nel catalogo USTC).

4. Titolo: *Aristotelis Opera cum commento Averrois, Metaphysica.*

Pubblicazione: Venetiis: Johannes et Gregorius de Gregoriis, impens. Octaviani Scoti. In folio. 130 cc., 1496 (ISTC ia00965000).¹⁸

5. Titolo: *Accipe lector studiose Aristotelem peripatheticorum principem ac eius fidelissimum interpretem Auerroem: castigatum erroribusque purgatum: necnon margines optimis annotationibus ac concordantijs ornatum atque fideli studio quoad fieri potest impressum.*

Pubblicazione: Venetijs: mandato et expensis heredum nobilis viri domini Octaviani Scoti ciuis Modoetiensis. In folio. 444 cc., 1507 (USTC 810858; EDIT 2840).¹⁹

6. Titolo: *Accipe lector studiose Aristotelem peripatheticorum principem ac eius fidelissimum interpretem Auerroem: castigatum erroribusque purgatum: necnon margines optimis annotationibus ac concordantijs ornatum atque fideli studio quoad fieri potuit impressum.*

Pubblicazione: Venetijs: sumptibus heredum quondam domini Octaviani Scoti Modoetiensis et sociorum. In folio. 444 cc., 1516 (USTC 810866; EDIT 2845).

7. Titolo: *Aristo. Stagyri. Lib. Metaphysi. 12. cum singulorum epitomatis hactenus non impressis: Auerroequ eius fideliss. interprete; ac M[arci] A[ntonii] Z[imarae] apostillis.*

Pubblicazione: Papieque: summa cura ac diligentia impressos per solertem virum Iacob de Burgofranco. 8°. 339 cc., 1521 (USTC 810879; EDIT 2854).²⁰

8. Titolo: *Metaphy. Aristo. cum commen. Auer. Aristote. Stagyrite lib. Metaphy. 12. cum singulorum epitomatis hactenus non impressis: Auerroequ eius fideliss. Interprete.*

Pubblicazione: Lugduni: apud Scipionem de Gabiano in vico mercuriali. 8°. 339 cc., 1529. (USTC 155851).²¹

9. Titolo: *Aristotelis Stagyritae libri Metaphy. XII cum singulorum epitomatis hactenus non impressis, Auerroequ eius fidelissimo interprete et M- Anto.*

¹⁸ Non presente nel catalogo USTC.

¹⁹ Copia digitale disponibile su Internet Culturale (ICCU); <https://www.internetculturale.it/>

²⁰ Copia digitale su Internet Culturale (ICCU); <https://www.internetculturale.it/>

²¹ <https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/28995>

Zimare apostillis, necnon duobus alii lib. quos Aristotelem redolere docti contendunt, in quibus tam exactam diligentiam invenies ut nulla ex parte damnare possis.

Pubblicazione: Lugduni: apud Iacobum Giunctam. 8°. 336 cc., 1542.²²

10. Titolo: *Aristotelis Stagiritae Omnia quae extant opera ... Averrois ... commentarii, aliique ipsius in logica, philosophia, & medicina libri, quorum aliqui ... nuper a Iacob Mantino sunt conversi ... Leui Gersonidis annotationes in Auer. expositiones super logices libros ... M. Antonij Zimarae in Aristotelis & Averrois dicta contradictionum solutiones. Octauum volumen. Aristotelis Stagiritae Metaphysicorum libri XIII. Cum Auerrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis, et epitome. Theophrasti Metaphysicorum liber.*

Pubblicazione: Venetijs: apud haeredes Lucaeantonij Iuntae. In folio. 188 cc., 1552 (USTC 810938; EDIT 2905).²³

11. Titolo: *Aristotelis Stagiritae Omnia quae extant, opera. ... Auerrois in ea opera omnes qui ad nos pervenere ... Marci Antonii Zimarae in Arist. et in Aver. dicta contradictionum solutiones. Tomus octavus operum. Aristotelis stagiritae peripateticorum principis ... cum Auerrois cordubensis duplici expositione, media scilicet hactenus haudquaquam excusa usque ad septimum librum. In hoc Octavo tomo haec continentur. Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri Quatuordecim.*

