

Heidegger's 1922 Teaching on *Metaphysics Lambda* 6: A Challenge for Aristotelizing Scholars

Whoever has been dealing with reading Aristotle in the twentieth century has come across Heidegger's path, which is powerful and significant for anyone involved in phenomenology and hermeneutics as philosophical currents in their own, regardless of whether or not ancient Greek philosophy is entitled to play a role in it.

By contrast, it does not often happen that special attention is paid to a dialogue with those Aristotelizing scholars who – for the most part no doubt – never got involved in Heideggerian readings and who might well find them as embarrassingly distant from their own no less in method as in content.

It is precisely for this reason that both of us are honored to make a brief contribution to this change of views. The whole Kronos enterprise deserves gratitude among Aristotelizing scholars. A bridge is being provided that qualifies and expresses the very nature of Aristotelian studies throughout the centuries: namely, building a dialogue on rational grounds, sharing viewpoints based on Aristotle's grammar of thought. This has proved to be a unique path for reciprocal understanding – no matter from which language, culture, religion, time, and place. It is, after all, Aristotle's main legacy to humankind.

Our comments will focus on what the impact hopefully can be to allow a closer understanding of Heidegger's distinctive and unconventional approach to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Book Lambda.

Having been dealing (S.F.) with *Metaphysics* Book Lambda at length for the past twenty years, we have now been asked – thanks to Serafin's kind invitation – to comment on Heidegger's Lambda translations, which appear in his 1922 courses (HGA 62, pp. 102-105). Three features and two reference works are worth commenting upon there.

One surprising fact could be that Heidegger's Lambda translations are there at all, since there is no hint that he devoted special attention to that (supposedly)

theological book: at the contrary, following Jaeger's 1912 path, Heidegger does his best to avoid putting *Lambda* or any possible overarching book in the middle. Another remarkable fact is how short and fragmentary such quotes from *Lambda* are. The third striking feature is how distant such renderings of Aristotle's Greek into modern languages are from standard ancient Greek.

The three features are interconnected, not only with each other, as parts or steps in Heidegger's project, but also with the general historical context. This includes no doubt the state of Aristotelian studies in the early twentieth century Germany. This can be seen from Heidegger's suggested bibliography, which is rich and detailed when Aristotle editions and translations are concerned. By contrast, it is very selective about scholarly literature on Aristotle.

Heidegger mainly indicates one very updated reference work, and one main piece of relevant scholarship.

The suggested reference work is "Überweg-Praechter *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie* I, (11. Aufl. vollständig Neubearbeitet v. K. Praechter, [Berlin: Mittler] 1920)". A paratextual remark gives an idea of the way these courses were recorded for the sake of a tightly knit Freiburg community: "anyone can find it in the reading room", which clearly means: Please, go and read it.

We can still locate the book in the Freiburg University Library. This is the Überweg's eleventh edition of *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, the second since Karl Praechter assumed the editor's office of Überweg's *Grundriß* in 1907. Unlike the 1909 edition by Überweg and Praechter, the one from 1920 is radically revised: "Neubearbeitete und stark vermehrte"¹. § 47 especially, the one about Aristotle's writings, was almost entirely new; it grew from scarcely one page in 1909 to being more than ten times longer in 1919. This means that the 1920 section (§ 47) about Aristotle's Writings is almost entirely new in the 11th edition of Überweg-Praechter *Grundriß*: Werner Jaeger's 1912 *Studien* are quoted there not less than twenty-five times. Praechter, the main author of the section, summarizes in the most authoritative way the new state of Aristotelian studies.

¹ The relevant volume, i.e. the copy of the 11th edition of Überweg-Praechter *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie* which was in the Reading Room in 1924, is still in the University Library Freiburg with the signature B 200,ak-1 (and accordingly the volume with the signature B 200,ak-1 (we are grateful to Dr J. Werner for this information). In 1926 finally, the canonical Überweg-Praechter version, "umgearbeitete und erweiterte" was published.

Praechter does this all in light of Jaeger's hypotheses, which he follows closely, as he says², and which he praises uniquely, without any shadow of criticism, while giving them a most appropriate overall shape. By doing so, Praechter in 1920 made Jaeger's hypotheses a main research stream for Heidegger and several generations of scholars to come.

In the following year, 1921, Jaeger, in his turn, offered an enthusiastic review of Praechter's work. While closing somehow the circle, Jaeger thus ends with a wish, almost a forecast:

"Perhaps it [i.e. Praechter's work] will also contribute to a new philosophical rethinking of the absolute content of the old philosophy, which we need more urgently than ever"³.

So far Jaeger 1921. Heidegger, since 1921, has read ancient philosophy in his courses, and especially Aristotle.

Jaeger's hypotheses, widespread and reinforced by Praechter, meant something to him. They especially affect his approach to Aristotle, to his *Metaphysics* and to *Metaphysics* book *Lambda* in particular.

A telling point of contact with Praechter is about Aristotle in general. Both Praechter and Heidegger are convinced that all of Aristotle's works are affected by the results of Jaeger's *Studien* on the *Metaphysics*. This is stated from the outset of the relevant section by Praechter ("in ihren Ergebnissen aber auch für die anderen Lehrschriften entscheidend waren") and then again by Heidegger, in very similar words: he praises Jaeger's "Ergebnis [...] für alle Aristotelesinterpretation grundlegenden Untersuchung" (HGA 62, 5). Again in a 1952 seminar devoted to the relationship between *Physics* Gamma and *Metaphysics* book Theta 10, Heidegger could argue that his own philosophy was rooted in the texts of Greek philosophy that he had already read as a gymnasial student (1912) and that among these Jaeger's *Studien* was of particular stimulus to him. It is no coincidence that the *Studein* and the 1923 text on Aristotle⁴ are referred to as 'wichtigen Werke'. In *Von Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις*, Heidegger criticizes the 1923 text for thinking in an "ungriechisch, scholastisch-neuzeitlich und neukantisch" manner; the *Studien* would instead be

² *Ibid.*, 273.

³ "Vielleicht trägt es auch zu neuer philosophischer Durchdenken des absoluten Gehalts der alten Philosophie bei, deren wir dringender denn je bedürfen", from "Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der geschichte der philosophie I Teil, das Altertum. 11. vollständig neubearbeitet u. stark verm. Aufl. hgb. v. K. Praechter, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1921: 137-141 (repr. Id. *Scripta Minora* vol. 2: 253-256).

⁴ The same text was recommended by Heidegger to his students already in the course of 1924 (see HGA 18, 4).

more correct because "vom »Inhaltlichen« weniger berührt" (HGA 9, 242). It is the methodological-formal nature of the *Studien*, so the new kind of philology they exhibit, and not their proper conceptual content, that meets Heidegger's enthusiasm. As we will see soon, this aspect is of the most relevance to understand his idea of philology.

It is therefore Heidegger himself, moreover in a mature phase of his thought, who makes explicit the fundamental importance that Jaeger's *Studien* had for his philosophical formation and production⁵.

As for the *Metaphysics*, Jaeger's main progress, in Praechter's view, already is breaking with the standard view point, in relation to broad and authoritative nineteenth-century scholarship: the first modern critical editors of the *Metaphysics*, Brandis, Bonitz, Schwegler are duly mentioned, with works published in the first half of the nineteenth century – 1823, 1847 and 1848, respectively. All of them strove for the best possible edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* after the damages in the course of the tradition. In fact, in Jaeger's view, there is nothing as a single work classical philology could strive to rebuild : the *Metaphysics* should not be regarded as a 'work' at all, since Aristotle did not have a unified conception of this subject.

In this regard, not only Jaeger was to dominate the exegetical debate about the *Metaphysics* for decades⁶, but his very key-words come again in Heidegger premises. In particular, Jaeger expressly plays a key role in Heidegger's 1922 courses. Let us consider this role more exactly.

Jaeger's 1912 *Studien* consist of two parts (*Einteilungen*). The first (I) titled: "Die Komposition der Metaphysik". Here, the very phenomenon of having the fourteen books of the *Metaphysics* assembled in their present form is severely scrutinized and deconstructed. The title of the second (II) is: "Die literarische Stellung und Form der Metaphysik".

Heidegger follows Jaeger's path closely. The title in his *Vorbemerkung* is very close to Jaeger: "Die Literaturform der überlieferten aristotelischen Schriften".

⁵ See HGA 83, 654-655.

⁶ Aubenque P.: *Le problème de l' être chez Aristote. Essai sur la problématique aristotélicienne*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 7: "La thèse de W. Jaeger [...] ne parut révolutionnaire à beaucoup que parce qu'elle restaurait, contre les détours de la tradition, le point de vue du simple bon sens".

The main difference, as we can see, is that Heidegger follows Praechter in generalizing Jaeger's claim concerning the *Metaphysics*: that they apply somehow to all of Aristotle's texts. This (even if it does not affect our present concern, which is with the *Metaphysics*) testifies Jaeger's growing credit within the Aristotelizing community. It means that after Jaeger (1912), things turned critical for any traditional interpretation of Aristotle as a whole.

According to Jaeger, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* books were composed in a very different order from the traditional one and the *system* which was made out of it is not Aristotelian in itself. This is susceptible to apply to any Aristotelian work in several books.

In the general context of early twentieth-century Germany, this change of perspective succeeded, putting value on the huge work accomplished from 1882 to 1909 by the Berlin Academy and directed by Hermann Diels on Aristotle's Greek commentators, deserves emphasis: these commentators thereafter became a separate field of research.

In Heidegger's view, however, Jaeger's deconstruction opens the door to something different still, that is to Heidegger's further deconstruction of the *Metaphysics* from a plurality of viewpoints. At the very beginning of his 1922 *Vorlesung*, Heidegger refers to Jaeger's 1912 *Studien* as a work of philology. He states that such a philological work has a relevance for «philosophic interpretation» in a negative way: the composition of metaphysical or just philosophical texts into a system could not be arranged “with violence”, “forcibly” [*gewaltsam*]. Heidegger says:

The result [of Jaeger's investigation], which is fundamental for any interpretation of Aristotle, can be summarized as follows: What is available to us is scientific literature strongly characterized by investigation and ongoing research; namely, it is meant to communicate within the closed research community in the Lykeion (research institute!). [We have] Lecture notes in the movable form of the "treatise". Their *ekdosis* mode, the type of publication, is not an edition as a book and "philosophical work" . Rather, it is the kind of communication that is in the form of a lecture (Aristotle's own manuscripts and their possible copies) for the sake of the introduction to and involvement in philosophical research. (...) For a philosophical interpretation, the result of Jaeger's investigation is

important in a negative way: it means that it is not acceptable to connect the treatises forcibly in a single system of metaphysics or even of philosophy as a whole⁷.