Pubblicazione: Venetiis: Apud Cominum de Tridino Montisferrati. 8°. 404 cc., 1560 (USTC 810955; EDIT 2925).²⁴

12. Titolo: *Omnia quae extant opera ... Averrois in ea opera ... commentarii ... M. Antonij Zimarae in Aristotelis et Averrois dicta in philosophia contradictionum solutiones. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis, Octauum volumen. Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII. Cum Auerrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis, et epitome. Theophrasti Metaphysicorum liber.*

Pubblicazione: Venetiis: apud haeredes Lucae Antonii Iuntae. 8°. 424 cc., 1562 (USTC 810959; EDIT 2925).²⁵

13. Titolo: *Aristotelis Omnia quae extant opera. Selectis translationibus, collatisque cum graecis emendatissimis, ac vetustissimis exemplaribus, illustrata,*

²² Copia digitale disponibile su <https://archive.org/>

²³ Copia digitale su Internet Culturale (ICCU); <https://www.internetculturale.it/>

²⁴ <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k68229d/f2.item>

²⁵ Copia digitale su Internet Culturale (ICCU); <https://www.internetculturale.it/>

... *Auerrois Cordubensis in ea opera, omnes, qui ad hæc usque tempore peruenere commentarij. Nonnulli etiam ipsius in logica, philosophia, & medicina libri, cum Leui Gersonidis in libros logicos annotationibus, quorum plurimi sunt à Iacobo Mantino in Latinum conuersi. Graecorum, Arabum, & Latinorum lucubrationes quædam, ad hoc opus pertinentes. Marciantonij Zimara ... in Aristotelis, et Auerrois dicta in philosophia contradictionum solutiones, propriis locis annexae. Bernardini Tomitani ... in Arist. & Auer. dicta in primo libro Poster. resol. contradictionum solutiones: ... Superaddite sunt huic operi Michaelis Pselli Metaphrasis secundi libri poster. Emmanuele Margunio interprete ... Aristotelis Opera cum Auerrois commentariis, Octauum volumen. Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII. Cum Auerrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis, et epitome. Theophrasti Metaphysicorum liber.*

Pubblicazione: Venetiis, apud Iunctas. 8°. 424 cc., 1574 (USTC 810983; EDIT 2946).²⁶

Note alle edizioni

1. 1473

È la famosa *editio princeps*, definita *superbe* da Bouyges,²⁷ in cui sembrano conservarsi fattezze caratteristiche dei codici manoscritti: due sezioni di testo scorrono parallele dividendo la pagina in parti uguali, sul modello di un antico codice greco così strutturato. La stampa è opera di Lorenzo Canozio.²⁸ Il succedersi del duplice *textus*, prima greco-latino e poi arabo-latino, ad introduzione delle relative sezioni commentate di Averroè, comincia dal libro *Alpha elatton*. Diversamente dalle stampe successive, già a partire dall'edizione del 1483, nessuna forma di numerazione o titolo viene riportata a stampa, nemmeno per i *commenta*.²⁹ L'alternanza dei due *textus* è qui evidenziata solo dal rientro del capoverso; diventerà più visibile e sistematica nell'edizione Giunta (vedi *supra*, edizione n. 10). Inizialmente, per il libro *Alpha meizon* è riportata solo la traduzione greco-latina, in due colonne per ciascuna pagina. Segue il libro *Alpha elatton* per il quale sono

²⁶ Copia digitale su Internet Culturale (ICCU); <https://www.internetculturale.it/>

²⁷ Bouyges (1967-1973) p. lxix.

²⁸ A partire dal 1472 oltre alla *Metaphysica* verranno stampate da Canozio sei opere aristoteliche corredate dal commento di Averroè: *De Anima*, *De Caelo et Mundo*, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, *Metereologica*, *Physica* e *Parua Naturalia*.