As we are about to see, Heidegger's understanding of *Metaphysics Lambda* is especially affected by the new trend— an especially deconstructing one, no doubt. The philological violence to which Heidegger alludes here (and which Jaeger is credited with having avoided) can be traced back to a methodological approach such as that of Wilamowitz. In a letter of December 1932 to Jaeger, Heidegger makes his criticism explicit: "I must confess that to this day the estimation of Wilamowitz precisely as philologist remains incomprehensible to me". And in that very letter, Heidegger contrasted Jaeger and Wilamowitz as "two completely different philologists"⁸. As we have seen previously, Jaeger has assigned to the *Metaphysics* an open and layered text, renouncing caging it in a both textual and conceptual system: this is the greatest Jaeger achievement⁹. In the 1926 course *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*, discussing Jaeger's *Studien* and Aristotle's reception, we read: "Alles offen"¹⁰. This remains the cornerstone of the Heideggerian reading of Jaeger's work until later years, as seen above. That is why it is simple to bring together Heidegger's esteem for the new philological method developed by Jaeger and his occasional critics towards some of his major theses¹¹. We will shortly see the consequences of this for the Heideggerian reading of philology itself.

⁷ "Das Ergebnis der für alle Aristoteles Interpretation grundlegenden Untersuchung ist kurz folgendes: Was vorliegt ist wissenschaftliche Literatur mit dem betonten Charakter der Untersuchung und eigentlichen Forschung; und zwar ist sie berechnet auf Mitteilung innerhalb der engeren Forschungsgemeinschaft im Lykeion (Forschungsinstitut!). Vorlesungsschriften in der beweglichen Form der >Abhandlung< - ihre *Ekdosis*-Weise, Publikationsart ist nicht die Herausgabe als Buch und „philosophisches Werk“ -, sondern die Mitteilung in der Vorlesung (eigener Manuskripte und deren [?] Nachschriften) für die Ein- und Mitführung in philosophische Forschung. (...) Für die philosophische Interpretation ist das Ergebnis der Jaegerschen Untersuchung in negativer Hinsicht wichtig: daß es nicht angeht, die Abhandlungen gewaltsam auf ein System der Metaphysik oder gar der ganzen Philosophie zu komponieren" (HGA 22, 5-6).

⁸ We quote this letter from: Edler F. H. W.: "Heidegger and Werner Jaeger on the Eve of 1933: A Possible Rapprochement?", *Research in Phenomenology*, 1997, Vol. 27 (1997), 125. This essay is particularly helpful in shedding light on the relationship between Heidegger and not only Jaeger, but also the philologists he influenced or was influenced by (i.e. Kurt Riezler, Karl Reinhardt, Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Julius Stenzel, Walter F. Otto, see 127).

⁹ HGA 18, 5.

¹⁰ HGA 22, 146. It will be shown that Jaeger's approach, although it has grasped the problem, remains insufficient.

¹¹ The major of them concerns of course Jaeger's interpretation of *Metaphysics Theta* 10 in relation to Schwegler and Ross, which can not be deepened here. See for instance: HGA 21, 171-173; HGA 31, 81-84; HGA 83, 654-657. This is why in this last work (1951) Heidegger can say that he has been dealing with the problem for twenty years in his lectures (HGA 81, 609), referring precisely to GA 31. After all those years, he will still see Theta 10 as the "Höhepunkt"/"Gipfel" of both Aristotelian and ancient Greek thought (HGA 31, 82; HGA 81, 656-657).

Little remains, in Jaeger's, Praechter's and Heidegger's account, of the value of this twelfth book of Aristotle's so-called 'theology', which had been regarded by far the most important one of the *Metaphysics* since the third-century CE. By Jaeger, book 12, i.e. book *Lambda*, had been removed from its traditional overarching role in the series of books.

Praechter says:

“Die Arten von Substanzen (sinnlich-vergänglichliche, sinnlich-unvergänglichliche, unsinnliche; letztere fallen unter eine besondere Wissenschaft [die Metaphysik], falls sie mit den sinnlichen von keinem gemeinsamen Prinzip abzuleiten sind)”¹².

He is clearly referring to *Lambda* 1. 1069a36-b2¹³. This gives an opposite, especially iconoclastic result when the traditional interpretation of the *Metaphysics* and of book *Lambda* in particular is concerned.

Heidegger does not enter into the issue, but it is interesting to notice that the spare passages he chooses to comment upon in book *Metaphysics Lambda* are those which are concerned with *movement*, the main theme of physics.

Later on, shortly after the war, Hans-George Gadamer as well, a former pupil of Heidegger, produced a translation *Metaphysics Lambda*, (1948, third rev. ed. 1976). This translation covers the entire book and is pretty well known, unlike Heidegger's bits and pieces of translation, which have hardly been discussed. In spite of differences in approach, Jaeger's reference is crucial to both. A comparison is telling: Gadamer's sounds like both a response to and a follow up of Heidegger's idiomatic way of *Übersetzung*¹⁴.