²⁹ Nell'esemplare di cui abbiamo consultato una versione digitale a cura della Biblioteca Digital Hispanica (Biblioteca Nacional de España) è tuttavia presente una numerazione a mano per le sezioni del Commento. Copia digitale disponibile su: <http://bdh-rd.bne.es>

riportate entrambe le versioni, greco-latina e arabo-latina, ed il Commento Grande. Al termine del libro viene ripresa una seconda volta tutta la seconda parte di *Alpha meizon*, 5.987a2-10.993a27. L'edizione comprende i libri dal primo al dodicesimo della *Metafisica* e riporta il libro *Kappa* nella sola versione greco-latina, da allora in poi presente nelle stampe insieme alla *Metaphysica Nova*. Lo stesso vale per la sezione finale del libro *Lambda*, 10.1075b11-1076a4, assente nella versione arabo-latina. Mancano i libri tredicesimo e quattordicesimo, che non sono oggetto del Commento Grande di Averroè.

2. 1483

Nell'incunabolo, opera dell'editore veneto Andrea Torresano, ogni parte di testo arabo-latino è preceduta dalla corrispondente versione greco-latina di Guglielmo di Moerbeke. I lemmi del commento sono numerati, ma non i rispettivi *textus*. I primi fogli dell'edizione introducono la *quaestio an celum sit ex materia et forma*, intorno al problema se il cielo sia costituito o meno da materia e forma, opera del filosofo patavino Nicoletto Vernia, forse il maggiore averroista del tardo Quattrocento.³⁰ I *textus* delle edizioni 1473 e 1483 si presentano identici. Come nell'edizione del 1473 non compaiono ancora titoli riferiti ai *textus*, che si riscontreranno nelle edizioni successive. I *textus* stessi non recano numero, bensì vengono progressivamente numerati i relativi commenti. I due *textus* affiancati, greco-latino e arabo-latino, non sono separati da righe vuote, né risultano tipograficamente distinti. Per il primo *textus*, visibile al f.13 della riproduzione, ognuna delle due versioni è stampata con un rientro su più righe, come per fornire spazio ad una iniziale rubricata. L'edizione riporta dodici libri della *Metafisica*, tralasciando gli ultimi due, come nell'edizione di Canozio.

3. 1489

Nella stampa, opera di Bernardino Stagnino di Tridino, il testo della *Metafisica* nella traduzione di Moerbeke occupa il corpo della pagina in due colonne al centro, fino a *Metaph.* A 5.987a2. Da questo punto in poi cominciano a succedersi i due *textus*, greco-latino e arabo-latino, in colonne parallele, incorniciati dal Commento di Averroè. Compare inoltre la numerazione dei *textus* arabo-latini e del relativo Commento, per es. da 1 a 51 per *Alpha meizon*. L'impaginazione del commento a cornice dei *textus* ricorda quella di certi codici greci, dove lo spazio vuoto dei margini veniva

³⁰ De Asula 1483, ff. 1r-3v. Su Nicoletto Vernia si vedano Keßler (1994); Mahoney (2000); Hasse (2004); De Bellis (2012); Hasse (2016).

riempito in modo continuo da glossatori e scolasti.³¹ Vengono inseriti dalla versione di Moerbeke gli ultimi due libri, *My* e *Ny*, privi di commento, non trattati nel Commento Grande di Averroè. Dal 1489 la *Metaphysica Nova* riporta dunque la stessa partizione della tradizione greco-latina. Il tredicesimo libro è introdotto da un titolo che precisa “*numquam in luce editus*”. In seguito a questa stampa tutte le edizioni in esame presentano gli ultimi due libri della *Metafisica*.

4. 1496

L'edizione riporta la versione greco-latina di Guglielmo di Moerbeke. È il quinto volume nell'edizione delle opere di Aristotele impressa per i tipi di Ottaviano Scoto tra il 1495 ed il 1496 e curata da Agostino Nifo. Il quinto e ultimo tomo, che contiene la *Metafisica*, reca la data del 26 aprile 1496. I *textus* della *translatio* arabo-latina e i *commenta* di Averroè sono numerati (cfr. Bouyges, *Notice*, p. lxxi).