¹² Überweg-Praechter 1926, 367.

¹³ This is a controversial passage: it paves the way to the argument of chapter 6-7, but, on a different reading, might imply that non-sensible substances belong to *Physics*, and that First Philosophy collapses with *Physics* (although not with *the Physics*, which is a much later collection of books) – and vice-versa, as held in *Met. Epsilon* 1. See for a review of issues at stakes Fazzo, S.: *Commento al libro Lambda della Metafisica di Aristotele*, “Elenchos” LXI-2, (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2014), 226-232.

¹⁴ See Aristoteles, *Metaphysik XII*, Übersetzung und Kommentar von H.-G. Gadamer, Dritte, verbesserte Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976). The first edition of the text dates back to 1948. Gadamer's translation has been translated in its turn: an Italian indirect translation based on Gadamer's circulation among scholars: Aristotele, *Metafisica libro XII. Introduzione e commento di Hans-Georg Gadamer*, (Genova: Il melangolo, 1995). We (S.F.) have seen the book in Enrico Berti's hands more than once at the Padua Aristotle Reading Seminar, because – as Enrico says – of its small size: the facing Greek being given, it offers an easy way to bring along that very crucial book of the *Metaphysics*.

Heidegger's and Gadamer's approaches thus show their differences, and crucial similarities. Both scholars are very careful and focused on Aristotle's text. Yet, if one were to regard either work as philological, it is clear that philology means something different in the two cases.

Gadamer's is as close and literal as one can be, above the average tendency of current Aristotle translations. He is both sharp-sighted on the context of meaning and faithful to the textual structure.

Heidegger's *Übersetzungen*, by contrast, rarely meets standard expectations about what a 'translation' is supposed to be. Precisely for this reason, they call for close scrutiny, as we are about to see.

Nevertheless, points of contact are strong and relevant. Gadamer's close rendering of the Greek text is as committed as Heidegger's to the deep meaning of entire sentences and arguments.

Gadamer's translation also depends on Jaeger's (1912)¹⁵ as if it were an obvious and fundamental reference work in 1948 as it was for Heidegger in 1922.

We know that Gadamer took a different path than Heidegger's when he moved to study philology. At that time, philology was becoming more and more relevant for Heidegger as well, not so much in itself, but as a part of the relationship between philology and philosophy.

But what does *Philologie* mean in Heidegger? This is a very broad question which can be addressed here only tentatively and partially. Our sake is elucidating Heidegger's understanding of *Übersetzung* from Greek texts, a technique whose implication for 'philology' is particularly tight.

In Heidegger's view, no doubt, mastery of (Greek) language is necessary (*Sprachbeherrschung*). This must be what the very word and concept of philology is primarily referring to when *Philologische Sprachbeherrschung* is

¹⁵ Gadamer quotes the 1912 and 1923 works of Jaeger as "Die grundlegenden Arbeiten von Wernern Jaeger" (see Gadamer H.-G.: *Einleitung* to Aristoteles, *Metaphysik XII*, 8). In the third edition he also mentions the 1966 classic of Düring.

prescribed. But philology couples with hermeneutics as the very path for authentic understanding, which uses an interpretative method [HGA 62, 4-7].

His very understanding of the term ‘translation’ shows that there was no time when Heidegger’s approach to Greek sources was not entirely focused on the ‘philological’ reading, that is, on his own hermeneutics. One could even discuss whether or not Heidegger’s *Übersetzungen* could be called ‘translations’ since the German word is both broader and stronger and is no way confined to words as sums of alphabetic letters.

We come now to our starting point, hoping we have achieved a further view-point on a current aporia. As mentioned above, scholars interested in Lambda’s fortune can be perplexed: by the fact that Heidegger seems to pay no special attention to one of the most important books in the history of philosophy, that was traditionally regarded as the top of the *Metaphysics*. What is worse, he seemingly “translates” some few sentences of it in a way that does not at all meet standard expectations.

Indeed, Heidegger’s approach to Lambda offers a good example and an interesting case study: we see here in what way Jaeger’s evaluation of the *Metaphysics* is so influential to Heidegger deconstructing attitude.

In Jaeger’s view, Book *Lambda* especially is dramatically out of order: it is not one of the latest, nor the most important (as in Alexander of Aphrodisias and, under his influence, in Averroes’s *Commentarium Magnum*). In Jaeger’s view, Lambda is still composed by Aristotle in the context of Plato’s Academy. Therefore, Lambda should be an early book of reduced relevance in Aristotle’s system, earlier in composition than the earliest (other) books of the *Metaphysics*.

This contributes to our understanding of Heidegger’s apparently dismissive attitude toward this book and to his extreme freedom in processing the series of bits and pieces from the Greek text during his 1922 classes.

The context is relevant as well. Heidegger looks at Lambda with the particular aim of grasping some information about the subject treated by him in

those 1922 classes: ‘God’ according to Aristotle. As a result, Jaeger’s thesis tells us that Heidegger was not looking for Aristotle’s God in Lambda, but in *Metaphysics* Alpha, which explains that the discussion of Lambda passages does not belong to a class on Lambda but to a class on Alpha, chapter 2 (as the running title of Heidegger’s GA edition correctly shows).

Heidegger’s starting point is a passage in *Alpha* 2 (983a5-10): an argument by *endoxon* by which Aristotle summarizes the current views about God among Greeks, including Plato’s. In this sense, the passage does not properly say anything about Aristotle’s view. The Book Alpha, in its view, is introductory and protreptic. Wisdom is characterized by several viewpoints.

In this context, the highest wisdom is ‘divine’. ‘Divine’ – which means “of God” – and has two meanings, corresponding to the subject’s genitive and the object’s genitive: science belonging to God and science about God. Seeking wisdom is divine in both senses. This analysis by Aristotle in *Alpha* 2 is thus, somehow similar to an etymological explanation of the very word ‘divine’. This is the context in which Heidegger looks at Lambda, as if this were the standard place to look in order to find Aristotle’s conception of God. The use of a few sentences of Book Lambda is ancillary to the understanding of Book Alpha. Surprising as this can be, such a use of Lambda makes sense in light of Jaeger’s 1912 theory about the genesis of the *Metaphysics*.

One is struck by the shortness of his selected sections of the book, who’s reading, however, seems to have been inspirational for the attending students. As we can gather by the way notes were taken during the class, see for example the nominal phrase with an exclamation point: " [Met. Λ 9, 1 074 b 34] – θεωρία!”¹⁶.

As for Gadamer, who is also a Jaegerian, since in spite of this he translates the whole of Book Lambda, the obvious difference between his and Heidegger’s translation is integrality as opposed to partiality: Heidegger’s translation covers a few lines only of the entire book. In this sense you may think that Gadamer’s

¹⁶ In his *Nachwort* to Band 62 of the HGA, Günther Neumann reconstructs the chronology and writing of the 1922 course and points out that he was able to consult the notes of Walter Bröcker, Helene Weiß and Franz Josef Brecht (HGA 62, 422).

fills Heidegger's gaps. On the other hand, Gadamer's is so literal that one is tempted to regard it as a response to Heidegger's¹⁷. But Gadamer's translation deserves credit on its own. Its strict literality is rewording in a field where so often one translator relies on the former, and all translations so often seem all alike. Not so in Gadamer¹⁸, and definitely *not* so in Heidegger, as we are about to see. Shall we say that the master and the pupil share a precise common trend, insofar as both are approaching the Greek Aristotle on its own, as a *sola scriptura* without intermediary filters? In fact, things are still more complicated than this. Gadamer translates in the narrow and current meaning of the word 'translation'. Heidegger's translations can be somehow similar, sometimes very different than a translation in the current meaning of this word. He thus does something both similar and different at the same time, as we are about to see starting from some of his numerous relevant assessments, now collected by John Sallis for the sake of our *Kronos* special issue.

See T.1.

Some of these statements look like plain and clear assessments of the subjective value of every given translation, whose very mission is to bring the world of the author into the new world of the translator:

T.1. »Jede Übersetzung ist aber schon Auslegung« [HGA 8, 107].

¹⁷ One is told that "Heidegger's initial distrust of the philosophical talent of his young assistant determined Gadamer's drastic decision to turn to the study of classical philology after completing his doctorate in philosophy in the spring of 1925. Paradoxically, it was precisely Gadamer's excellent results in this field that prompted Heidegger to propose his habilitation in philosophy in 1927". See Gregorio G.: "Lebendigkeit, Selbstbewegung und Erkenntnis. Zu Gadamers Interpretation des Timaios". In: M. Abbate, J. Pfefferkorn, A. Spinelli (Eds.) *Selbstbewegung und Lebendigkeit. Die Seele in Platons Spätwerk*, (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2016), 299 n. 1.

¹⁸ Not so in Gadamer, but, e.g., in 1071b12, a most controversial point among scholars (see Laks, A.: "Metaphysics L 7", in: M. Frede/D. Charles (eds.), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda*. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford 2000, 207–243 vs. Berti, E.: "Unmoved mover(s) as efficient cause(s) in Metaphysics L 6", in: M. Frede/D. Charles (eds.), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda*. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford 2000, 181–206, with Fazzo, *Commento al libro Lambda*, 290-295; on the textual constitution of that sentence see also Ead. *Il libro Lambda della Metafisica di Aristotele*, "Elenchos" LXI-1, Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2012, 267), κινητικὸν is rendered in the most cautious way as "ein Bewegen-Könnendes". This does not only avoid commitment with the nature of the implied kind of causality in κινητικὸν but allows the space for a non causal understanding as well for the same verbal adjective, namely as potentiality to be in movement, and not only to move something else as in most current translations.

However, see T.2. If we look to more involved and engaged discussions about the very value of translating in Heidegger's perspective, we find something crucially different, in the light of which even the previous statement turns in a different direction.

T.2. »Da diese (Übersetzung) schon die eigentliche Auslegung ist, bedarf es nur einer Erläuterung der »Übersetzung« [HGA 9, 245].

Here, Heidegger does not speak about translations as a *genre* nor about translations as a whole. Since he does not do so, T.1's commitment to "Every translation" is in no way a neutral statement, but paves the way to a completely different concern: 'translating', so to speak – we shall see some telling examples very soon – as a way of making philosophy. Were it not so, one could not make sense of the ancillary role of "explanatory remarks" (*Erläuterung*) on "translations".