5. 1507

L'edizione riporta la versione greco-latina di Guglielmo di Moerbeke. È stampata dagli eredi di Ottaviano Scoto; secondo Bouyges (p. lxxi) è assai simile all'edizione n. 4 (cfr. *supra*) *apud Scotum* del 1496. Nell'opera compaiono per la prima volta le annotazioni di Marco Antonio Zimara (*non vidimus*).

6. 1516

L'edizione conserva la traduzione di Guglielmo di Moerbeke. Rispetto alle precedenti edizioni *apud Scotum*, assai simili, del 1496 e del 1507 (edizioni nn. 4 e 5 *supra*), Bouyges nota (p. lxxi) che i margini sono più ricchi di annotazioni e riferimenti (*non vidimus*).

7. 1521

Edizione pavese di Iacopo di Burgofranco, particolarmente rara.³² Nella traduzione di Moerbeke, il testo occupa la pagina intera fino a *Metaph.* A 5. 987a2, luogo testuale da cui iniziano i *textus* commentati da Averroè. I due *textus*, greco-latino e arabo-latino, si alternano, mentre i *commenta* sono distinti dal carattere a stampa diminuito e anche numerati. Ogni libro viene introdotto da brevi sommari degli argomenti, redatti da Marco Antonio Zimara.

³¹ Riguardo la funzione di note, lettere dedicatorie e paratesti nell'ambito della produzione letteraria di età rinascimentale si rimanda ad Abbamonte-Laureys-Miletti (2020).

³² Bouyges (1967-1973) p. lxxi. Bouyges afferma di non aver potuto consultare l'edizione.

8. 1529

È la prima edizione lionese della *Metaphysica Nova*, stampata da Scipione Gabbiano. Ogni libro della *Metafisica* fino al dodicesimo viene diviso in *capita*, con brevi sommari anteposti ad ogni esordio, mentre i *commenta* di Averroè sono numerati in ordine progressivo. Le due traduzioni, la greco-latina di Moerbeke e l'arabo-latina, si possono distinguere grazie agli *incipit* di ciascuna parte di testo, evidenziati in maiuscolo, mentre il *commentum* segue i due *textus* in carattere uguale, diminuito di corpo. La *Metafisica* viene edita in quattordici libri. Ai ff. 245-271 il volume riporta il *Liber de Substantia orbis* di Averroè.

9. 1542

L'edizione si deve a Jacques Giunta (1486-1546), figura di primo piano dell'editoria lionese del Cinquecento.³³ L'opera riproduce la traduzione di Guglielmo Moerbeke dell'edizione Canozio 1473. I due *textus* non vengono tuttavia distinti in alcun modo, mentre sono numerati i *commenta* di Averroè. Brevi sommari divisi in capitoli introducono ogni libro. In ogni pagina il titolo superiore è compreso a decoro entro due foglie secondo un modello già reperibile nei titoli rubricati dei manoscritti greci.

10. 1552

L'assetto di questa prima edizione Giunta del 1552, introdotta da un volume di prefazione,³⁴ riprende in modo evidente la stampa del 1483 per i tipi di Andrea Torresano. Ai due *textus* affiancati, che si susseguono identici nel carattere a stampa, distinti unicamente dal rientro del capoverso, segue in corpo minore la parte relativa al commento. Nell'edizione Giunta 1552, come successivamente anche in quella del 1562, si impone la presenza di un introduttivo *Index summarum ac capitum librorum*, con titoli e sottotitoli che compendiano il contenuto dei diversi capitoli: questa importante scelta

³³ A guida della libreria e stamperia Giunta di Lione, Jacques aveva prodotto la prima edizione aristotelica dell'*Etica Nicomachea* nel 1535: *Ethicorum libri X ad Nicomachum, necnon commentario elucidati adjectus est de moribus dialogus ad Galeotum, dialogo parvorum moralium Aristotelis ad eudemium fere respondens*, 1535 (USTC 157054).

³⁴ Secondo la magistrale analisi di Burnett (2013) l'opera consta di undici volumi, uno dei quali prefatorio, del 1552, inclusivo di *errata corrige* per gli altri, che furono invece stampati nel 1550. A questo si deve, nota Burnett, l'anomala indicazione cronologica fornita: 1552-1550. Più precisamente, queste sono le date di pubblicazione degli undici volumi della prima edizione Giunta: I 1552, II 1550, III 1550, IV 1550, VI 1550, VII 1552, VIII 1552, IX 1550, X 1552, XI 1552.

editoriale permetterà al lettore una immediata consultazione dei vari luoghi testuali dell'opera. La divisione in *summae* e *capita* si deve a Giovanni Battista Bagolino, come specificato dal medico e filosofo padovano Marco degli Oddi nella sua prefazione al primo volume. Le Giunta riproducono integralmente i quattordici libri della *Metafisica*. Si sottolinea che dopo l'accurata prefazione di Marco degli Oddi, con l'elenco degli interpreti impegnati nella monumentale impresa di collazione e traduzione dei codici, viene presentato l'indice dei volumi di tutta l'opera, con i rispettivi contenuti. Di seguito un prezioso passaggio della prefazione di Oddi, dove si precisa la lista degli interpreti.

Aristotelis Stagirita ... Averrois Cordubensis Commentarii, Venetiis Apud Iunctas MDLII f. 6v:

Cum igitur Bagolinus noster horum duorum facile principum Philosophorum monumenta tum logica, tum philosophica, medicinaliaque colligere, et castigatissima in lucem emittere destinasset, varia quidem exemplaria Aristotelis interpretum undique conquisivit, ex quibus omnibus Theodorum Gazam elegit, Nicolaum Thomaeum, Georgium Vallam, Alexandrum Chamaillardum, Leonardum Aretinum, Bernardinum Donatum, Georgium Trapezuntium, Franciscum Philelphum, Alexandrum Paccium, Bessarionem Cardinalem Nicenum, Dominicum Montesaurum et Iulium Martianum Rotam Medicos celebres, Ioannemque Bernardum Felicianum, viros profecto omnes egregios. omisit autem Argyropilum, hoc tantum nomine, quod eum paraphrasten potius, quam interpretem crederet.

In questa edizione Giunta 1552 compare la *Metafisica* di Teofrasto.³⁵

³⁵ La traduzione di Teofrasto è quella di Bessarione, già stampata da H. Stephanus a Parigi nel 1515 e nuovamente a Venezia *in aedibus haer. Aldi* nel 1516 (cfr. *supra*, n. 4); essa è preceduta dal famoso scolio (f. 185v): "Libellum hunc Andronicus, et Hermippus non agnoscunt. nec enim prorsus de eo mentionem fecere, in librorum Theophrasti descriptione. At Nicolaus (is enim ex Suda creditur e Damascenorum urbe Philosophus Peripateticus, Herodi Iudeorum Regi, Augustoque Caesari familiaris) in speculatione τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ Aristotelis, eius meminit, Theophrastique esse asserit. Sunt autem paucae quaedam in eo praeviae tractatus universi dubitationes." Lo scolio è presente nel codice Parisinus gr. 1853 (X sec., f. 312r) e studiato al riguardo da Vuillemin Diem (1995) ed Hecquet (2004). La traduzione bessarionea deriva più direttamente dal Vaticanus gr. 1302 (XIII-XIV sec., f. 100r) secondo Most, in Laks-Most (1993) p. lxxix.

Riportiamo qui di seguito il frontespizio del primo volume dell'edizione Giunta 1550-1552 da cui emergono i tratti distintivi di un progetto editoriale eccezionale fondato sull'autorevolezza che gli scritti di Averroè avevano ottenuto nel contesto culturale europeo, ed in modo specifico nell'Università di Padova tra XV e XVI secolo.³⁶



Figura 1: Frontespizio dell'edizione Giunta 1552, primo volume.