The special force and meaning of Heidegger's concept of translation is made clear in T.3 where he plainly distinguishes 'translation' in the current sense, a kind of 'displacement' of meaning in a different language, and 'translation' in his sense, a philosophical activity that moves from one context to another – from Greece of the fourth-century BCE to Germany of the twentieth century CE.

T.3. «Die »Übersetzung« ist allerdings keine Übertragung des griechischen Wortes in die eigene Tragkraft unserer Sprache. Sie will nicht das griechische Wort ersetzen, sondern gerade nur in dieses versetzen und als Versetzung in ihm verschwinden» [MGA 9, 245].

For now it must be emphasized that nothing of all this would make sense, were Heidegger's 'translations' mere translations in the current sense. This does not mean that none of them ever looks – *prima facie* at least – like an ordinary translation. But in such cases, too, one has to pay attention to single changes of wording and even to seemingly irrelevant *minutiae*: any of these can be a further

symptom of a work in the progress of appropriation: that is, the ownership of the philosophical activity is being handed to the ‘translator’ (*Versetzer*).

It is precisely at this point that it makes sense to return to what we saw about philology in the 1922 course. Already in this text it was said that “every translation is already a precise interpretation” and that translation “is always relative to the purpose [*Ziel*] of the interpretation” (HGA 62, 6-7). An authentic translation is therefore always philosophical and not just philological. In other words, a non-philosophical translation is simply not a translation, but precisely a violent (*gewaltsam*) assemblage (i.e. Wilamowitz)¹⁹. This allow us to resume Heidegger’s interpretation and usage of Jaeger’s work: the credit of Jaeger’s philology is that it leaves room for the philosophical question to arise (but: he is not the one asking philosophically)²⁰, which is decisive both for the correct approach to the philological problem being tackled and for its eventual resolving understanding²¹.

In what follows, we will not go through all of the bits and pieces but we suggest a few remarks on some of them, so as to justify our final conclusion.

Starting with Heidegger’s first translated sentence²², our T.4. We therefore need to pay attention to a change of wording:

T.4. *Α* 61071 b 6-7: ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν

»Die Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung ist so, daß Bewegungsein nicht selbst entstehen und vergehen kann. Bewegung war nämlich immer.« Bewegung ist ihrem Seinssinne nach so, daß sie immer war. (Eigentlicher Seinssinn von Bewegung: der der ersten kreisenden ständigen Bewegung des ersten Himmels.)

¹⁹ This is fully clear in § 2 of HGA 18, 5, when Heidegger claims that the course he’s starting has a philological purpose.

²⁰ In HGA 22, 145-146, Heidegger critiques Jaeger’s “weil die philosophische Interpretation nur in engen Grenzen bleibt”. It is clear that Jaeger marked a watershed with respect to Wilamowitz, since his philology allows to enter into the “unterirdischen antiken Philosophierens” (Edler 1997, 124 and 139-144); but he still remains not capable of asking ‘ur-philologish’ (see HGA 83, 655), as his misunderstanding of Theta 10 proves.

²¹ See always HGA 22, 146.

²² Quotes from HGA 62, 102-105.

Here Aristotle's 'movement' becomes "Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung". It is quite evident that Heidegger is reading the passage in the light of its central concept of *Bewegtheit*, which in those years represents the core of his ontology of facticity. It is impossible here to go through the entire development of this concept, but it is important to point out that for Heidegger the ontological character of movement is both a practical and theoretical process. We read in the *Sophistes* "So ist jede πρᾶξις, jedes νοεῖν Bewegung" (HGA 19, 18). As we will see later, this aspect is of particular interest because it will allow Heidegger to introduce movement also in the πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον as its constitutive component, arriving at results that are apparently paradoxical but consistent with the "kinetic ontology" he was elaborating in those years²³.

Nevertheless, this move also has some justification in its favor from a strictly Aristotelian perspective. As a matter of fact, it seems that a general concept of *kinesis* is found in the middle of Aristotle's sentence, and only in the course of the argument is one led to consider one special movement, that is the circular, eternal and eternally regular movement of the sphere of the fixed stars. The point was already raised, in this very case, by Aristotle's direct pupils and ancient commentators: Eudemus, and thereafter the school of Aphrodisias, until the debate was recorded by Simplicius in his commentary to the *Physics* 8. We can say that Heidegger as well, when he translates *kinesis* with "*Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung*", clearly sides with a general interpretation of the noun. This being said, is this not a kind of *overinterpretation* of Aristotle's text? If so, this is exactly what Heidegger says when he claims that "Every translation [his translation especially] is interpretation".

T.5. 1071 b 7-9: οὐδὲ χρόνον· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου

»So ist es auch mit der Zeit; es gibt kein Vorher und Nachher, ohne daß die Zeit nicht schon war.«

²³ See Ansen R.: *Bewegtheit. Zur Genesis einer kinetischen Ontologie bei Heidegger* (Cuxhaven: Junghans-Verlag, 1990).

This sentence is a very nice and not-too-literal translation of Aristotle's one. In this case, it is also possible to advance some considerations. As we have seen in the previous passage, the main theoretical problem at this stage of Heidegger's thought is the analysis of the ontological character of movement (*Bewegtheit*) and its centrality for the relationship between *Dasein* and *Umwelt*. The question on time does not yet occupy a privileged place in the *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, which, not by chance, finds its reference text as the most relevant philosophical analysis of movement in the *Physic* and not in the *Metaphysics*. This may help to contextualize Heidegger's linearity in this and also in the following passage.

T.6. 1071 b 9-10: καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχῆς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος· ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος

»Auch ist die Bewegung - ebenso wie die Zeit - sich in sich selbst nach ihrem Seinssinn zusammenhaltend. Demnach ist die Zeit entweder dasselbe wie Bewegung oder ein Wie in der Weise des Seins der Bewegung.«

A relevant change of punctuation occurs in T.6. Aristotle's argument is based on time: it is from the eternity of time that Aristotle argues for the eternity of movement.

Nonetheless, it seems that Heidegger does not wish to make this use of the concept of time. As we have seen, in 1922 he had different projects with this very concept. The dynamic dimension remains here in the spotlight as the main thematic question and this explains Heidegger's conceptual inversion of the Aristotelian schema²⁴.

T.7. 1071 b 10-11: κίνησις δ' οὐκ ἔστι συνεχῆς ἀλλ' ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἢ κύκλῳ

»Sich in sich selbst - nach ihrem Seinssinn - zusammenhaltend ist nur die Bewegung als Fortgang von-zu, und zwar ein solcher Fortgang von-zu in der Weise des <Kreisens>.«

²⁴ Heidegger is clearly keeping in mind books III and IV of *Physics*, consistent with what was said before.

In T.7 *Bewegung* in its ontological sense is once more substituted for ‘movement’.

T.8. 1071 b 12-13: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν

»Aber *Bewegung ist* nicht, wenn es zwar ein Bewegendes und etwas Ausrichtendes gäbe, das aber nicht so wäre, daß es *ist* in der Weise des Bewegtheitseins.«

»Denn was so ist, daß es bewegen, ausrichtend auf etwas zugehen *kann*, braucht ja nicht seinen Seinssinn in der Bewegtheit zu haben.«

No proper translation in the current sense is provided by Heidegger for T.8. A corresponding Aristotelian term for “ausrichtendes” is remarkably missing in the Greek text. We will return to this point shortly, in the considerations of T.11 and T.12.

T.9. 1071 b 14-15: οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ’ ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν αἰδίους, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἶδη

»Es trägt aber auch nichts bei zur *Erhellung* des Notwendig-immer-seins von Bewegung, d. h. überhaupt des Seins von Bewegung, wenn wir die Weisen der Seinshaftigkeit als immer bestehend ansetzen - wie jene, die die <worauf> der bewegten Dinge als so etwas ansetzen.«

Several differences can be noticed in T.9. A telling one is that: Aristotle puts special emphasis in his argument against Plato’s theory of ideas. This part of the argument is obsolete in Heidegger’s case and it makes sense for him to put it aside. We find the further developments are instead apparently his own.

T.10. 1071 b 16-17: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ἰκανή, οὐδ’ ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἶδη

»Aber auch so etwas ist fürwahr nicht genügend [dem Sinn des Seins von Bewegung nicht entsprechendes Woher], noch leistet das eine andere, neben die besagten Worauf gesetzte Weise *solchen* Seins.«

Something similar can be said about T.10. Once more, Aristotle's reference to Plato's ideas is the very conclusion of the argument, and it is introduced by 'therefore' (τοίνυν). In Heidegger, τοίνυν becomes 'auch', because this part of the argument is left aside.

Heidegger, on the contrary, takes care to specify the directionality of the movement that he had already posited in the previous text. This introduction aims to recall the phenomenological lexicon that he is resemantizing in his own hermeneutics of those years. The following two texts, which recall the problems seen above, are examples.

T. 11. 1071 b 17-18: ἔτι οὐδ' εἰ ἐνεργήσῃ, ἢ δ' οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις

»Weiter. - Aber auch wenn das Woraus so wäre, die reine Zeitigung machte aber nicht gerade den Seinssinn der ἀρχή selbst aus, bliebe alles unverständlich.« Es *wäre* nicht – gegenständlich gesprochen -, das Seiende ist nur gehabt und da nach seinem Aussehen (Was es ist), sofern es in seiner echten <sachlich> genügenden Warumbeziehung steht.

T. 12. 1071 b 18-19: οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις αἰδίος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὄν μὴ εἶναι

»Auch so wäre noch keine ewige, ständig seiende und ständig *gleich* seiende Bewegung. Es *kann* das, was nur ist, so, daß es etwas ausrichten kann, in diesem Kann-*sein* auch *nicht* sein.«

For T. 11. And T. 12. Heidegger makes no attempt to produce anything similar to a standard translation. Perhaps, Heidegger was inspired by the verb ἐνδέχεται which plays a role in Aristotle's practical philosophy as well, where it indicates the kind of events in which human choice can play a role. This could explain the occurrence in Heidegger of the already seen concept of "ausrichtendes", which could appear remarkably extraneous to Aristotle's context but has nevertheless a coherence with the passage. This word indicates not only a dynamic aspect, but also the productive process that characterizes the

ἀρχή: without this activity, it would not be possible to have a *Seiende*, since this would have no cause²⁵.