³⁶ Cfr. Hasse (2007) pp. 113-36.

11. 1560

L'edizione 1560, a cura di Comin da Trino, affine alla precedente Giunta 1552 per l'identica suddivisione in *summae ac capita* e per la presenza della *Metafisica* di Teofrasto, produce in realtà una notevole innovazione: per i primi sette libri della *Metafisica* si antepone al Commento Grande, il Commento Medio (*expositio media*) di Averroè nella traduzione latina del filosofo ed erudito ebreo cretese Elia Delmedigo.³⁷ Così si legge nell'indice del volume, dove l'editore rivendica il primato di quella traduzione: *Averrois in septem libros media expositio, ab Haelia Cretensi in latinum conversa, Ante hac nunquam excusa, summis vigiliis elaborata*. L'opera inoltre presenta un altro rilevante elemento: per il primo libro della *Metafisica* fino a *Metaph.* A 5.987a2, luogo da cui ha inizio il Commento Grande si trasmettono due *textus* greco-latini, quello di Moerbeke e quello di Bessarione. Ad essi seguono parti della *expositio media*. L'edizione permette di rilevare a chi compari in parallelo le traduzioni di Moerbeke e Bessarione evidenti differenze, nonostante alcune affinità, riscontrabili ad esempio all'esordio del libro. Se nella sua impresa Moerbeke si era basato sulla *Translatio Anonyma*,³⁸ è importante invece sottolineare la particolare fedeltà da parte del greco Bessarione al costruito sintattico del testo. A partire da *Metaph.* A 5.987a6 i *textus* relativi ai passi commentati riportano, come nell'edizione Giunta, la versione di Bessarione e l'arabo-latina. Tutti i *textus* si distinguono attraverso un rientro del capoverso. I caratteri a stampa risultano identici, solo diminuiti nel corpo per entrambi i commenti di Averroè. Come nell'edizione Giunta, la *Metafisica* viene riprodotta in quattordici libri. Di questa particolare e importante edizione, che riporta di Averroè, per ogni libro della *Metafisica*, uno dopo l'altro, prima il Commento Medio, più parafrastico, poi il Commento Grande, lemmatico, riportiamo il frontespizio e l'indice esplicativo del contenuto dell'opera.

³⁷ Del Commento Medio alla *Metafisica* aristotelica, perduto l'originale arabo, restano due traduzioni dall'ebraico. Si ricordi l'opera di Zonta (2011), che include un'edizione critica del testo di Averroè nella traduzione di Zerayah Hen del 1284 e nella traduzione di Qalonymos del 1317.

³⁸ Cfr. Vuillemin-Diem (1995); Borgo (2014) pp. 48-52.



Figura 2: Frontespizio dell'edizione Comin de Trino, 1560. Ottavo volume.

IN HOC OCTAVO TOMO
HAEC CONTINENTVR.

ARISTOTELIS Methaphisicorum libri Quatuordecim, denuo castigati, ac in summas & capita diuisi. char. 5.
Auerrois in septem libros media expositio, ab Hælia Cretenfi in latinum conuersa, Ante hac nunquā excusa, summis vigiliis elaborata. char. 5.
Auerrois in xii. eosdem libros antiqua commentaria, cum duplici textu ex antiquissimis Exemplaribus castigata. char. 20.
Proœmium in duodecimū librum, quod Paulus Israelita primo, postea vero Iacobus Mantinus in Romanam conuertit linguam. char. 311. & 313.
Epitome In eosdem Metaphisicorum libros, Mantino interprete cum Arist. testibus, vt eis respondent, in margine citatis. char. 370.
Theophrasti Methaphisicorum liber. char. 400.
Summarum ac Capitum index. in Tomi initio.

Figura 3: Edizione Comin del Trino, 1560, f. 1v. Indice.