Moreover, Heidegger speaks in T.13 of “reine Zeitigung”. This, too, is a technical term in the Heideggerian lexicon, on which Ian A. Moore has spent some timely remarks in his contribution to this issue. In particular, Moore rightly emphasized its relation to the question of time and the act. Given the breadth and technicity of the problem, we merely add here, in connection with what is now being said, that the question of temporality raised here is to be traced back to that of movement (always following *Physics*) and its relationship with the act: behind the question of *Zeitigung* we must always keep in mind the fundamental question of movement²⁶.

This is quite interesting for us, because it appears clear once more that also what is a pure act knows some kind of inner movement for Heidegger. This intuition finds its proof in the following texts:

T. 13. 1071 b 19-20: δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια

»Also muß es mit dem Sein der ewigen Bewegung für diese einen solchen Ausgang geben, dessen Seinshaftigkeit, Sinn des Seins, reine Zeitigung ist, ἐνέργεια.«

T. 14. »Die sich aus der letzten sinnmäßigen Aufklärung des Seins von Bewegung ergebende Bestimmung des Seinssinnes des ersten Bewegers als reine ἐνέργεια und der Bewegtheit desselben als θεωρία.«

I (S.F.) wish to reserve a final word for these two passages. The idea of pure ἐνέργεια is of Neo-Platonist origin²⁷. As Hegel could read in Brandis 1823 and Bekker 1831, the Greek text has the first unmoved as unceasingly

²⁵ I (J.M.) would like to mention that, precisely during the comparison seminar organized by Andrzej Serafin (University of Krakow) on these passages (30/10/2021), together with Ian A. Moore (Loyola Marymount University) we noted the difficulty of translating the term ‘ausrichtendes’ — which clearly exhibits a phenomenological derivation — at least in this specific context.

²⁶ “Sein heißt Temporalität (Bewegtheit), und: Seiendes *ist in Bewegung*. *In-Bewegung-Sein* ist selbst *ein bestimmtes Sein* und muß daher aus Bewegtheit (transzendentaler Bewegtheit) verstanden werden” and “Transzendente Bewegtheit — Zeitlichkeit” (HGA 83, 19). Moreover, the act itself understood according to this transcendentality can be seen as ‘κίνησις’ (see *ivi*, 20).

²⁷ It is interesting to note that shortly before (summer semester of 1921) Heidegger had given a seminar entitled *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus* (see HGA 60).

acting. After Hegel, a vulgate was introduced that makes the first unmoved mover, that is, Aristotle's God, a *pure act*. This implies that no subscript iota was no longer added to some crucial occurrences of the word ἐνέργεια (including *De anima* III.5, based on *Lambda*)²⁸. In this regard, therefore, Heidegger's interpretation is partly removed from the Greek wording, but this is the cause not only by his intellectual choice, which also plays a strong role, but also by the printed edition of the Greek text. Without such a text, it was more difficult for him to keep commenting upon that very passage as follows:

»Es ist wichtig zu verstehen, wie Aristoteles den Sinn von ἐνέργεια bestimmt, wie aus dem reinen Bewegungsproblem nicht nur das notwendige Dasein des ersten Bewegers erwächst, sondern auch die inhaltliche Bestimmung der Bewegtheit desselben als νόησις νοήσεως [Met. Λ 9, 1 074 b 34] - θεωρία!«

Nevertheless, as we have anticipated, this theoretical outcome finds its own coherence within Heideggerian philosophy. Pure νόησις is also a form of *Bewegtheit*. As we read in the Natorp-Bericht "Der höchsten Idee reiner Bewegtheit genügt nur die νόησις als reines θεωρεῖν» [HGA 9, 386]. In opposition to the *Bewegtheit* that characterizes the *faktisches Leben*, which is always "ἐνέργεια ἀτελής"²⁹ and therefore never fulfilled, this is "reine ἐνέργεια" : it therefore knows a ἐντελέχεια and differs ontologically from *Dasein* because it doesn't know a πρᾶξις. But the theoretical outcome proposed by Heidegger remains surprising and ingenious: the πρῶτον κινουὺν ἀκίνητον would not be properly immobile; on the contrary, it shows "the highest idea of pure movement", a paradigmatic one³⁰.

On the whole, if we look to Heidegger's methodological principles when talking about 'translation' we find that his behavior is remarkably coherent,

²⁸ Fazzo, S.: "Unmoved Mover as Pure Act or Unmoved Mover in Act? The Mystery of a Subscript Iota", in: Horn, H. (ed.): *Metaphysics Lambda - New Essays*, (Boston/Berlin: De Gruyter 2016), 181-205; see in part. 190-194 on *De anima* III.5 as a parallel case study.

²⁹ "Die Bewegtheit der Bewegung is ἐνέργεια ἀτελής — das Im-Werk-Stehen, das noch nicht in sein Ende gehommen" (HGA 9, 291). See also HGA 83, 7-8.

³⁰ While writing this account, I (J.M.) had to publish another text in which the same thesis appears, albeit in relation to a different problem.

rich, inspirational. We believe that misunderstanding Heidegger's attitude occurs because his own principles, which he makes clear with extreme lucidity, are less well known than they should be when such an influential thinker is concerned.