12. 1562

L'edizione Giunta del 1562 si presenta affine alla precedente. Nell'opera vengono introdotte le *Solutiones* di Marco Antonio Zimara, assenti nella Giunta 1552. Per il testo della *Metafisica* si riscontra tuttavia almeno un'aggiunta significativa: riguarda il passo del libro Θ 6.1048b17-35.³⁹ Se nei *codices vetustissimi*, i più antichi manoscritti in greco della *Metafisica*, il Vindobonensis Phil. gr. 100 (J) ed il Parisinus gr. 1853 (E) e negli altri della cosiddetta famiglia α il passo non compare, esso è invece presente nel Laurentianus 87.12 (Ab), e nella cosiddetta famiglia β.⁴⁰ Probabilmente questa sezione di testo costituisce un prodotto della scuola di Costantinopoli, aggiunto fra il X secolo e l'inizio del XII, quando venne composto il codice Ab.

³⁹ Per un'analisi dell'inserito e delle sue fonti greche si consulti Fazzo-Folli-Ghione (2022). Si veda anche Helbing (1997).

⁴⁰ Sulla tradizione greca della *Metafisica* vedi bibliografia e stemma in Fazzo (2022).

Nella prima edizione Giunta il passo del libro *Theta* non veniva riportato, mentre già compariva nell'*editio princeps* del testo greco, l'aldina del 1497.⁴¹ Nella seconda edizione Giunta del 1562 il passo compare preceduto da una breve nota critica che precisa come il suo inserimento si debba al lavoro di collazione dell'erudito Ciriaco Strozzi (1504-1565), docente di lettere classiche nel Ginnasio di Pisa.⁴² Il passo è assente nei manoscritti bessarionei della *Metafisica* e nella traduzione greco-latina bessarionea dell'opera, edita per la prima volta a Venezia da Aldo Manuzio nel 1516. Rispetto a tutte le altre edizioni della *Metaphysica Nova*, la Giunta 1562 reca il segno di una innovazione stilistica, l'adozione del corsivo per i *textus* arabo-latini. Tale scelta mette in risalto la differenza delle due traduzioni, le quali, sebbene riportate una dopo l'altra, si caratterizzano in modo chiaro grazie ai differenti caratteri. L'innovazione rende così i due *textus* consultabili in modo distinto. Di seguito l'introduzione a *Metaph.* Θ 6.1048b17-35.

Aristotelis Opera Apud Iunctas 1562, f. 235v:

Sequens textus, quamvis reperiatur in Graeco exemplari, tamen a nullo unquam ex Latinis fuit consideratus, praeterea a Domino Chiriaco Strozza Fiorentino nobili et eruditissimo viro graecarum litterarum peritissimo, qui, cum in Pisano Gymnasio grecas litteras doceret, non solum hoc animadversione dignum putavit, sed et transtulit, verum etiam doctissime ipsum publice interpretatus est.

13. 1574

Il volume, che riproduce l'ottavo tomo della Giunta 1562, si colloca all'interno di una nuova edizione dell'*Opera omnia*, pubblicata dal 1573 al 1576.

⁴¹ Sulla tradizione greca a stampa si veda Burnyeat (2008). Natali (2013) si esprime a favore dell'autenticità del passo Θ 6.1048b17-35.

⁴² Cfr. Zorzi (2006). Esaminando la documentazione epistolare di Ciriaco Strozzi, Zorzi approfondisce l'attività di ricerca dello studioso e le sue relazioni con i filologi legati alla cerchia di Pietro Vettori. Sulle ricerche di Strozzi si consultino anche Bertoli (2011) e Curnis (2019).

M. Ghione-L. Folli-S. Fazzo, La tradizione a stampa della *Metaphysica Nova*

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IN MEMORIAM
FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN



*Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann nel giugno 2019
alla firma del Learning Agreement per chi scrive*

La recente scomparsa del Professor Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann trova in *Aristotelica* una sede opportuna di ricordo: von Herrmann faceva infatti parte del Comitato scientifico della Rivista nel 2022, anno di fondazione della stessa. Il dato è in sé significativo. A più di vent'anni dalla sua *Emeritierung*, questo studioso d'eccezione continuava a prendere parte alle iniziative (spesso di natura internazionale) che reputava di rilievo scientifico: l'adesione all'*Advisory Board* di *Aristotelica* è stato il suo ultimo impegno editoriale.

L'intensa attività degli anni più recenti è legata proprio all'Italia, alla quale fu sempre particolarmente legato e da cui provengono diversi suoi allievi. Nel 2016, partecipò a un importante convegno a Pavia. L'anno successivo ricevette la massima onorificenza della Pontificia Università Lateranense; nel 2019, fu nuovamente a Pavia, dove fu insignito della medaglia onoraria dell'Ateneo. A pochi mesi di distanza da questo incontro, fu ancora in Italia per una seconda *lectio magistralis* nell'ambito di un convegno sul rapporto filosofico tra Emanuele Severino e Martin Heidegger. Avrebbe dovuto curare nel 2020 un seminario su Agostino e la fenomenologia presso il Collegio Borromeo di Pavia: annullato per via della pandemia, quella relazione sarebbe stata l'ultima tenuta da von Herrmann. È d'altronde proprio Agostino l'autore antico più amato dallo studioso: all'Ipponate è dedicata l'unica monografia che abbia pubblicato su un pensatore greco-latino (seppur in relazione alla 'fenomenologia ermeneutica'), disponibile anche in lingua italiana. La presenza della dottrina agostiniana del tempo nel suo itinerario di ricerca è infatti costante e rintracciabile fin dalla tesi di abilitazione *Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Temporalität des Seinsverständnisses*, data alle stampe nel 1971 col titolo *Bewußtsein, Zeit und Weltverständnis*. In questo lavoro, che resta il più speculativo della sua produzione, numerosi sono i riferimenti a Platone, Aristotele (il cui *corpus* è ampiamente consultato) e Plotino.

Impressiona notare come questa vocazione filosofica totale si sia declinata, sempre negli ultimissimi anni, anche negli ulteriori ambiti di competenza del classico maestro di scuola. Fino al luglio 2022 (è scomparso il 2 agosto) era solito ricevere – nel suo appartamento privato o nei luoghi friburghesi legati alla storia della fenomenologia – professori, ricercatori e studenti da tutto il mondo. La nomina del suo assistente particolare è del 2016. Due anni dopo, esce il volume 82 della HGA, curato personalmente da lui

In memoriam Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann

(ma si premurerà di coordinarne l'edizione sino alla morte). Nel 2019 (a 85 anni), accettava di seguire il suo ultimo *Privatstudent*. E, sempre nel 2019, avviava la pubblicazione dei corsi tenuti durante gli anni di insegnamento all'Università di Friburgo. Al momento, sono stati pubblicati per i tipi di Königshausen & Neumann (Würzburg): *Transzendenz und Ereignis. Heideggers Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). Ein Kommentar* (2019); *Intentionalität und Welt in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. Zwei Freiburger Vorlesungen* (2020); *Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft als transzendente Metaphysik* (2021). Dato il rigore metodologico ed espositivo di questi protocolli (von Herrmann teneva lezione leggendo i testi che preparava con meticolosità di anno in anno), è ora in programma una pubblicazione puntuale dell'intero lascito dattiloscritto, a cominciare dal volume *Hermeneutik der Zeitlichkeit*, in uscita per la fine dell'anno corrente. Una bibliografia completa dell'opera di Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann è invece prevista per il prossimo anno, in un volume celebrativo per la casa editrice Springer.

Chiunque abbia avuto la fortuna di conoscere Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann ricorderà per sempre, con infinita gratitudine e affetto, il maestro rigoroso e infaticabile, l'uomo nobile e mite, lo studioso di filosofia che sa il proprio compito quale destinazione morale universale.

Jaka Makuc
Università di Bologna

AUTHOR GUIDELINES

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